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In the matter of:

Docket No. 2000-9

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral Recording

CARP DTRA 1 & 2

CARP Hearing Room
LM-414
Library of Congress
Madison Building
101 Independence Ave, SE
Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, October 17, 2001

The above-entitled matter came on for rebuttal hearing, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m.

BEFORE

THE HONORABLE ERIC E. VAN LOON Chairman
THE HONORABLE JEFFREY S. GULIN Arbitrator
THE HONORABLE CURTIS E. von KANN Arbitrator

NEAL R. GROSS

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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

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WITNESS	DIRECT	<u>CROSS</u>	REDIRECT	RECROSS
Michael Fine By Mr. Jacoby By Mr. Newberg	11458	11498		
William Fisher By Mr. Rich	11598		11715	
By Mr. Garrett	11370	11638		
EXHIBIT DESCRIPTI	<u>ION</u>		<u>MA</u>	RK RECD
Fine Rebuttal				
3A, 3B, 4A, 4B			114	56 11498
RIAA				
107 RPX Garth Bro	ooks Chart	t	115	24
108 RPX Garth Bro	ooks Chart	t	115:	24
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(9:11 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, good morning
4	everyone. And, again, the Panel apologizes. We
5	appreciate your being here on time and do our best.
6	The Capitol Police interceded this morning, and we're
7	going to try to be on better relations with the law
8	enforcement officials in the future and be able to be
9	here on time.
10	MR. JACOBY: Is there anything you want to
11	share with us on why that happened?
12	(Laughter.)
13	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: No, not necessary.
14	MR. JACOBY: Okay.
15	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Any administrative or
16	procedural things before we hear from our first
17	witness? Mr. Garrett?
18	MR. GARRETT: Just a question, Mr.
19	Chairman. Yesterday during his testimony Mr.
20	Mandelbrot made a number of statements about the
21	reasons why RIAA entered into the agreement with Yahoo
22	as well as RIAA his reasons for believing that RIAA

had certain motivations for particular provisions in 1 2 the agreements. And my question simply is whether our 3 witnesses will have an opportunity or whether they 4 5 will be permitted to respond to some of the things that Mr. Mandelbrot said. 6 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: I suppose there's two 7 ways at looking at it. One is that we, the Panel, 8 specifically invited these people -- the licensees --9 to get an idea of what was in their thoughts and their 10 minds having heard extensively from Mr. Marks for over 11 a week about what was in his mind. 12 13 And I suppose one way of looking at it is that this is an interesting picture and we -- you 14 know, he may or may not have been right in his 15 16 surmises of what he thought the negotiators on the 17 other side of the table were thinking. And I suppose 18 the other way of looking at it is to provide an opportunity for specific rebuttal of that. 1.9 2.0 Does the Panel have --ARBITRATOR GULIN: Yes. I quess I'd want 21 to ask the webcasters this: Mr. Mandelbrot was only 22

1	the second of the licensees to testify. There are
2	going to be others, and some of those are going to say
3	some things that you'd like to rebut. So have there
4	been discussions between the two sides on this issue,
5	whether you want to allow your witnesses to be able to
6	comment on things that have been said by licensee
7	witnesses?
8	MR. GARRETT: There have not been any
9	discussions, Judge Gulin.
10	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Why don't we hear from
11	the webcasters' side?
12	MR. STEINTHAL: I think I alluded to this
13	last week, that when we were talking about Mr.
14	Marks' testimony and the duration of it. And that I
15	had a feeling we were going to get to an issue about,
16	you know, the duration, for example, of Mr. Marks'
17	testimony, and that if we were going to start
18	rebutting all of the licensee testimony then it could
19	be a lot longer than anticipated.
20	Personally, I would rather not let, you
21	know, the genie out of the bottle, in the sense that
22	once we get into that area it could lead to extensive

1	examination. I wouldn't characterize Mr. Mandelbrot's
2	testimony as his testifying about the RIAA's
3	motivations as opposed to what was articulated to him
4	during the course of the negotiations about the RIAA's
5	motivations.
6	In other words, he wasn't speculating as
7	much as he was testifying based on meetings he was at
8	and information he gleaned from those meetings.
9	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Either way we'd like
10	to
11	MR. STEINTHAL: Right.
12	ARBITRATOR GULIN: whatever he said.
13	MR. STEINTHAL: I would prefer that we not
14	get into an area where we start rebutting all of the
15	licensees through witnesses that have previously
16	testified. Among other things, we have a situation
17	where Mr. Marks is on their witness list. And,
18	therefore, he's they have the advantage, if you
19	open the door, to having a witness that's already on
20	the list rebut.
21	Now, what if something comes up, entirely
22	likely or possible, where I don't have somebody to

rebut without adding somebody to the witness list. 1 2 Then, I'm prejudiced. So it's not as simple as once you say, "Okay. Let the RIAA rebut. 3 webcasters rebut." If I don't have somebody on the 4 5 witness list to do it, I can't do it. MR. JACOBY: Can I make a suggestion along 6 this line of a way to approach this? It would seem to 7 8 me --9 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Suggestions are always welcome. 10 MR. JACOBY: It would seem to me on -- I 11 can't think of a matter that Mr. Mandelbrot didn't 12 13 testify -- that he testified about that wasn't the subject of testimony from Mr. Marks' perspective. He 14 was on the direct case. He testified about each of 15 the negotiations. 16 17 And unless there is something that's 18 raised that couldn't anticipated, be wasn't anticipated, or is outside of the scope of his prior 19 20 testimony, then it seems to me the rule should be that 21 there should not be opening the door. 22 It should only be a situation where

there's some -- something new that's come up that could not have fairly been anticipated or was not covered in their testimony earlier, where an application would be made to the Panel and the Panel could decide that on a case-by-case basis.

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Mr. Garrett, do you have any further thoughts on that?

MR. GARRETT: Yes, a couple. First of all, as to Mr. Steinthal's being prejudiced by not having a witness, since all of this testimony concerns negotiations between RIAA and the licensees, it's not clear to me what witness Mr. Steinthal would have in any event. However, I'm certainly prepared to do that, you know, to consider letting him bring somebody in on a, you know, case-by-case basis, if there really is someone that he has that would be responsive.

Beyond that, you know, I think from the beginning of this proceeding the Panel has made clear that they had a strong interest in hearing the testimony about the Yahoo agreement. The other side has certainly made a significant issue about Yahoo in our dealings with Yahoo.

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And I think given the importance that has been attached or seemingly attached by the Panel and by the other parties to this proceeding to Yahoo's testimony, in all fairness, we should have the opportunity to respond to things that we think that the Panel might conceivably otherwise rely upon in their decision here.

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T'm envisioning lengthy not very testimony, and I'm not sure I would confine it just to But the point is is that it is Mr. Marks either. important testimony. Yahoo is our licensee. also are not a disinterested party in the sense that the outcome of this proceeding will have an impact on They're here. them. They were here yesterday represented by DiMA's counsel.

I think that it's important for us to have the opportunity to respond to at least those things that were said by Mr. Mandelbrot concerning RIAA's motivations.

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Mr. Garrett, just a couple of thoughts from one Panelist. We are reaching the point in a trial-like proceeding where everybody

is nervous about who is going to have the last word.

This always happens in long trials. Everybody always likes to do it. I'm sure they'll have some issues of that sort, you'll have some issues, and at some point the curtain does have to come down.

Number two, I did not, frankly, think there was anything in Mr. Mandelbrot's testimony which was startlingly at odds with Mr. Marks' testimony, other than the perceptions of two people on opposite sides of the negotiating table. I mean, it's quite common, frankly, for people to get somewhat different perceptions about what the other side's motivations are.

So from my point of view, there was -- I haven't gone back to study it in great detail, but there was nothing about that I found dramatically at odds with Mr. Marks' account of it. It is an important licensee. I think we all recognize.

Perhaps we could have a special Yahoo rule that if there was something very, very striking in that one licensee that you felt it was critical to rebut, you could make a proffer to us or something,

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and we could consider it.

But I would be a little nervous about opening this up with all of the licensees that we're going to have. And, frankly, I also think it's -- from your point of view, I think you may be overnervous about it. I don't think that there was, from my point of view, anything about his account that in any significant way requires massive rebuttal from Marks, other than his perception of it from one side of the table and Marks' from another.

Frankly, I think their testimony can be harmonized fairly well, actually. But if there's something specific, I guess if you wanted to make a proffer to us, perhaps we could consider it under the special Yahoo rule. But I would certainly not want to start seeing us do this with every single licensee, because we'll -- we will, then, be prolonging this rebuttal forever.

But maybe there is something very specific in that that you feel is critical to -- and I guess we could consider it on a case;-by-case basis or something.

MR. STEINTHAL: I just had a -- just a couple of thoughts. One is Mr. Garrett referred to us making a big deal about Yahoo, about, you know, from the beginning as if they're not a disinterested interest witness and they're "on our side" almost.

I want to remind the Panel that when I got

I want to remind the Panel that when I got up in my opening we had not even been given the right to talk to Yahoo. We had no idea what Yahoo had to say or what its motivations, positions were at all. There had been effectively a gag order on Yahoo.

So the notion that there is some relationship between the webcaster community and Yahoo, relative to Yahoo's testimony, in a circumstance where we had no opportunity to even speak to them by the time this proceeding started, is a startling suggestion.

And as far as Mr. Greenstein being DiMA's counsel, he has acted on behalf of DiMA very independently of his relationships with many other clients, both on the record community side and the webcaster side. So the notion that because Mr. Greenstein, among his clients, has done legislative

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work for DiMA, there is some, you know, suggestion of 1 affiliation there is, again, something that isn't even 2 3 part of the record. But since Mr. Garrett decided to mention 4 5 it, I think it's important to say that Mr. Greenstein and his firm represent record companies. 6 7 represent DiMA. And they represent Yahoo. So there should be no suggestion associated with that. 8 9 I am concerned about the time associated 10 with opening the door to have Mr. Marks respond to all of the licensees. And, you know, I quess the Panel 11 will reach a resolution of this issue as it chooses, 12 13 but I hope we will not be prejudiced by the fact that 14 they've got an opportunity for a ready witness while 15 we don't. 16 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: I think we will --17 what I would propose is that we take this under advisement, that we talk about it during the break and 18 get back with our thoughts thereafter. 19 2.0 ARBITRATOR GULIN: Let me ask this one The parties were permitted, under the 21 question. 22 procedure we agreed to, to designate I think it was

1	six witnesses each that would be able to comment on I
2	guess it was opposing witnesses' testimony on
3	rebuttal. And there was really, as I recall, not any
4	discussion as to whether that would include the
5	licensee witnesses.
6	Was Mr. Marks designated as one who would
7	be commenting on opposing witnesses?
8	MR. GARRETT: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
9	ARBITRATOR GULIN: And, of course, you had
10	to indicate on what he would be commenting on. But I
11	guess it's conceivable that you could have indicated
12	that he would be commenting on the licensees'
13	perceptions of negotiations, though we really didn't
14	discuss that you'd have the ability to do that.
15	But it's just another I guess something
16	else to consider when that goes into the mix of
17	this. Did you have something else you wanted to
18	MR. GARRETT: Well, just I mean,
19	obviously, Your Honor, we didn't know what the
20	witnesses were going to say.
21	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Right.
22	MR. GARRETT: And couldn't say we're going

1 to comment on any of them --

ARBITRATOR GULIN: Right.

MR. GARRETT: -- at that point. I have no problem in confining this at least to Yahoo. Maybe that's just because there has only been two who have testified, but -- or confine it to Yahoo.

There's also one other issue here, too, which is is that Mr. Greenstein had suggested yesterday that -- well, he had asked that the testimony, a large portion of it, be heard in closed session. And, you know, many of the things that were said about RIAA's motivations, the things that were said in closed session, and so technically they are things that we can't share with the client at this point and even get their reaction to some of the things that were said.

And I'd certainly like the ability to provide to the client those portions of the transcript, including the closed sessions, where there was testimony about matters that --- don't want to give them the testimony about Yahoo's motivations of their negotiating strategy, but only about those things

concerning RIAA's motivations.

You know, it's possible, but once they see that, you know, there's nothing that -- you know, very elaborate that anybody would want to present here. But, you know, I think in fairness they should have an opportunity to look at that testimony, and I think we should have the opportunity to at least request that specific testimony be offered in response if we thought it was necessary.

MR. STEINTHAL: I think there's an easy procedure for that, which is that to the extent there are passages of the transcript that relate to Mr. Mandelbrot's testimony about what the RIAA said to him, because we were in a situation where there was -- because there was the risk of restricted information, we were probably in a restricted transcript more than we needed to be on an entire -- well, looked at in retrospect, on an entire basis.

I'm sure that Mr. Greenstein, if presented with a request to treat as confidential rather than restricted certain passages that relate to Mr. Mandelbrot's testimony about what RIAA said to him,

I'm sure he would have no objection to that being 1 2 treated as confidential rather than restricted. I think it's just a question of RIAA 3 identifying those passages of the transcript and 4 5 making a request to Yahoo. I think that those are the 6 ground rules that were agreed upon at the outset of 7 his testimony. Well, I am at least 8 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: 9 genuinely up in the air on this, and I think that the best thing is for the Panel to discuss it during a 10 11 I think it raises lots of delicate questions, 12 including that the Panel is acutely aware that we 13 invited these people and gave them assurances of 14 confidentiality. 15 learned yesterday there Wе is possibly another negotiation upcoming very soon, and 16 17 sometimes hard information about what the other side thinks you think can be a factor in the negotiation. 18 So it's a very complicated matter. 19 20 MR. GARRETT: One thing I could offer, Mr. is that we're certainly prepared to go 21

through the transcript and make our cuts as to what we

think could be declassified, and then to show it to 1 2 Mr. Greenstein and see whether we can get agreement on that. 3 And, you know, we're certainly prepared to 4 undertake the work in the first instance here. 5 again, we would want to get a response back from him, 6 so that we would have -- we'd be in a position to make 7 8 a timely request for any kind of response and 9 testimony. CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Okay. Suggestions are 10 11 welcome. We'll take that under advisement, then, and we're -- should at this time invite -- oops, there may 12 13 be --14 MR. STEINTHAL: One more procedural issue. 15 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: -- it looks like one 16 more procedural matter. 17 MR. STEINTHAL: Late-breaking scheduling issues. We are going to have to move the testimony of 18 Ms. Morissette for just basically -- have her just, 19 20 you know, come in on direct as the -- on the written initially discussed, unless we can 21 statement as schedule her for next week. 22

1	Mr. Fagin is still on board for Friday.
2	But I did receive word last night that Ms. Morissette
3	will not be able to be here Friday morning, which
4	should make our Friday a little bit easier. That's
5	the good news.
6	And I will get back to the other side and
7	the Panel about availability for next week or whether,
8	in the scheme of things, it's so tight we should just
9	go forward on the direct, you know, written statement.
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: But Mr. Fagin will be
11	able to be here on Friday as planned.
12	MR. STEINTHAL: I'm advised that's still
13	the case.
14	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And so that would also
14 15	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And so that would also suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on
15	suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on
15 16	suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on Friday.
15 16 17	suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on Friday. MR. STEINTHAL: Right. And
15 16 17	suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on Friday. MR. STEINTHAL: Right. And MR. JACOBY: Was the Panel made aware of
15 16 17 18	suggest more time for Mr. Jaffe, Professor Jaffe, on Friday. MR. STEINTHAL: Right. And MR. JACOBY: Was the Panel made aware of the fact also that RIAA had offered to move Dr.

1	prepared to go forward with that.
2	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: So it's definite on
3	Thursday?
4	MR. GARRETT: Yes.
5	MR. JACOBY: Do we have actually the
6	schedule worked out in terms of who is
7	MR. GARRETT: I think he was in the
8	afternoon.
9	MR. JACOBY: Afternoon?
10	MR. GARRETT: Yes. I think he's the last
11	witness on that day.
12	MR. JACOBY: Okay.
13	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: That leaves four for
14	Thursday if I counted Mazis, Williams, Kessler, and
15	Seltzer? And possibly carryover of Fisher, if we
16	don't finish him today. A busy day.
17	MR. JACOBY: Possibly, but hopefully not.
18	And I would anticipate Kessler and Williams to be
19	relatively short.
20	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, let's leap into
21	the first witness, then.
22	MR. JACOBY: Okay. Mr. Fine.

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. 1 MR. JACOBY: For the Panel's benefit in 2 advance of his testimony, Mr. Fine will, of course, be 3 addressing his rebuttal testimony as filed in written 4 5 form. As indicated in the notices we gave last 6 Friday, he will also be commenting upon portions of 7 Dr. Seltzer's testimony, as well as Dr. Schink's testimony, so you might want to have -- the Panel 8 9 might want to have the testimony available now. 10 And, lastly, I don't think these have been distributed to the Panel. 11 There were four pages, 12 which we've marked as Fine Rebuttal Exhibits 3A and 3B 13 and 4A and 4B, which were likewise provided to counsel 14 last Friday. We haven't provided one to the Copyright 15 I guess we should for the public file as 16 Do you have a copy? 17 (Whereupon, the above-referred 18 to documents were marked as 19 Fine Rebuttal Exhibits Nos. 3A, 20 3B, 4A, and identification.) 21

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CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. We can make --

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for

1	these are exhibits?
2	MR. JACOBY: These are exhibits to his
3	testimony, because I mean, we'll offer them
4	formally, but that's what they're intended to be
5	exhibits.
6	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: They will be offered
7	during the course of the testimony.
8	MR. JACOBY: Yes.
9	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes, okay.
10	MR. JACOBY: But I just wanted you to have
11	it in advance.
12	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: By the way, with
13	regard to the scheduling changes, if it were possible
14	to produce just an update of this tomorrow on all of
15	these changes to be a handy reminder to the Panel,
16	that would be appreciated.
17	Well, welcome back, Mr. Fine. Good to see
18	you again. Let me ask you, once again, to raise your
19	right hand, please, and be sworn.
20	WHEREUPON,
21	MICHAEL FINE
22	was called as a witness and, having been first duly

1	sworn, assumed the witness stand, was examined and
2	testified as follows:
3	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: The floor is yours,
4	Mr. Jacoby.
5	DIRECT EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. JACOBY:
7	Q Good morning, Mr. Fine.
8	A Good morning.
9	Q Would you describe to the Arbitration
10	Panel the issue that you were asked to look at for
11	purposes of your rebuttal testimony in this
12	proceeding?
13	A Yes. I was asked to look at the issue of
14	the importance of the musical work versus the
15	importance of the artist, and how each is a driver of
16	sales.
17	Q And what did you do in order to make an
18	analysis of that question?
19	A Well, what I did was I looked at two
20	different ways of analyzing how a work how the work
21	itself contributes to the success of album sales. If,
22	in fact, you were to take the supposition that the

musical work was not important, and that, really, the most important factor was the artist, then you would expect to see the sales pattern of a particular artist to sort of follow -- not a better term -- sort of a curve, a bell curve.

You'd expect that when an artist is new and unknown their sales would be low or lower than -- you know, at the beginning. Sales would increase over a period of time as they became more popular. Then, once they reached popularity, sales would be maintained for a level. And then, as their popularity waned, their sales would decrease.

So you would expect a rise, a pretty consistent level for a while, and then a gradual or hopefully a gradual decline. And that's what you would expect if, in fact, the artist was strictly the driver of success.

If the musical works itself or the songs play a factor, then you would expect more up and down sales. Artists would have albums with -- which the public considered to be songs that they like better. So you might have a successful album. Then you might

have an album that was a little less successful. Then

it may bounce back again because the next album may

have songs that are better, etcetera.

And so I felt one way of looking at this

situation was to look at artists and see what their

patterns of sales have been since the inception of

Now, you would expect that if you did this, and you chose the most popular of artists, that this would be the area where the popularity would probably drive artists even more than the quality of the song.

Q Drive the sales.

A Drive the sales even more than the quality of the song. So using the top artist, you would expect it to even be more difficult to show that the song was important, because you're so popular, and if that is the driver, then the songs would have less impact. Whereas, if you were a less popular artist, you would expect it would be easier to have the songs having an effect.

So what I did was at first I took the top

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Soundscan.

20 artists in what we call "the Soundscan era," since 1991 -- we have a chart in Soundscan that lists every artist by how many albums they've sold. I started with the most -- with the highest artist on the list, went down to the first 20 artists that had at least five releases in the 1900 -- in the 1990s, up to the year 2000.

Obviously, if they only had one release, you really can't tell a trend. So we decided five would at least give us enough to be able to look at sales. And we looked at and produced charts for each of the -- of these 20. Actually, to get through the top 20, we had to actually go through to our number 33 artist.

So out of the top 33 artists in the 1990s, including the year 2000, 20 of them -- of the top 33 had five releases during that period.

And we looked at the sales over time of each artist's album that was released during that period and what their sales had been. And we produced a chart for each one. If you'd like, we could just turn to the first chart and get an idea of what it

1	looks like. I don't think we need to go through each
2	chart. So
3	Q Okay. And that would be found as Fine
4	Rebuttal Exhibit 1, which is found at Tab 13 in the
5	exhibit binders.
6	A And the first one is Garth Brooks.
7	Q These are in rank order, so Garth Brooks
8	was the top seller for the 1990s?
9	A Yes. The 20 artists are put in the order
10	that they appeared on the as best sellers. And
11	just looking at Garth Brooks, you can see that his
12	first album, which was actually came out during
13	1991, had sales of a little bit over \$9 million.
14	And as you look through, up to the year
15	2000, I guess even 2001, each of the albums that were
16	released, what their total sales have been to date.
17	And so as you go across you see the years and you see
18	the titles of the albums.
19	And we've done this for all 20, and I
20	don't think we need to go through. It's a fairly
21	self-explanatory pictorial of what their sales have
22	been.

We looked at each of the 20, and, in fact, there were a few where the sales do look like they rise and then they fall. There were three in specific that looked like that -- Metallica, Kenny G, and Michael Bolton. The rest of the artists have various different patterns that would indicate that, in fact, the songs are playing an important part in the success -- and we measure success by the number of units sold.

Some cases, people who were -- at the beginning of the period sort of had low sales suddenly have good albums. So it's sort of like a revival situation. And you have cases of that nature.

You have cases of a nature where you have a very successful album, then you have a less successful album, then you have, you know, a couple of less successful, then a successful, then a less, and it goes up and down.

And I would suggest that -- and it's fairly, I mean, accepted in the industry that these changes in the success of albums -- all of these albums -- in some ways, many of them may be successful. You may sell nine million units of an

album, and that would be very successful. The next time you may sell two million units.

Now, two million is a successful album. But, in fact, if it was strictly the artist that was driving the sales, you wouldn't expect to go from nine million or two million to four million to three million to five million. All of those could be successful albums, but you would not expect to see ups and downs.

And, really, the explanation or the reason that you have the ups and downs, by and large, are caused by the fact that albums contain usually two or three songs that consumers really like or -- and, therefore, because they really like them, they're more apt to buy them.

And I think this indicates the importance of the musical work itself in relation to the artist. Now, nothing that I'm trying to say says that the artist is not important. But what I really think, they're probably pretty close to equally important.

On a very, very popular artist, maybe it's 60/40 or something like that. As you go down the

range a little bit, the music becomes more important. Certainly, as you first start out, the music probably is a little more important. As you become more popularity -- more popular, your popularity can drag you along.

But if you think of it as a two-pronged situation, you have an artist and you have the musical work, and you can say the artist is popular or unpopular and their musical work is good or bad. I think if you have a very popular artist with very good music, you get a super hit. If you have a very unpopular artist with very poor music, you get a very big failure.

But I don't think, even if you have a popular artist, if you have poor music, you're going to get a very successful album. And so I think it's really the need for the combination of both that's really important. And while it's hard to quantify, my guess would be or my opinion is that the quality of the work is certainly as important as the performer who is performing the work.

The second way to look at this is to look

1	at a situation where you may have an artist who has a
2	very successful album, and sometimes people talk about
3	this using the term "one-hit wonders." It
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Before you go to one-
5	hit wonders, I was curious, in terms of successful
6	albums, one I noticed was not on here under Eric
7	Clapton, is this year's Riding With the King, and
8	THE WITNESS: It's probably.
9	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Reptiles here for
10	this year.
11	THE WITNESS: I'm not I think the scale
12	went to 2001, but I think we stopped at 2000 as far as
13	reporting sales. There may have been some, but I
14	would not look at 2001 as being significant, because,
15	obviously, it's so fresh and out so recently that you
16	don't you don't know what the sales are going to
17	be. It's really too short a period.
18	So I would not look at anything from 2001
19	to say this is good or bad or
20	MR. JACOBY: What is the album that you
21	are referring to?
22	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: It's called Riding

1	With the King.
2	MR. JACOBY: A 2001
3	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes.
4	MR. JACOBY: release?
5	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. It appeared on
6	many of the other exhibits that we received in the
7	direct. It's
8	MR. JACOBY: Do you know the date of the
9	release? Do you remember when that was?
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: No. And it occurred
11	to me maybe it's because it's B.B. King along with
12	Clapton.
13	MR. JACOBY: Oh, okay. That was the other
14	issue, which actually we'll come to later in his
15	testimony, talking about the collaborative album with
16	B.B. King, right.
17	THE WITNESS: We don't have collaborative
18	albums here or soundtracks.
19	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: I see.
20	THE WITNESS: Okay.
21	MR. JACOBY: We will come to that
22	particular album in

THE WITNESS: And one other point. 1 other thing, often, is that when you look at the 2 history of artists, their greatest hit albums tend to 3 do very well. In some cases, their albums may not be 4 5 doing well. Suddenly, you have their greatest hits, it sells very well, and then the next album will not 6 sell as well. 7 8 I think this is another indication of the importance of the content, because, obviously, if it 9 10 was just the artist then you would expect all albums to do reasonably same. But if you put what obviously 11 12 the record companies consider to be the greatest hits, or the best songs, and those suddenly do sell better, 13 14 then it's obviously being driven by the content of the album, certainly, in those situations. 15 16 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. And I stand 17 informed by my colleague here that the double asterisks on the -- at the bottom of your exhibit 18 actually refers to that album. 19 So I --2.0 THE WITNESS: Yes. There's a thing in Seltzer's analysis of -- which we'll get to. 21 22 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Okay.

THE WITNESS: As I was saying about one-hit wonders, or so-called one-hit wonders, you would expect that, you know, if, in fact, the popularity of the artist was the driving factor that this phenomenon would really not exist. Certainly, a record company, once they have a successful album, spend a considerable amount of money promoting the next album because they're hoping that they do have the artist.

They generally put out an album reasonably

-- within a year or two of the success of the first
album to try to capitalize on the artist's popularity.

And there are just, you know, many, many instances
that we could point to where you have this phenomena
of one-hit wonders, and then drop-offs of 80 percent,

90 percent in the next album, which would certainly
have to say something about the content being
important to the album that was successful.

I've presented a few of these in the next set of exhibits. In some cases, it's the first album that the artist does, and in other cases it doesn't necessarily have to be the first. They may have had one or two low albums, suddenly a real hit, and then

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the next one drops off 80 percent. 1 2 MR. JACOBY: For the record, Mr. Fine was referring to Fine Rebuttal Exhibit 2, found at Tab 14. 3 4 THE WITNESS: And there was just -- off of 5 my own memory, I picked a few that I knew had this phenomena. We could have went through and found many 6 And I think the point is that all of this is 7 8 contradictory to a hypothesis that says -- that would 9 say that, gee, the most important thing is the artist. The content really isn't that important. An artist 10 puts out an album. It's going to sell because of the 11 12 artist. 13 Again, in summary, let me say I'm not 14 trying to say an artist is not important. I'm saying that it's really a combination of an artist and the 15 16 musical works, the songs that appear on the album, 17 that lead to success. 18 BY MR. JACOBY: All right. I'd like you at this point, 19 Q 20 Mr. Fine, to turn to Dr. Seltzer's testimony. Do you 21 have a copy of that? 22 Α Yes, I do.

1	Q And, specifically, I'll ask you to turn to
2	page 10, where he directly addresses your testimony.
3	In Section 1 of this is subsection 1 of Section B,
4	I guess, of Dr. Seltzer's testimony, beginning on
5	page 10, Dr. Seltzer raises a question of whether or
6	not the correlation that you demonstrated in your
7	original direct testimony between the ratio of pre-
8	release detects to total detects in the year 2000 as
9	compared to the ratio of first week sales to total
10	sales in the same year was a "false" or "spurious"
11	correlation, and was really caused by artist
12	popularity.
13	First of all, let me ask you, do you agree
14	or disagree that artist popularity influences both
15	pre-detect detects and first week sales?
16	A I would agree with that.
17	Q Okay. Now, Dr. Seltzer then attempted to
18	do a what he called a partial correlation,
19	attempting to control for artist popularity. And
20	you've examined his analysis, have you?
21	A Yes, I have.
22	Q Okay. Do you have any comment about that

analysis and the conclusion he reaches?

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A Well, the first thing is let's take the analysis that he's done. In a minute I'll address -- I don't think it's the best way to do this, but it's certainly a way that you could do it. And if you look at the results of his analysis, it comes out with a correlation of .46, as he describes, and in his work papers, which have been provided to me, that comes up with a -- what they call a P of .001, which means that the probability of this being -- of this correlation happening by chance is less than .001, or the reliability you could say is 99.9 percent.

If one was to have done this analysis and said, "Gee, you have a correlation of .46," how would one interpret that correlation? One would say, even doing it this way, that air play is important to sales and has a high correlation. .46 is still a fairly high correlation. Not as high as .67, but still a significant correlation.

So if you think about it in terms of your conclusions, or what your -- or what the data tells you, even doing it this way it says that air play does

influence sales.

However, I would not have done this, and the reason I would not have done this is we know that the popularity of an artist is important, especially for first week sales. Record companies, prior to first week sales, go out and try to get radio stations to play a song. It is much easier to have radio stations play songs that come from popular artists in the past than from new artists.

And, therefore, if you -- which we'll see later -- when you look at the data, popular artists, as defined by Dr. Seltzer, do get more air play prior to release than new artists, and we would expect this. But the effect is still the same. The best way, I believe, to look at this phenomena, if you want to call it that, is to look at our artists that we did, the 54 artists, and break them into the two groups, as Dr. Seltzer did, of new artists and established artists. He has used those terms.

And then, look at the correlation separately for the two groups, so you can look and see, gee, what happens with new artists, and what

happens with established artists. And you would expect that the newer artists would have higher correlation, and that the established artists, because of the popularity, would have the correlation between sales, and air play would not be as strong because popularity is having an effect. And so we have done that in Exhibit 3A.

Now, one thing that Dr. Seltzer did was he used 1999 sales as the determinant to say whether -if an artist had sales in 1999, and they were an existing artist, if they had no sales in 1999, then they were a new artist. And when he did that he came up with 12 artists.

Eric Clapton and B.B. King was considered, in his analysis, as a new artist, because it was a collaborative effect, and they hadn't done one before. So when you go into their database and you look at it, you don't have previous sales.

For my analysis, I have moved them into the existing artists. So when I did it I felt it was fairer, because obviously there were existing artists, and so my analysis is done on a split of 11 new

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artists and 43 existing artists. And if you look at
Exhibit 3A, the correlation for new artists is
actually .69, using the same methodology of the
proportion of sales and the proportion of air play.
And for established artists, it's actually .61.

And you can see that actually the .69 and the .61 are higher than Dr. Seltzer's .46. And the reason for that is because you're really stratifying now into two groups. When you were doing the correlation with all of them together, the effect of the existing artist's popularity causes more ups and downs, which, therefore, gives you a lower correlation.

When you take the two groups out separately, and you don't have the fact of existing artist and established artist together, then each group is a more pure group of its own, and you see the correlation better. And that's why I think this is a better way of looking at the effect of new artists -- of the popularity of existing artists.

Breaking it out into two sales, then muddling the water by just "keeping them together,"

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we're controlling for something, but yet leaving both 1 types of artists together. As I say, when you look at 2 this, we've provided -- that was also provided -- the 3 statistical significance. And the reason that you get 4 a little bit below 99.9 -- and 98.1 is still so high 5 -- is obviously, as you get to smaller sample sizes 6 7 below seven, eight, nine, ten, the errors just tend to be a little bit larger, just because of very small 8 9 sample sizes. 10

But still, you're saying that the probability is 98.1 percent that this is not a random occurrence or something equivalent.

Q All right. In subsection 2 of Dr. Seltzer's analysis, he raises a couple of questions about your original analysis, Mr. Fine. One is he raises a question about why you chose to use a comparison of ratios in your original analysis.

The ratio -- the two ratios, of course, that you compared were the pre-detect releases -- pre-release detects versus total detects is one ratio, compared with first week sales to total sales. And Dr. Seltzer professes ignorance as to why you chose to

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use that ratio. Would you explain to the Panel why you chose to use the ratios as distinguished from absolute numbers?

A I mean, there are many ways you could do the analysis. One of the things I was trying to do when I did the analysis initially was to provide the Commission with a -- sort of a simple way -- I thought it was simple anyway -- that would really try to show the impact before the quality of the work became important.

So what happens normally is a record comes out, especially if it's an established artist, you'll have pretty good first week sales because you're basing the first week sales on the -- to some degree, it's important both on the air play and on the reputation of the artist. But then, if the work isn't as good, sales will tail off, because as the critics come out and people say, "Gee, it's not so good," word of mouth, etcetera, etcetera, then sales will tail off.

And so if you look at sales, just looked at -- you know, if you looked at sales at the end of

the period -- of the period, then you're looking at an 1 2 influence of not only the radio air play and the artist, but you're also looking at the effectiveness 3 of the material. 4 And so what I tried to do in my analysis 5 6 was try to take that factor out and try to look at it in its purest sense as you could, which is really at 7 the beginning when it -- when the album has first come 8 9 out. So if you're going to look at that, then 10 I felt that the best way to look at that situation is 11 to compare how your sales were at the beginning versus 12 the end as a ratio, because then that takes -- and if 13 14 you use the ratio to detects and the ratio to sales, 15 you have a common area to compare the two. 16 There were other ways that this could be I just thought that this way was the best way 17 to take out the quality of the work. 18 19 Now, if you think about the motion picture industry, if they have successful actors, you know, 20 and if they've produced a movie that they feel isn't 21

that good, what they'll generally do is spend as much

advertising as they can the first week to get the 1 2 audience in before the word can get out that it isn't 3 as good, because they want to recapture as much as you 4 can. 5 Again, to take away that phenomena of the affect of the quality, of how people like the songs, 6 we did this analysis using first week's results or the 7 8 earliest results that we could. And that's the reason 9 for it. Now, Dr. Seltzer also raises a 10 Q question about your initial study based on the fact 11 that in making the comparisons the denominators in the 12 13 ratios were based on the sales -- the detects or the 14 sales in each case for the balance of the calendar 15 year. And he suggests that it would be appropriate, 16 rather, to do a rolling analysis, actually parroting 17 a comment that Arbitrator von Kann raised with you, if you'll recall in your direct testimony --18 19 ARBITRATOR VON KANN: What did I say? 20 (Laughter.) 21 MR. JACOBY: You'll get to read it again. 22 We won't go over it.

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BY MR. JACOBY:

Q Do you have any comment on that particular criticism or question that Dr. Seltzer raised?

A Yes. I think that using a full rolling year is certainly a reasonable way to do this, and possibly even better than what I had done. I chose the method that I did because I felt that it was a fair method, and, in fact, would fairly represent the situation.

Mould it have been better to use a 12-month rolling average? Yes. It would have been more difficult. We would have crossed over years. The data set I was looking at was a one-year data set, but it certainly could have been done. And I would say with certainty that the results -- the numbers may be slightly different, but the end conclusion would not change.

Now, to test that, I did take the existing data set, and I looked at just those titles that were released prior -- July 2nd or sooner. And the reason I did that, it would give all of those titles at least six months, because the biggest effect in the analysis

was really, as Dr. Seltzer pointed out, was that you had a lot of titles that were released in November.

And so -- and so -- and he questions the effect of that on the ratios, etcetera.

So I looked at just those titles of this list that were released July 2nd or earlier and ran the same exact analysis as we had done for those items. If you look at Exhibit 3B, we have the results of that analysis. And as you can see here, for the first half-year releases, the correlation coefficient in total is .71, doing it exactly the same way.

And for new artists, because I figured once we're into this new artist/existing artist we may as well look at everything that way -- that you would be interested -- for new artists it actually goes way up, as I would have expected, .85. And then, for established artists, it's .46.

And so what you're really saying is here

-- is that there's still, even when you segment this
and look at only titles that were out for at least six
months, you actually even have a stronger result on
new artists and a fairly similar result on existing

It would not change any conclusions. artists. 1 But certainly -- again, it just points to 2 the fact that radio air play is an important driver of 3 sales. 4 All right. Let's turn to subsection 3, if 5 of Dr. Seltzer's commentary on your 6 you will, 7 analysis. And there Dr. Seltzer does an analysis of detects, pre-release 8 pre-release detect actually, to total sales, as well as absolute pre-9 10 release detects to total sales, and finds no statistically significant correlations. 11 12 Would you give us your opinion of that 13 analysis? Well, I think the analysis, to put it 14 nicely, is totally -- totally misleading and is 15 actually totally ridiculous. 16 17 0 Why is that? 18 Well, it is certainly -- it's -- you're 19 not comparing -- you know, you're comparing apples and 20 You're taking total -- you're taking preoranges. release detects, which is detects for a short period 21 22 of time, and taking total album sales.

you're trying to say is the amount of air play that 1 something receives prior to being released, is that 2 indicative or can you predict total sales at the end 3 of some period of time. 4 And you would not expect that you could, 5 because if you could then everybody would know whether 6 7 something was going to be successful or not just based on how much the radio played it before anybody even 8 9 purchased any albums. So, frankly, it's absurd. The whole point is, when you take a --10 let's look at it separately. When you take a new 11 12 artist -- a new artist, by Dr. Seltzer's own numbers later on, gets very little air play prior to release, 13 and you expect that. And then, what happens? 14 album is released. More radio stations start to play 15 it. Air play increases. So people buy it more. 16 17 So on any new artist, basically, you're going to have much stronger sales by the end than you 18 19 would have based on strictly air play at 20 beginning, which is going to be, by definition, low. 21 If you're going to do this, and I think

that this kind of analysis -- and it has somewhat

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usefulness -- and as I explained earlier, I didn't do this, because I didn't want to take into consideration the quality of the work. Once you look at sales, total sales at the end, you're looking into the quality of the work.

But if you are going to do this, then the appropriate way to do this is to look at total detects over the same period. You have total detects and you have total sales, and look to see whether you have a relationship that way.

Now, I did that in Exhibit 4A, which, as it's headed, says, "This is a full -- this is the full year 2000 analysis." We, again, looked at new artists and established artists, and we're now looking at total detects versus total sales. To some degree, the popularity of the artist is now diminished a little bit because it's over a longer period of time.

But now the success of the performance -of the song itself plays more of a part, because now
over a period of time there has been either -- either
people have said this is a great album, it has great
songs, or it's okay, or it isn't. So there are more

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1 | influences in here.

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But even looking at this on a total basis, total detects versus total sales, which would be the only reasonable way if you wanted to take the attack that Dr. Seltzer did, you still find correlations of .65 for new artists and .42 for established artists, pretty much the same as you had before, which, again, says that you have a strong relationship between air play and sales.

The probabilities or the reliability or the chance that you have something by chance are still very small, 99.5 for established artists, where you have 43 cases; 97, which is still very high, where you only have 11 cases. But still very -- but still would come to the same conclusion, even just -- if you did nothing else but look at this, you would still say air play is a significant driver of sales.

Q And would you, then, just to complete the analysis, explain what you did in Rebuttal Exhibit 4B.

A Well, 4B -- Dr. Seltzer then goes into looking at this last thing which he has on his page 15, where he takes the low pre-release and the

high pre-release and looks at the sales ranks and tries to say there's no difference.

Well, again, he's doing the same thing here. He's just looking at it another way. He is looking at pre-detects against total sales rank. He's just looking at ranks rather than numbers. And, again, it's the same fallacy. You cannot mix apples and oranges. You can't take something only for the pre period and try to say that's going to tell you what's going to happen at the end.

If you want to do this analysis, then take all of the detects and take all of the sales, or take only the pre-detects and take only the first week sales. Be consistent. You can't mix them.

And so in Exhibit 4B, I've done that.

I've taken the total -- total sales for the entire period, by total detects, and I took only those -- well, in this case, I took only those that were released during the first half of the year -- again, trying to look at those low releases and the high releases, and ran the same correlations.

And here you get correlations -- new

artists again a little higher than existing artists. And because you're down in nine cases, you're at 92.6 percent, which is still within the -- which is still high for this analysis. And at the end, you'd come up with the same conclusion again. If this is all you looked at, you would still say that there are strong indications of the effect of radio air play on sales.

And, frankly, I think that at the end of the day Dr. Seltzer's criticisms -- nowhere in his criticisms does he say that radio is not an important driver of sales. What he's tried to do is he has tried to show, well, the correlation may not be .67. It may be .48, or it may be this, or it may be that.

But no matter what the numbers are, if you do reasonable analysis of the data, if you don't mix apples and oranges, then you're going to come out with a conclusion that there is a strong relationship between sales, air play, and sales. And at no point are we trying to say that an artist's popularity is -- doesn't have an effect, has a greater effect at the beginning than it would at the end, but it still has an effect.

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1	Q All right. I'd like you to turn now to
2	Dr. Schink's analysis. Do you have a copy of his
3	testimony?
4	A No, I don't.
5	Q And I'll ask you to focus on his analysis
6	or his discussion of promotional effect of radio air
7	play, beginning on page 22 of his testimony,
8	specifically focusing on paragraph 42.
9	And here, as we see, this is actually a
10	commentary on Dr. Jaffe's analysis, but it is an
11	aspect of Dr. Jaffe's analysis in which he used
12	certain data points from your initial direct
13	testimony, some information which comes from the
14	Sounddata surveys that you described in your initial
15	direct testimony.
16	And, specifically, Dr. Schink focuses on
17	the point that case from one of your Sounddata surveys
18	that attributed 27 percent of record sales to radio
19	air play. And Dr. Schink concludes in this paragraph
20	that Professor Jaffe overstated the size of the
21	promotional benefit in using that 27 percent figure.
22	Would you comment on that conclusion by Dr. Schink?

1	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: This is
2	paragraph 42?
3	MR. JACOBY: Yes.
4	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Okay.
5	THE WITNESS: Well, I really have two
6	comments to make about it. The first thing
7	actually, three. The first thing would be that I
8	believe that 27 percent is probably a conservative
9	number. It's my belief that radio air play impacts
10	the effect on sales would be greater than 27 percent.
11	And I look at it, really, in two ways.
12	One is Sounddata and one is a logic statement and the
13	way the industry runs. The first thing is I asked
14	myself, if there was no radio, radio was cut off
L5	tomorrow, and no songs were played on the radio, what
16	do I think the effect would be on sales?
L7	And I feel pretty comfortable that sales
18	would drop more than 27 percent. The reason for that
19	is right now radio is the predominant way people learn
20	about a song.
21	An established artist doesn't start off as
22	an established artist. They start off as a new

artist. And how are they exposed to the public? The biggest exposure, both for new artists and existing artists, when a new song comes out, is the radio. If the radio was not available, the record companies would have to promote in a different way. Until they were efficient at promoting in a different way, sales would drop off.

The only way that I can see right now that a record -- what it would force the record industry to do would probably be to promote through television. Television is, by and large, in most cases too expensive for record companies. They use television very -- a very small percent of the artists and a very small percentage of their releases because of the prohibitive cost.

So in, really, an absurd situation where there was no radio, I think the effect would be greater than 27 percent.

However, if you just look at my Sounddata survey, and the way Dr. Schink is using it, I think it -- in a way it's a little -- it really would itself say that the number should be higher. The question

that the 27 percent comes from is basically a diary question that asks somebody that just purchased it, "What was the most important thing that made you buy this album?"

So it's really to a large degree the last thing that really drove them to buy the album. Twenty-seven percent say that it was hearing the song on the radio. Dr. Schink here suggests that, gee, there are other reasons that affect sales, and so, really, you can't say that all 27 percent -- that this was the reason. Some of these same people had other reasons, and this is just the last one, so the number is probably less than 27.

The problem with that argument is there are 73 percent of the people who said something else. And those 73 percent also were influenced by radio and might not had said radio at that time. So from a logic standpoint, you've got 27 percent of the people in one group, who a few of them may be the really predominant was not radio, it was just the last, so they may lose a few from the 27.

But you've got 73 percent on the other

side, where radio may have been very important but it wasn't the last thing that drove them. And so you're going to pick up more from 73, just by logic, than you're going to lose from 27. So going down the same path as he does in his analysis, it would suggest that 27 percent is a minimum number.

Now, typically, a record consumer hears a song on the radio. They hear it a number of times. They get to like it. They're thinking about it. Maybe it isn't on their mind when they first go into the record store. They go in the record store. They might hear it in the store. They might see it. There might be a sale on it. There may be a point of POP as they call it in the store. And then says, "Gee, you know what? Yes, I'm going to buy it."

So when they answer, "Why did you buy it?"
"Well, it was on sale. I saw a poster. I saw it
advertised in the store." But, in essence, it was
really the radio that really got them interested and
got them to the state where that little last nudge got
them to buy it.

The person answering this question is not

1.2

1	going to answer "radio" probably. They're going to
2	answer "the sale in the store or the POP." Because of
3	just the sizes of the two sales, I really think that
4	the 27 percent is a conservative number to use, and it
5	is probably considerably higher.
6	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: What's POP?
7	THE WITNESS: Point of purchase.
8	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Point of purchase.
9	BY MR. JACOBY:
10	Q Can you explain what a point of purchase
11	is?
12	A Well, point of purchase could be anything
13	in the store. It could be a poster, it could be a
14	sign, it could be well, they have end caps with
15	just the title on it. It's the position in the store.
16	It can be a listening booth. It can be a number of
17	things in the store that just drive drive you to
18	make a sale.
19	There's approximately somewhere between
20	about 35 percent almost one out of three sales
21	customers tell us are an impulse. They've walked into
22	the store to buy something, and they buy something

1	else. This could have been some of these something
2	elses. They're going to answer that impulse that
3	caused you to buy it, and not necessarily the radio
4	that made you aware and made you really think about
5	buying it.
6	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: This is why my wife
7	doesn't let me do the grocery shopping.
8	(Laughter.)
9	THE WITNESS: Exactly.
10	MR. JACOBY: Are you a victim of the end
11	cap what's called the end caps?
12	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Come back with lots
13	of things that weren't on the list.
14	MR. JACOBY: Anything that's on the end of
15	the aisle, right?
16	THE WITNESS: Well, or pretty pictures of
17	women or whatever else you want it to be, or the rock
18	groups.
19	BY MR. JACOBY:
20	Q All right. Would you turn now to
21	paragraph 43 of Dr. Schink's testimony on page 23?
22	And I'm just going to focus your attention on two

sentences in paragraph 43 that begin -- it's the fourth line of paragraph 43, in which he -- in which Dr. Schink says, "First, webcasting play will be incremental to radio play. The additional exposure provided by webcast play should produce fewer incremental album sales than are produced by the existing radio play." Do you agree or disagree with that statement by Dr. Schink?

A Well, I disagree with it. I may be interpreting it differently than he does, but I disagree with it. To me, a play is a play. If you're talking about the effect on any one individual, then one individual hears that -- hears that song or performance on the radio, the effect on that individual should be no different than if that person heard it through streaming or whatever on the internet.

All of advertising, or certainly all of radio promotion, is based on the fact that you want your customer to hear the song as much as possible, because it is the repetitive hearing of a song that drives a customer to want to buy something. Very few

customers say that if they hear a song once they're 1 2 going to go out and buy it. I've seen other testimony, and I think Mr. 3 McDermott talks about just the theory of the record 4 companies and how they promote records. 5 The idea is to get it onto radio stations and get it played as 6 often as they can on a station to create awareness. 7 8 And this is just like in any, you know, 9 consumer product out there. Advertising is not based 10 on making an impression once but compounding the 11 impression a number of times. 12 If you're saying, gee, the audience size 13 is greater on a radio station than on somebody 14 listening to a radio -- you know, a streaming broadcast, and so the effect from playing on the radio 15 is greater, then I would agree, because there are more 16 17 people listening, you know, probably to a radio station than there are to streaming. 18 However, you would say the same argument, 19 20 that a play on one radio station will have a different effect than a play on another radio station. 21

have a radio station in New York or in Washington

1	that's being heard by a half a million people, and you
2	have a radio station somewhere else that's being heard
3	by 20,000 people, then, obviously, the total effect on
4	sales is going to be different.
5	But I do believe that when it comes down
6	to a single performance, to a single customer, it's
7	down to one person hearing it once, I don't see how
8	you could think that there would be a different
9	effect.
10	Q Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. No further
11	questions.
12	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Let's go off the record
13	for one second.
14	(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the
15	record briefly.)
16	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Back on the record,
17	because I thought you probably might be
18	MR. JACOBY: For the record, I'd like to
19	offer Fine Rebuttal Exhibits 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, into
20	evidence.
21	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And is there any
22	objection?

1	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Did you I don't
2	think you said you were going to file it. Did you say
3	you were
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: All four will be
5	admitted, but they just come in as part of the
6	exhibits. And, actually, that's why I get the two
7	copies. We file the hearing exhibits with the office.
8	So they're all four admitted.
9	(Whereupon, the above-referred
10	to documents, previously marked
11	as Fine Rebuttal Exhibits
12	Nos. 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B for
13	identification, were admitted
14	in evidence.)
15	CROSS EXAMINATION
16	BY MR. NEWBERG:
17	Q Good morning, Mr. Fine. My name is Brad
18	Newberg, and I represent the Recording Industry
19	Association of America. The first thing I'd like to
20	do is go into your discussion about Dr. Seltzer's
21	testimony and your rebuttal exhibits.
22	In this chart, your Rebuttal Exhibits 3A,

1	3B, 4A, 4B, and in your analysis during the first
2	phase of this proceeding, you started by taking the
3	most successful artist by sales in the year 2000. Is
4	that correct?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And then you looked at the detects and the
7	pre-release air play for these artists. Is that
8	correct?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And when you broke it down by new artists
11	and established artists in your rebuttal exhibit, your
12	sample size for new artists, at least in Exhibit 3A,
13	was 11.
14	A Correct.
15	Q So these, in essence, were the 11 most
16	successful new artists of 2000 by record sales.
17	A Yes.
18	Q Did you do any analysis of, say, the 100
19	new artists with the highest pre-release air play?
20	A No.
21	Q Did you do any analysis like that where
22	you looked at the artists with the highest pre-release

air play to see what their sales were? 1 2 Α No. So your analysis does not account for any 3 artist that got high pre-release air play but still 4 5 had low record sales? Well, there was no -- the amount of record 6 sales is only a determinant factor based on how it 7 ended up at the end of the year. And the reason that 8 I picked doing it this way, there was a reason. 9 of all, if I had gone out and picked some other way of 10 11 picking albums or artists, people would say, "Well, why did you pick this one? Why did you pick that 12 one?" 13 14 And you would have had a -- there may have been considered some -- someone may have thought that 15 I had biased the selection process looking for 16 17 something that would come out one way or the other. By taking just the top, you take away all of that 18 bias. There is no selection criteria. I took the most 19 20 popular. Also, by taking the most popular, I was 21 actually -- if, in fact, I was trying to prove a 22

point, I was making it the most difficult, because I do believe that as you go further down the list of successful artists that the relationships actually become stronger between air play and sales, because of the fact that popularity of an artist, which has its greatest impact at the beginning, would not be there.

And so as you looked at -- if you took things that sold very little, number one, you would probably find very little air play in a lot of cases, so you couldn't do an analysis. But if you did go further down, you'd find stronger relationships than weaker relationships.

Q All right. But my question was -- wasn't really why you chose what you did. It was asking whether or not you took the -- whether or not your analysis dealt with any of the, say, top 100 or top 50 artists with the highest pre-release air play to see what their sales were.

And I think you mentioned there might -you might be accused of some bias in that. And if you
just chose the top 50 or the top 100, what bias would
there be in that?

1	A Well, I guess, but then one would say, why
2	did you start with number 40 and not number 100?
3	Because, again, the top slants it the other way. I
4	did what I did. And the answer to your question is,
5	no, I did not do that, because I presented to you why
6	what I did and why I did it.
7	Q All right. But this is you are putting
8	this forward as kind of a cause and effect analysis to
9	show that pre-release air play causes these sales.
10	A I'm using this to support the supposition
11	or the conclusion that says radio is an important
12	driver of sales. I've done many analyses over over
13	periods of time that looked at the relationship
14	between radio and air play, and in every analysis that
15	I've ever done I have always found that there is a
16	relationship between it.
17	If there was not a relationship between
18	it, the record companies would not spend most of their
19	of their promotional dollars on radio. Radio is
20	where all of the costs today, other than not all of
21	the costs, but the majority of costs in marketing a

record are for promotion, which is basically the

effort of people getting radio stations to play songs. 1 If they didn't feel and know that, in 2 fact, there was a strong relationship, they wouldn't 3 4 do this because you would tell them that they're wasting their money. So all I've done is I've picked 5 one analysis that I thought was sort of simple, easy 6 7 to do, didn't involve looking through a lot of data, to show, in fact, the relationship between radio and 8 9 air play. 10 I could have done this 20, 30 different ways and would have come up with the same conclusion. 11 And if I did it your way, which I could have done, I 12 13 would, again -- I would be positive -- actually, I am 14 positive I would come up with the same thing, because 15 that's why people spend their efforts trying to get 16 radio to play songs. 17 Well, I mean, don't you think in a cause and effect analysis it might be helpful to look at the 18 cause first? 19 20 Α What are you defining as the cause? 21 The pre-release air play. 0 22 Pre-release А air play causes sales,

obviously, at the first week. Nobody would go out -
I mean, let's start off with a supposition. There is

no -- there is no publicity. There is no advertising

it whatsoever. A record company takes an album, puts

it in a record store, and waits to see what's going to

happen.

A typical record store would have, I don't know, 10,000 different albums put in bins. How many people, if they didn't know it was there, would buy -- while going through the bins, find this record and buy it? I mean, it would -- you could probably count them on your hand.

So you start off with the supposition that you have a release date. This album is going to be in stores on a certain date. What's your first thing a record company wants to do? They want to make people aware that this record is going to be in the store on that date.

How do they do it? They do it a number of ways. They may advertise in the newspaper. They may do some TV advertising, which they do very seldom. But the majority of the way that they get the message

1	to the consumer is through radio, and the fact that
2	radio plays the song. That's why they put out a
3	single usually six weeks, eight weeks, before the
4	album comes out, to create the hype, to create the
5	awareness.
6	So, obviously, there has to be a
7	relationship between the prior detect and first week
8	sales. If people don't know about it, they're not
9	going to buy it. The more you make people aware of
10	it, the more chance you have of sales happening in the
11	first week. So there's definitely a relationship.
12	Q Well, if there was data showing that there
13	were a lot of albums that had high pre-release air
14	play but low sales, would that affect your analysis in
15	any way?
16	A No.
17	Q And why is that?
18	A I mean, it there would be some reason
19	I mean, first of all, if it was if it happened
20	all the time, then, definitely yes. If it happened
21	some of the time, you'd have to look and see what
22	happened to that album. What was the pre-release air

play, and what was the publicity around that release?

2.0

And if the publicity around that release was that it's a terrible album, then what you're really saying is you're starting to get some of the effect of the quality of the work playing a bigger part earlier than people would hope. Certainly, that could happen. If there's very bad publicity, even though it may be played on the radio, then you would have less correlation.

I mean, you -- as I said to you at the beginning, it takes, really, both things to be successful. You have to have a good work as well as a good artist, I mean, to be the most successful. If you have a -- if the work is not considered good and people don't like it, they're not going to buy it strictly because they heard it on the radio. So the quality of the work does come into play.

And the reviews, if there are a lot of bad reviews early in the game that get a lot of attention, then that would affect sales and you could see some air play without -- without the corresponding sales.

Q Well, you don't really need reviews, do

you? Because people can actually hear the song when 1 2 they play it on the air before the release. If people hear it and they don't like it, 3 then they'll be less likely to buy it. And that's why 4 record companies spend so much effort trying to figure 5 out which song should be released first. 6 I mean, you 7 have an album. That album is going to be released on 8 a certain date. It probably has 10, 11, 12 songs on 9 it. record companies 10 You make know, concerted effort to pick the right song that they 11 think will help justify the success of the album. 12 13 the album is bad, though, you may pick the -- you know, the best of the bad, and then you, in fact, 14 won't have sales. That could happen. 15 If I could just ask you, on these charts 16 17 that you did in Exhibit 1 --CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Excuse me. We need to 18 19 suspend for a second and go off the record. 20 (Whereupon, the proceedings the foregoing matter went off the record at 21 10:33 a.m. and went back on the record at 22

1	11:05 a.m.)
2	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, we have worked
3	out a resolution to the location business. We're just
4	going to rename this building Arnold & Porter, and
5	we'll be set. We figured we should wait until late in
6	the day and see if we can get a further update from
7	Bill, any further information on all this.
8	Do we know yet whether we have an option
9	as earlier as tomorrow if need be?
10	MR. GARRETT: I am sure we have space.
11	The question is whether we have the best space
12	available. And I got something that we had set up for
13	this weekend, and it's pretty much the same fashion as
14	this room.
15	But we certainly have plenty of conference
16	rooms that are available, and so that will be able to
17	accommodate this.
18	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, this panel wants
19	the best space.
20	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We are going to
21	import the art.

(Laughter.)

1	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: We wouldn't mind a few
2	windows as a substitute. So, we could do it tomorrow
3	if need be, you're saying?
4	MR. GARRETT: Yes, yes.
5	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And do the parties
6	have a preference, one way or the other?
7	MR. STEINTHAL: Do you mean as between
8	here and Arnold & Porter?
9	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. I mean, I
10	suppose there's a school of thought that says this
11	could be in flux every day back and forth.
12	MR. STEINTHAL: And the big thing is going
13	to be knowing when we have to move, that which we need
14	to move. It's not like the Steve Marks cross the last
15	time around where we had boxes and boxes of materials
16	that we had to have on-hand.
17	So, we are more portable. We just need to
18	have requisite notice to take what we need from here.
19	So that, if we if we know today at four o'clock or
20	five, preferably by four, that we're going to be going
21	to Arnold & Porter, that's going to be fine for us.
22	I suppose you guys have the same problems

we do. You know, we can leave some of the stuff here 1 and just take, you know, what we need for the next few 2 3 days. But I guess there is the -- one of the 4 issues is are we going to be closed down for, you 5 6 know, ten days, in which event we need to move everything out of here? I guess we haven't -- that's 7 8 something we'll just learn more about. 9 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: As far as we're aware, there's, you know, no high profile recipient of 10 letters or anything here in Library. 11 There's no indication whatsoever, which is really different from 12 either the House or Senate office building where 13 14 they're getting tons of mail every day from all sorts 15 of people. 16 MR. STEINTHAL: But as we sit here today --UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And assuming that 17 the mail all goes to the right place, too. 18 MR. STEINTHAL: -- we're prepared to go, 19 20 you know, where -- you know, in the exercise of caution, let's not take a chance about tomorrow, 21 starting tonight when it's going to be closed, or wait 22

just, you know, until Bob tells us that they've got 1 the facilities, and we'll just show up there tomorrow 2 3 morning. It's not a big issue for us. Okay, we'll revisit CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: 4 5 this then later in the afternoon when we -- when we've got more information, and see whether there's more 6 7 preferences. Mr. Newberg, you were in the midst of 8 your questions. 9 MR. NEWBERG: I was. CONTINUED CROSS EXAMINATION 10 11 BY MR. NEWBERG: 12 Mr. Fine, in your rebuttal testimony, you 0 13 state that -- tell me if I'm inaccurate -- that the 14 sales of records are partly driven by the underlying musical works? 15 16 Yes. 17 Now, when you were here previously, you Q testified that radio air-play was the driving factor 18 for album purchases. Have you changed your view about 19 20 the driving factor behind sales, or are you just saying now that there are various factors behind the 21 sales? 22

1	MR. JACOBY: I'll object to the form of
2	the question, but because I think the foundation is
3	accurate, but I'll let the witness answer.
4	THE WITNESS: Okay, no, I think I think
5	there are a number of things that affect sales.
6	Obviously, you have to have a something to sell,
7	and so you have an album that has to be created. And
8	things go into creation of that album: the artist,
9	the music, okay?
10	And once you have the album, you have to
11	promote it, and you have to get people to buy it. And
12	there are various ways of promoting it. Radio is one
13	of them.
14	And the only thing that I've said is, is
15	that radio is an important driver of sales. It's
16	certainly not the only driver of sales.
17	BY MR. NEWBERG:
18	Q So, you agree that there are other drivers
19	of sales?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And the popularity of the artist might be
22	one?
	1

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And the amount of promotion and
3	advertising	spent by the record label might be
4	another?	
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	Are displays in a store that consumers can
7	see?	
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	Or hearing about an album from a friend?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	Magazine reviews?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	Seeing a music video?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Seeing an artist in concert?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	Did you look over the any information
18	on the radi	o air-play detections or the pre-release
19	air-play on	the albums in the charts you've presented
20	with your re	ebuttal testimony?
21		MR. JACOBY: I'm going to object to the
22	form of the	question, but the witness can answer. I

1	didn't understand the question.
2	THE WITNESS: Only if one of them happens
3	to, by chance, correspond to the 54.
4	BY MR. NEWBERG:
5	Q So, you didn't make any independent
6	A No.
7	Q study? Okay. And just to be clear on
8	the purpose of your testimony here today, you reviewed
9	the Soundscan sales data for the 20 top-selling
10	artists since 1991, correct, if they had at least five
11	albums?
12	A Correct.
13	Q And charts showing that sales data can be
14	found at Exhibit 1 to your testimony, at least in bar
15	graph form?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Now, and a premise of yours was that an
18	artist if an artist's contribution was the primary
19	factor in sales, one would see a curve or a slope of
20	increasing or decreasing sales over time, correct?
21	A No, you'd probably see something more like
22	a trapezoid. You'd go up; you'd be sort of a

1	pretty big you'd have a you'd go up; you'd have
2	a pretty big base across the top, and then you'd start
3	to come down. It wouldn't really be a curve.
4	Q In your testimony, you point out examples
5	where this was not the case?
6	A Correct.
7	Q And you conclude that such examples show
8	the public's positive or negative reaction to the
9	musical works?
10	MR. JACOBY: Objection as to form.
11	THE WITNESS: No, I'm only saying that the
12	that the reaction to the musical works is a driver
13	of sales, as well as the popularity of the artist.
14	BY MR. NEWBERG:
15	Q And in paragraph eight of your testimony,
16	you state that your review of the chart shows you that
17	greatest hit albums out-perform studio albums, apart
18	from any other sales trends for the artists, and that
19	this "strongly suggests that consumer purchases are
20	driven by the underlying works"?
21	MR. JACOBY: Objection as to form,
22	mischaracterizes testimony.

ARBITRATOR GULIN: Mr. Jacoby, do you want 1 2 rulings on these objections? No, I just -- I am just MR. JACOBY: 3 4 trying to maybe give notice to Mr. Newberg that he is 5 constantly mis-stating premises in his questions. And 6 for the record, I think I should do that, and maybe he 7 will take more care. 8 For example, he skips the word "generally 9 out-perform" that was testimony, and he skips the word 10 "generally". He's characterizing the 11 mischaracterizing the testimony. I think it's 12 important for me to just make a record notice of that. 13 I'm allowing the witness to answer. 14 ARBITRATOR GULIN: Okay. 15 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: I think we would 16 prefer, in the interest of time and to be consistent 17 with the way we've treated all of the other objections, that if there is an objection to which you 18 19 would like us to rule, and -- and sort of seriously do 20 not want the witness to answer until you've received 21 a ruling, then let's have an objection.

MR. JACOBY: Well --

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: . -- as to each and 1 2 every one as to form --Well, I don't want to do 3 MR. JACOBY: But on the other hand, he is consistently --4 5 counsel is consistently mischaracterizing testimony in 6 asking a question. And that's not appropriate. Could we have a ARBITRATOR VON KANN: 7 8 standing understanding that if the witness thinks the 9 question mischaracterizes, he can correct that? Don't feel bound by the form of the question. 10 Say, "I didn't quite say that, Mr. Newberg, " or "You've left 11 12 something out, " and he needs to qualify that. 13 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. NEWBERG: 14 in fact, in the one instance where I said I was 15 quoting, if you have any problem with the language 16 that I said I was quoting, please let me know. 17 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Please proceed. THE WITNESS: I think the question had to 18 1.9 do with greatest hits, and I said, "Generally 20 speaking" -- I mean, there are occasions where a 21 studio album can have sales higher, more than a 22 greatest hits.

in οf these 1 what you see some 2 situations was that albums were released. They seem to be on a decline from previous albums. There's a 3 greatest hits that certainly sells well. And the next 4 album after the greatest hits sort of declines again. 5 And all I'm using is -- again as I said, 6 7 this would probably be the hardest case to make a case of this because you do have the most -- in a lot of 8 9 cases, obviously the most popular artists. 10 And all I'm saying is that there is a relationship between the song, as well as -- as well 11 12 as the artist. It isn't one that makes it without the 13 other. You need both. 14 And that content is important. If content 15 wasn't important, then you would expect, if you could 16 do this, you should be able to do this on every -- on every album, if it didn't matter. 17 I mean, if the 18 person -- if the only thing was the artist and it 19 didn't matter what they sang, then why would sales be 20 different from album to album if you put the same 21 effort in to promote it?

And if a record company felt that they

1	could get nine million sales every time, then it
2	certainly pays to put in the effort. So, the reason
3	it doesn't happen is because sometimes the material is
4	better than other times.
5	And it's a simple, logical thing. This is
6	not, you know, something that isn't recognized in the
7	business.
8	BY MR. NEWBERG:
9	Q But you do say, do you not, in paragraph
10	eight that greatest hits albums generally out-perform
11	studio albums?
12	A Quite apart there's a second part to
13	the sentence.
14	Q Right, quite apart from any upward or
15	downward sales trends for the artist.
16	A Yes, there are times where inside the
17	trend, you can stop the trend by having a greatest
18	hits. And it depends on the artist. If the artist
19	doesn't have a lot of great hits, then the greatest
20	hits album won't be very good.
21	Q And you do say, and I'll quote here from
22	paragraph eight, that "This phenomenon strongly

suggests that consumer purchase decisions are largely driven by the songs contained on particular albums, not simply by the popularity of the artist"?

A Yes. It's not one or the other; it's both. It's not simply by.

Q And is it your testimony that if the

Q And is it your testimony that if the musical works themselves were at least as important as the popularity of the artist, then you would -- you would see this up and down trend in your charts, an up and down where one album sold significantly -- significantly better than, say, an album prior or subsequent to it?

an artist over a shorter period of -- over a short period of time, a few years rather than 20 or 30 years, okay, that it is reasonable to assume that ups and downs, given the same artist in the same stage of their career pretty much, with the same effort behind them, if not more effort on the subsequent one than on the previous one, that if sales are not the same or not better, then there's a -- it's reasonable to conclude that that is caused by the material.

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1	Q But my question, my next question, is, is
2	it a logical conclusion that, if that is the case,
3	that the musical work is at least as important as the
4	popularity of the artist?
5	A It's my opinion, yes.
6	Q Well, let's take out promotion,
7	advertising, word of mouth, concerts, all the other
8	stuff that I mentioned for other factors. If the
9	artist the popularity of the artist was 80 percent
10	of the factor, and musical work, underlying musical
11	work, was 20 percent of the factor; say sound
12	recordings were you know, the artist's popularity
13	was four times as important, wouldn't you still expect
14	some significant rise and fall?
15	A I guess you'd have some, but I certainly
16	don't think you'd have up and down, and up and down,
17	and up and down. I mean, you would have pretty much
18	because if the words was only 20 percent, then it
19	would have much less effect, and it would not cause
20	you to go up and down very much.
21	And especially if you take that looking at
22	the example of one-hit wonders where you have a

1	situation in those cases where the following album
2	drops as much as 80 percent or more, that certainly
3	would imply that the works is a lot more than just a
4	minor contributor.
5	Q Now, in your direct testimony, you relied
6	on a correlation analysis, a statistical correlation
7	analysis?
8	A In my first, I did.
9	Q Right.
10	A Yes.
11	Q Did you do any statistical correlations to
12	get to your conclusions in your rebuttal testimony
13	today regarding the importance of musical works?
14	A No.
15	Q So, your assumptions are based on your
16	general experience and these charts that show the
17	differences in sales among albums?
18	A Yes.
19	Q Before I get to these charts, let me ask
20	you, have you ever heard of a tribute album?
21	A Yes.
22	Q What is that?

1	A It would be an album put out by an artist
2	that has a theme to it, some type of theme to the
3	album.
4	Q Have you ever heard of tribute albums
5	where an artist or a group of artists get together and
6	cover the songs of another artist?
7	A Cover songs cover yes.
8	Q For example, a tribute to Garth Brooks, or
9	a tribute to Madonna, where a bunch of artists get
10	together and do Garth Brooks songs or Madonna songs?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Do you have any view on how these albums
13	generally sell?
14	A Some sell well; some don't sell well.
15	Q And is that true, even though the tribute
16	albums are using the same underlying musical works
17	that the original artist used?
18	A It's I'm not sure how I can answer that
19	question. I mean, some of them some of them are
20	more successful than others.
21	Q Okay. Well, let me take a give you a
22	copy of what I'll mark as RIAA Exhibit No. 107 RPX.

1	THE COURT REPORTER: Can you say the
2	number again, please?
3	MR. NEWBERG: Yes, it's 107 RPX.
4	(Whereupon, the above-
5	referenced document was marked
6	as RIAA Exhibit No. 107 RPX for
7	purposes of identification.)
8	BY MR. NEWBERG:
9	Q And then, while you're looking over that,
10	I'll have another chart marked as RIAA Exhibit No. 108
11	RPX.
12	(Whereupon, the above-
13	referenced document was marked
14	as RIAA Exhibit No. 108 RPX for
15	purposes of identification.)
16	BY MR. NEWBERG:
17	Q If I could ask you to look at these two
18	exhibits, 107 and 108, and also if you could just have
19	handy your Chart One of your Exhibit 1, your Garth
20	Brooks chart? Now, as you can see from Chart One that
21	I've handed out, which is 107 RPX, the album in blue
22	is "Fresh Horses," which was released on November

1	21st, 1995. And I believe that is on your chart, is
2	it not?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Now, next to it is an album called "Hats
5	Off, a Tribute to Garth Brooks," which I've attached
6	the track listings for "Hats Off, a Tribute to Garth
7	Brooks". And this isn't on your chart, but we've
8	attached the Soundscan data as well.
9	And would you agree with me that "Hats
10	Off, a Tribute to Garth Brooks" sold 7,368 copies?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Now, is there any album on your Exhibit 1,
13	Chart One of Garth Brooks that sold anywhere close to
14	the range of 7,368 copies?
15	A No.
16	Q Yet, this is a tribute album using the
17	same underlying works that Garth Brooks has used?
18	MR. JACOBY: Is that a question?
19	BY MR. NEWBERG:
20	Q Is that correct?
21	A I don't know. I mean, it's a the
22	artist it's various it's various artists is what

that says, and the title of it is "Hats Off".
Q Are you familiar with Garth Brooks'
A Yes.
Q music at all?
A A little bit.
Q Could you take a look at the track list?
Have you ever heard of songs like "Friends in Low
Places"?
A Yes.
Q Do you know that to be a Garth Brooks
song?
A I believe that is.
Q And so, if you assume that all of these
songs are Garth Brooks recordings re-done, can you
explain why a tribute to Garth Brooks, using his
underlying works that were hits for Garth Brooks, sold
7,368 copies, while a general studio album of Garth
Brooks sold over 3.8 million copies?
A I mean, there would be a couple of
reasons. And one is the obvious reason, that Garth
Brooks has that Garth Brooks is a popular artist,
and popularity and the performance of the of the

artist has something to -- has something to say about 1 2 the success of an album. And I've never said that 3 that isn't important. The second thing is, I'm not sure who 4 5 released this. The artists may not be a group of artists, obviously if they're totally unknown, that 6 7 people would necessarily go out and buy. 8 The record companies may not have promoted 9 it as well. And I don't know that you're really 10 comparing -- what you're trying to compare is really, 11 again, an apples and orange situation. 12 All I'm suggesting in my analysis is that 13 given an artist and given the popularity of an artist 14 -- and there are artists who are better than other artists. And therefore, if an artist is better, they 15 will have more sales than another artist. 16 17 But given the artist -- and that's a You have Garth Brooks. Now, he's putting 18 constant. 19 out a number of albums. Garth Brooks is putting them 20 out, not other people. If, in fact, the only thing that mattered 21 22 was the fact that Garth -- Garth Brooks puts it out,

then you would expect to see why did sales go from 1 2 nine million on his very successful 1991 album down to under three million, back to five million, a little 3 over four, back up to eight, down to four, back to 4 5 almost six? I would say that a reasonable explanation 6 for all of this up and down is caused by the quality 7 8 of the work. It's the same performer, very popular in 9 the 1991 to 1995 area. interesting 10 group of is an 11 artists. They generally put out something every year, 12 so that you really are trying to capitalize on the popularity of the artist. 13 14 If you can't maintain it over a short 15 period of time, and you have the ups and downs, I would think a reasonable reason for that is difference 16 17 in acceptance of the quality of the work and how people feel about the songs. 18 But those answers, the second half of your 19 20 answer about the quality of the work, that doesn't 21 explain why the tribute album did so much worse than

Garth Brooks' "Fresh Horses." That goes -- if you

1	would let me just finish, that goes back to your
2	answer that the popularity of the artist does have
3	some effect, and the promotion of the label does have
4	some effect?
5	A And the songs, and the popularity and
6	who is singing it, and maybe the quality of the work,
7	and how it is presented. There's a lot of things.
8	But certainly, I am not saying that the popularity of
9	the artist does not have an important effect.
10	Q But when you just to clarify, when you
11	said "the quality of the work" there, do you mean the
12	quality of the underlying work or the quality of the
13	sound recording, given that here, it's the same
14	underlying work?
15	A Well, it may be the it may be the art
16	cover. It may be a lot of things that would cause
17	that would cause a tribute put out by a different
18	label, not his label I'm sure this was not
19	necessarily released by the same label that is
20	promoting Garth Brooks.
21	I can't I just can't tell you why it
22	why it would happen.

1	Q So, the identity of the label could also
2	be
3	A Well, I'm only using
4	Q a factor?
5	A I'm only thinking of it in the sense of
6	the if it's put out by an independent label for
7	some reason, and I don't know who put it out. And the
8	amount of money that they've spent to promote it may
9	be different than a major label getting behind an
10	artist.
11	Q Okay.
12	A But it's it's a factor there's a lot
13	of factors that go into selling an album.
14	Q And your answer would be the same for 108
15	RPX, I would imagine, the "New Friends in Low Places"
16	that sold about 26,000, 27,000 copies, while "In the
17	Life of Chris Deams" released a month later sold 1.1
18	million?
19	A Yes.
20	Q And if I could just give you one last
21	one of these tributes to look at, 109 RPX, and we've
22	got more of these tribute albums here. But in the
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1	interest of time and not going through nostalgia,
2	we'll stick with The Beatles here.
3	And here, I guess your answers would be
4	the same for this "20th Century Masters: A Tribute to
5	The Beatles," that sold 833 copies and the 92 copies
6	for the instrumental jazz tribute, as opposed to
7	"Beatles One," which was their recently released
8	greatest hits album?
9	A Well, I mean, this seems to say that there
10	is a series of 20th Century Masters of different
11	artists. And this series wasn't very doesn't
12	appear to be very successful. All of the artists sold
13	very few, and that may be more about how it's
14	promoted, where it's promoted, the target audience,
15	etcetera, than anything else.
16	(Whereupon, the above-
17	referenced document was marked
18	as RIAA Exhibit No. 109 RPX for
19	purposes of identification.)
20	BY MR. NEWBERG:
21	Q So, the same musical work done in
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have success or not success because of the target 1 audience as well. Is that correct? The timing of it, the target audience, other songs that are on the album, how people feel about it, how many times the song has appeared, you know, on an album; you may have a -- have a hit song that's appeared on four or five different collections. So, the next collection of it does not do as well. Okay. 10 But I think the basis is, if you look at studio albums and look at the trends, studio albums, you know, there are differences. Individual albums put out by artists, they go up and down. And the fact that they do go up and down, I say, is attributed to the musical works on the album. Well, let's just take a look at a few of your charts here. We'll stick with The Beatles. That's Chart Two. And just before I ask you a question about the chart, what's on the chart

specifically, do you see any -- any album on this

chart that approaches the range that the tribute album

we just discussed, 833 copies sold?

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1	A No.
2	Q Now, in your testimony, I believe you
3	refer let me just be sure that I'm not mis-stating
4	you. I believe you refer to The Beatles in paragraph
5	eight as an example of where the greatest hits
6	collection sold substantially more than the albums
7	these artists had released directly preceding or
8	following the greatest hits release.
9	A Yes. I mean, I point to it because it's
10	one of the 20 artists that met the criteria on
11	within within this thing. The Beatles is probably
12	not the best example because they are an older band,
13	and a lot of their success occurred 20 years ago, and
14	that obviously, they weren't together and had some
15	demise when some of these albums were put out.
16	But it just points out that, in this
17	particular case, they did you know, a top hit album
18	did very well.
19	Q Well, weren't they, The Beatles, broken up
20	before 1991?
21	A Yes.
22	Q And so, aren't all of these albums

essentially hits compilations?

A Pretty much, though some have some original materials that weren't. But they are -- and here is one that, you know, particularly did well.

And I just point to it; I mean, there are other examples of -- of top hits in the list that are -- that I think are better representative of what happened to The Beatles.

Q Right. Well, but here is my -- what I'm -- what I'm getting at, Mr. Fine, is that in your testimony, you specifically refer to this chart as an instance where the greatest hits album did significantly better than albums preceding or after it, but in this case, we'll say preceding.

And my question is, aren't you just saying that this greatest hits album did better than other hits albums?

A Yes, except for the "Live at the BBC," which was not necessarily a hit album. It had not been released prior, but was an individual performance album that was released. And it certainly did not do as well as the hits albums do.

1	Q Do you know if the "Live at the BBC" album
2	was a case where The Beatles performed live songs that
3	were already on other albums?
4	A They probably have some have some songs
5	on it.
6	Q Do you know if sometimes live albums of
7	the same underlying musical works that an artist has
8	on other albums do better or worse than the studio
9	albums?
10	A Could you repeat the question?
1.1	Q Sure, maybe I can make it clearer. On
12	live albums, you said that sometimes well, I don't
13	want to, again what you said but you agree that
14	on live albums, the artist often makes live sound
15	recordings of the same musical works that are on his
16	other albums?
17	A In many cases, yes.
18	Q And is it your experience that these
19	albums sometimes sell significantly worse or better
20	than the studio albums?
21	A They usually do not sell as well as studio
22	albums.
- 1	1

1	Q And do you have any explanation for why a
2	different recording by the same artist doing the same
3	musical works would sell fewer albums?
4	A On some cases, it's because if you have
5	had very successful albums initially, people have
6	bought it. And if there are a couple of songs that
7	they like and they already own it, they don't need to
8	buy it again on a live recording.
9	Q So, that might be the case for this "Live
10	at the BBC" as well?
11	A It's possible. And as I've said, and I
12	have said to you, I don't think The Beatles, because
13	of where they are in their career, is possibly, I
14	should not have mentioned it, if that would make you
15	feel better.
16	But the other ones in the group I think
17	are much clearer examples. The Beatles would not be
18	as clear of an example because of of just their
19	situation.
20	Q Okay, that's fair enough, and we can move
21	on from The Beatles after one last question, actually.
22	If we assume that "Beatles One," the album that did

better, are the -- are the songs that reached number one for The Beatles, if your premise is correct that greatest hits albums generally do better studio albums, would it -- would it be proper to say that number one greatest hits do better than --

A I mean, I don't --

Q -- do even better?

A -- I don't know, but obviously, if you have an album that has the biggest of the hits, there's a greater probability that that will do better than an album that has less of the hits, if you're comparing different hit albums.

But it would also depend upon, to some degree, when the album was originally -- you know, how the individual songs were originally sold, how long ago. Are you creating a new market of people who -- maybe, you know, not using The Beatles, but I mean, hypothetically, if you have an artist whose career has suddenly taken off again and maybe most people who bought the songs, that was ten, 15 years ago, and now you have a new audience who maybe has not bought the album ten or 15 years ago, then you have less

effective previous sales for -- for the new album. 1 2 generally, greatest hits because of the fact they -- they have their songs that 3 were the most popular, do sell well. 4 And if we could just turn to the next 5 chart, which is Mariah Carey, it looks to me like she 6 7 has actually a number one hits compilation as well released in 1998. Do you know if that's correct? 8 9 Α I'm not sure that it was all number ones, but it was a hit compilation. 10 11 Fair enough. And is it correct to say, by looking at your chart, that her number ones -- her 12 13 hits compilation named "Number Ones" did slightly worse than the album released before it, and slightly 14 better than the album released after it? 15 Would you repeat that again, number --16 Α 17 0 Is it fair to say, looking at your chart, that Mariah Carey's hits compilation named "Number 18 19 Ones" did slightly worse than the album that preceded 20 it, and slightly better than the album subsequent to it? 21 22 Α Yes.

1	Q So, this might be another example of where
2	the greatest hits album didn't do significantly better
3	than the studio albums?
4	A That's possible. I think this particular
5	graph the important thing in this graph is the real
6	significant drop between "Daydream" and "Butterfly".
7	And in fact, you have two studio albums, one right
8	after the other, with such a significant drop that
9	would certainly indicate that the material was not as
10	well received on "Butterfly" as "Daydream".
11	Q Well, let's talk about that then. I
12	wasn't going to get into that, but let's talk about
13	that. You had said before when you testified earlier
14	that if the artist was the most important, you would
15	get a bell curve.
16	And then, I asked you about that, and you
17	said it's actually more of a trapezoid, that it would
18	go up, steady, and come down. Now, isn't that pretty
19	much what we're seeing here with Mariah Carey?
20	She has "Emotions". It starts to go up,
21	and then it starts to come down?
22	A Yes, I would think that you would not have

1	the drop that you would have between "Daydream" and
2	"Butterfly". That's not a that's not a small drop.
3	I can tell you that the record company, I'm sure,
4	spent significant dollars promoting "Butterfly". It
5	was considered it was considered an unsuccessful
6	record.
7	I can tell you also that they certainly,
8	based on the relationship and this is another
9	peculiar situation. Mariah Carey was married at the
10	time to the president of the record company, and he
11	was certainly spending as much money as he could to
12	make his wife successful.
13	And so, I would suggest
14	MR. GARRETT: Are they still married?
15	THE WITNESS: No. But I would certainly
16	suggest that here's a case where it wasn't promotional
17	dollars that had any factor. And in fact, they were
18	spending because I happen to I mean, you know,
19	this was my business. They were spending all they
20	could to make this record successful.
21	BY MR. NEWBERG:
22	Q And do you have any specific inside

1	knowledge about that?
2	A It's been written in the trades. I'm sure
3	you could find articles if you went back at the time.
4	Q And do you
5	A But
6	Q Do you know how many dollars were spent
7	A No.
8	Q on "Butterfly" as compared to
9	"Daydream"?
10	A No, but I would if I had to guess, I
11	would tell you it was probably as much on "Daydream"
12	certainly because they pulled out all the stops to try
13	to make that successful.
14	Q That's a hypothesis you're making, though?
15	You don't have any data on it?
16	A Well, it's pretty well industry
17	industry knowledge.
18	Q Okay. Let's skip over Metallica since I
19	think you actually you actually state in your
20	testimony, at footnotes at footnote three, that
21	Metallica actually is a chart that demonstrates an
22	expected life cycle pattern of an artist?

1	A Yes.
2	Q Okay. So, let's move over Metallica into
3	Celine Dion. And this is another one you said The
4	Beatles might not be a good example, but the other
5	ones in your testimony where you say that greatest
6	hits generally out-perform the studio albums, that
7	this there are other ones that might be better
8	examples.
9	Is this one of the ones that you would
10	consider
11	A No.
1.2	Q a better example?
13	A And I didn't say that they always
14	generally out-perform. I said there are times where
15	they will do better than preceding albums or
16	subsequent albums within the span of a career. Now,
17	in Celine's case, she has had she had the
18	soundtrack from a movie which was a super-hit, that of
19	course would not would not fall into this analysis
20	because it was a soundtrack and there were other
21	people on it.
22	And I would certainly say that you know

she is still obviously a very successful artist. Her sales are still very high. She is more -- more in -- you know, she is still at the top, and we haven't seen a decline in her sales yet.

But I would still say that the material is important and, you know, the fact that she put out a small album, "These are Special Times," which had some -- certainly at four million sales, is a successful album.

The point is, afterwards, they put together a compilation album of hits, and she sold six million. So, all I'm saying here is that obviously, the difference could be attributed in some cases here to the fact that you're going from a successful album at four million to an even more successful album at six, because people bought it because they were hit songs that they liked and it was a way to buy, you know, hits.

I mean, there's -- there's -- in the record business, there is a -- there is a controversy of whether you put out greatest hit albums, or compilation albums, which are greatest hits of various

artists. And the point is, how much does it count as 1 sales because if you're giving people just the songs 2 that they like, obviously they'll buy it because they 3 like those songs. 4 And they may not have to buy the album 5 6 that it came from. And so mostly what you're looking at here, or you hopefully are looking at here, is 7 you're looking at taking hits from artists that are 8 established for a period of time and just putting them 9 together and getting another surge of sales. 10 And those are successful because people 11 12 like the songs moreso than just the artist. 13 And you're pointing -- but let me get back 14 to my question. You point to -- in your testimony, to Celine Dion as an example where her greatest hits 15 album sold substantially -- let me quote it, "Sold 16 17 substantially more than the albums" -- and you're talking about a group of artists -- "these artists had 18 released directly preceding or following the greatest 19 hits release." 20 Yes, and if you look at this, it goes --21 22 the previous album sold four million, and this sold

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1	six million. It's 50 percent more.
2	Q And the previous album is "These are
3	Special Times"?
4	A Right.
5	Q Now, do you happen to know what songs are
6	on "These are Special Times"?
7	A No.
8	Q Do you happen do you know whether it is
9	a studio album at all?
10	A No.
11	Q Is it possible that "These are Special
12	Times" is actually a compilation of Christmas songs
13	done by Celine Dion?
14	A I can say anything is possible. I haven't
15	I did not investigate what was on each of the
16	albums.
17	Q So, you didn't do any investigation into
18	what these albums were before you made your conclusion
19	that "All the WayA Decade of Song" was an example
20	where a greatest hits sold substantially more than the
21	album before it?
22	A Well, it did sell substantially more than

1	the album before it.
2	Q Than the studio album before it?
3	A Than the album before it.
4	Q But your testimony does say "the studio
5	album"?
6	A Yes.
7	Q I just want to hand you, so you have it,
8	what we'll mark as 110 RPX. It's the track listing
9	and some reviews for everyone to look at, which is the
10	track listing for "These are Special Times".
11	And if you could turn to page two of the
12	track listing right there, and would you agree with
13	me, looking at the track listing, that these are all
14	classic Christmas songs that Ms. Dion has covered?
15	A Yes, it is an album of Christmas songs
16	that she is singing.
17	(Whereupon, the above-
18	referenced document was marked
19	as RIAA Exhibit No. 110 RPX for
20	purposes of identification.)
21	BY MR. NEWBERG:
22	Q And would that affect your analysis at

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A Well, it still is -- I mean, these are not necessary her songs. I mean, most of them are not her songs. She is singing a compilation of songs, okay? But yet, when the next release was of -- was of hits of her songs, okay, they did sell -- her sales do go up.

And to the extent that it isn't as clearcut as if was a studio, I would agree with you. But
I would still fall to the premise that by and large,
that the fact that hit albums by artists sell well is
an indication that, in fact, it is the songs that are
important as well as the artist.

We're still not minimizing the importance of the artist. We're just saying that both are important.

Q Well, isn't it the case that if you go back and look at her previous studio album, "Let's Talk About Love" in 1997, that "All the Way...A Decade of Song," her greatest hits album, actually sold three million fewer copies than her studio album?

A That's right.

1	Q So, this really wouldn't be a very good
2	example of showing where the greatest hits album did
3	significantly better than the prior studio album?
4	A This would not be a good example of that.
5	What Celine has here basically is two very big hit
6	albums prior to the release of the hits, two albums in
7	'96 and '97. And those were very successful albums.
8	And then, she put out a hit album that was
9	still successful, and successful based on the fact
LO	that I believe because it contained the songs
L1	people wanted to hear.
L2	Q Well, I'm confused. I thought your
L3	testimony says that when greatest hits albums that
L4	"Greatest hits albums generally out-perform studio
L5	albums," and that this phenomena means that people
L6	like the underlying works of the hits, the things that
17	made hits better, and so they sell better.
L8	Isn't that what you point to Celine Dion
L9	in your testimony for?
20	A I pointed here to the fact that when she
21	had a hit album, she had success selling songs that
22	were more successful than her previous album.

1	Q But in fact, that's not the case?
2	A It wasn't a studio album in the definition
3	of a pure studio album; that is correct. And if you
4	would turn to Chart Seven, to George Strait, or to the
5	next one where you've had greatest hits George
6	Strait is an example. You have an artist who has many
7	albums out there that are selling.
8	His career seems, in the 1995, '96, '97,
9	'98, '99, to sort of be on a down-swing. And then, he
10	puts out a greatest hits album, doesn't sell as well
11	as some of his older albums, but it certainly sells
12	better than his previous albums over a period of time.
13	And this is something, of course, that
14	just came from the top 20 artists. If you were to
15	expand this to other artists, you would find even
16	bigger differences where, in less popular artists,
17	greatest hits have even a bigger effect.
18	Q But your testimony does focus on the top
19	20 artists, does it not?
20	A Right.
21	Q And so far, the first two examples we've
22	gone through that you mentioned specifically in your

1	testimony, which I haven't skipped any, do not prove
2	the point that greatest hits albums did substantially
3	better than the album studio albums prior and
4	subsequent to.
5	A Okay.
6	Q And actually, I believe the next, which we
7	really need to get into but I believe the next
8	chart is Chart Six, Kenny G, is the next one with a
9	greatest hits collection. And would you agree that
10	Kenny G's greatest hits collections actually did
11	his greatest hits gift collection, as "Classics in the
12	Key of G," actually did significantly worse than his
13	other albums?
14	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: What chart number is
15	that?
16	MR. NEWBERG: Chart Six.
17	THE WITNESS: We've said that Kenny G
18	seems to show the more of the lifestyle pattern.
19	Here's an artist that seems to be on the way down.
20	BY MR. NEWBERG:
21	Q And his greatest hits albums didn't change
22	that pattern at all?

1	A It didn't change thé pattern. It did
2	better than his subsequent album and
3	Q Now, which album is that?
4	A Well, greatest hits did better than
5	"Classics in the Key of G". But I've said that this
6	is more of a lifestyle example.
7	Q Just so we can get off this chart, do you
8	happen to know what songs are on "Classics in the Key
9	of G"?
10	A No.
11	Q Do you happen to know whether that's also
12	a hits compilation?
13	A No. But I've said that this this chart
14	appears to look like a lifestyle situation.
15	Q Let's move forward to another one that you
16	point to specifically in your testimony. I don't want
17	to take up too much more time with this, so I'm going
18	to skip to just a few that you point to specifically
19	in your testimony.
20	If you feel that there are any I skipped
21	that you would rather go through, please let me know
22	and we'll do so, okay?

1	A Okay.
2	Q Let's go to Chart Ten, which is Reba
3	McIntyre.
4	MR. JACOBY: Didn't you skip Garth Brooks,
5	by the way? You may have mis-stated. You said you
6	covered each one.
7	MR. NEWBERG: I have covered each one that
8	he pointed to in his greatest hits, is what I said.
9	MR. JACOBY: Did you point to Garth
10	Brooks?
11	MR. NEWBERG: Did he point to Garth Brooks
12	and his greatest hits?
13	THE WITNESS: No, I don't think so.
14	MR. JACOBY: Yes.
15	MR. NEWBERG: Okay.
16	MR. JACOBY: That was the first one, and
17	you skipped that one.
18	MR. NEWBERG: Okay, we can go back to
19	Garth Brooks.
20	MR. JACOBY: Okay. You made a
21	representation that you had covered each one, and I
22	didn't want to leave a false representation on the

1	record.
2	MR. NEWBERG: That's fine.
3	BY MR. NEWBERG:
4	Q We can go back to Garth Brooks if you'd
5	like.
6	A Okay.
7	Q I believe you discussed Garth Brooks.
8	That's why I went over it, but we can if you'd like
9	to discuss more with Garth Brooks, we can.
10	A No, Garth Brooks, I mean, I I just
11	point out that there were people that had hit albums.
12	Garth Brooks, his first his album, "The Hits,"
13	which was in 1994, sold considerably more pieces than
14	his two studio albums preceding and following, "End
15	Pieces" and "Fresh Horses".
16	Q And if you look at 1998, Garth Brooks put
17	out both a limited series boxed set and a "Double
18	Live". Do you happen to know whether those are also
19	hits compilations?
20	A There are hits on those.
21	Q And did those seem to follow a downward
22	trend from his previous studio album, "Sevens"?

1	A W	Well, if you were to if you were to
2	combine the t	two of them, "Double Live" and "Limited
3	Series Box-se	ets," you'd have sales that would be
4	higher than "	Sevens".
5	Q S	so, we would have to combine the two
6	greatest hits	3?
7	A W	Well, but you're putting them out in
8	pretty much a	t the same time.
9	Q D	o you know exactly when they came out?
10	A I	couldn't give you the exact dates. I
11	could get the	em.
12	Q D	o you know how they were promoted?
13	A I	don't remember.
14	Q D	o you know why "Double Live" did
15	11	
	significantly	better than the boxed set?
16		better than the boxed set? Double Live" was probably I mean, I'm
16 17	A "	
	A " not sure; I wo	Double Live" was probably I mean, I'm
17	A " not sure; I wo	Double Live" was probably I mean, I'm ould guess it sounds like it was probably
17	not sure; I wo	Double Live" was probably I mean, I'm ould guess it sounds like it was probably
17 18 19	not sure; I wo	Double Live" was probably I mean, I'm ould guess it sounds like it was probably e, and probably had more promotion behind

1	A No, I mean
2	Q If you'd like to point out
3	A Is that why we're going to Reba?
4	Q I'm actually looking at it because you
5	pointed out Reba for two reasons. But like I said,
6	I'd be happy to go through any
7	A Well, you have George Strait, which is
8	Chart Seven, which I also point out his "2000 Greatest
9	Hits". And all I'm really pointing out here is
10	that's you've had you've had a situation where a
11	lot of his album sales have sort of gone down.
12	And suddenly, he puts out a greatest hits,
13	and he gets a it becomes successful, more
14	successful than his previous album. Again, it's a
15	function of the artist, George Strait, and the fact
16	that he has now compiled a group of hits that people
17	want to hear.
18	He puts it out together. And the
19	combination of the two makes for a success.
20	Q And which of George Strait's greatest hits
21	albums on this chart are you pointing to?
22	A To the one at the end of 2000?

,	
1.	Q "The Latest Greatest Straitest Hits"?
2	A Right.
3	Q And looking at the album right before that
4	that says "Christmas" and the album prior to that says
5	"Merry Christmas, Wherever You Are"
6	A Okay.
7	Q do you
8	A Well, those, I would assume, are very
9	limited. And I'm looking more at what's happened
10	compared to "Always Never," "One Step at a Time," and
11	his his general studio albums were on a sagging
12	basis.
13	I wouldn't profess to say that because
14	"Christmas" did poorly that you're comparing it to
15	"Christmas". But you're comparing it to a trend. It
16	isn't one the whole idea here is that you're not
17	looking for individual, isolated cases.
18	You're looking for a trend. In this
19	particular case, it fits the situation where his sales
20	on studio albums were on the decline and came up with
21	the greatest hits albums, and his sales bumped up
22	again.

1	Q I'm sorry; I just don't see the decline.
2	Perhaps, you could point it out. I see that "Latest
3	Greatest Straitest Hits" sold slightly better than
4	"Always Never the Same" and slightly worse than "One
5	Step at a Time."
6	A Yes, but you would expect that if he was
7	to put out another studio album at that time, it would
8	have he was on a down-trend at the time. And this
9	is sort of reversed because the sales of "Always
10	Never," "The Latest Greatest Hits" was was now
11	going back in the opposite direction.
12	Q Would you consider that a significant
13	change, the greatest hits sales, as opposed to the
14	"Always Never the Same" sales?
15	A I think it was because you you have to
16	look at the combination of the greatest hits and then
17	the album of George Strait that appeared pretty much
18	close to the same time frame.
19	And if you looked at the two of them
20	together and just in the time line as when these were
21	happening, and from the point of view of the record
22	company, you suddenly saw a resurgence of George

1	Strait.
2	Q So, the resurgence is going from about a
3	million sales to about 1.2 or one and a quarter
4	million sales?
5	A Or if you add the two together they
6	came out pretty much simultaneously it's up to over
7	two million.
8	Q Which two that came out almost
9	simultaneously?
10	A "Latest Greatest Hits" and "George
11	Strait".
12	Q Okay, so if you added together also the
13	"Always Never the Same," "Merry Christmas Wherever You
14	Are, " and "Christmas," which seem to have all come out
15	in 1999, that would probably be about equal, wouldn't
16	it?
17	A Well, it wouldn't be equal certainly to
18	adding those two together. And as I said as you've
19	pointed out, it's probably unfair to use something
20	like a Christmas album as as a basis in that.
21	Q Okay, any others we should hit before
22	Reba?

1	A No.
2	Q Oh, by the way, as an Eric Clapton fan, I
3	believe Judge Van Loon is right that "Riding with the
4	King" is not on his chart. But "Crossroads 2" is a
5	greatest hits collection and also appears not to be on
6	the Eric Clapton chart. It's a 1996 release.
7	A I'd have to see why.
8	Q That's all right; we can just go on to
9	Reba.
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: What chart number is
11	that?
12	MR. NEWBERG: Reba McIntyre, Chart Ten.
13	BY MR. NEWBERG:
14	Q Now, I believe in your testimony, you
15	point to Reba McIntyre to make two points: one, to
16	show an example where a new studio studio album did
17	significantly better than the studio albums before it,
18	thus reversing a trend; and two, to show an example
19	where a hits compilation did significantly better than
20	the studio albums preceding and subsequent to it. Is
21	that correct?
22	A Yes

1	Q And could you tell us what you were
2	looking at when you made that statement in your
3	testimony?
4	A Well, the Volume II of the "Greatest Hits"
5	in 1993 sold significantly more than her previous
6	studio albums of even, you know, "For My Broken Heart"
7	and "It's Your Call".
8	Q What about "Forever in Your Eyes"?
9	A That's obviously a very low selling album.
10	I'm not sure exactly what was on it. But if you look
11	at that, then it's even more significant.
12	Q Do you happen to know whether "Forever in
13	Your Eyes" is actually like "Greatest Hits," a hits
14	compilation?
15	A I'm not sure of what was on it, but I was
16	looking more at the "For My Broken Heart" and "It's
17	Your Call".
18	Q And you decided to not look at "Forever in
19	Your Eyes" just because it was so small?
20	A Yes, and I'm looking for trends. I'm not
21	looking for individual situations. Here is an example
22	of a greatest hits that that sold significantly
1	1

1	better.
2	Q If "Forever in Your Eyes" was a hits
3	compilation let's just assume for now that it was
4	could you explain why that might do so poorly,
5	while the "Greatest Hits, Volume II," which was
6	released right after it, did so well?
7	A I would have to go back and look and see
8	what was on it, whether it was really sold to all
9	stores, whether it was how it was promoted,
10	etcetera.
11	Q And what about the point where you were
12	showing a new studio album did significantly better
13	than the studio album before it?
14	A We were looking at "Starting Over" there,
15	I believe.
16	MR. JACOBY: What?
L7	MR. NEWBERG: In his testimony, he points
L8	to Reba McIntyre as an example where a new studio
L9	album does significantly better than the albums
20	preceding it, reversing a trend.
21	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: What page is that,
22	Mr. Newberg?

1.	MR. NEWBERG: In fact, I believe he points
2	to "Starting Over" specifically
3	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Is that paragraph
4	seven?
5	MR. NEWBERG: which was paragraph
6	seven.
7	MR. JACOBY: It was paragraph seven.
8	MR. NEWBERG: Yes, paragraph seven.
9	MR. JACOBY: Okay, go ahead.
10	THE WITNESS: I assume they were looking
11	at "Oklahoma Girl".
12	THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Fine, you're
13	going to have to speak up.
14	THE WITNESS: I assume they were looking
15	at "Oklahoma Girl".
16	BY MR. NEWBERG:
17	Q Okay, my first question is, do you happen
18	to know what songs were on "Starting Over"?
19	A No, I do not.
20	Q I'd like to hand something out as RIAA
21	Exhibit No. 111 DPX RPX, excuse me. If you would
22	take a look at "Starting Over" and look at the track

1	list?
2	A Yes?
3	(Whereupon, the above-
4	referenced document was marked
5	as RIAA Exhibit No. 111 RPX for
6	purposes of identification.)
7	BY MR. NEWBERG:
8	Q Do you recognize any of those songs?
9	A I don't.
10	Q Do you know Linda Rondstat's "You're No
11	Good" or the Romantics' "Talking in Your Sleep" or
12	"Please Come to Boston"?
13	A Obviously, "Please Come to Boston," I've
14	heard the title. But I I'm not familiar with the
15	other songs on this album.
16	Q Do you know if it's possible that this
17	album, "Starting Over," was actually simply a cover
18	album that Reba McIntyre did of other people's hits,
19	underlying works?
20	A I guess it's possible. I don't know.
21	Q Would that affect your analysis at all?
22	A Well, if it was a cover album and if I

1	knew it had been a cover album, then I would not have
2	used this as an example for showing a reversing of a
3	downward trend.
4	Q And albums that was compared to, I guess
5	you skipped "American Legends". That's done because
6	it's a greatest hits
7	A Obviously.
8	Q album. Do you happen to know if
9	"Oklahoma Girl" is also a hits compilation?
10	A I don't know.
11	Q Would it affect your analysis if "Oklahoma
12	Girl" was a hits compilation?
13	A It would have affected it would affect
14	it to the extent that this would not be a good example
L5	of a reverse trend. But there are other artists here
16	that were better examples of a reverse trend.
L7	Q Okay. Then, let's move on to another
18	artist.
19	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Mr. Newberg, do you
20	have a sense of about how long
21	MR. NEWBERG: Yes, I have about two more
22	charts three more charts, one of which is brief,

1	and the oth	er two which are the same amount of time
2	that I've be	een taking on each chart.
3		BY MR. NEWBERG:
4	Q	The next one I'd like to look to is U2,
5	Chart 12.	
6	A	Yes?
7	Q	Now, again, you point to U2, Chart 12, as
8	an example v	where a new studio album did significantly
9	better than	the albums before it, thus reversing a
10	trend?	
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	And which album were you looking at there?
13	A	"Pop" and also "Zooropa".
14	Q	"Zooropa"?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	As compared to "All That You Can't Leave
17	Behind"?	
18	A	Compared to "All That You Can't Leave
19	Behind".	
20	Q	And you weren't comparing it to the to
21	the best-of	albums
22	A	No.

1	Q which did significantly worse than "All
2	That You Can't Leave Behind"?
3	A No.
4	Q And you would agree that those are
5	greatest hits compilations?
6	A They're hit compilations.
7	Q And do you see a significant difference
8	between "All That You Can't Leave Behind" and
9	"Zooropa" seven years apart and less than a million
10	copies sold apart?
11	A I see a difference because U2 has in
12	the industry, was considered a band that was on their
13	way down. And this album was a was considered a
14	resurrection of their career as a new as a new
15	as an up-tick to their career.
16	Q And it wouldn't have anything to do with
17	the fact that they had only released one studio album
18	one studio album in the previous seven years?
19	A That may have had some effect on them.
20	Q That people might have been
21	A Well, I think
22	Q U2 fans might have been thirsty for a new

1	studio album?
2	A Well, they might have been, but I also
3	think it depends on the material.
4	Q Okay. We're going to make a big jump here
5	to because of the time to Chart 18, the Dave
6	Matthews Band.
7	Here, I believed you point to the album
8	"Recently" as the new studio album that did
9	significantly worse than the previous studio album;
10	thereby, reversing a positive trend. Is that correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And your conclusion there was that the
13	public reacted negatively to the underlying musical
14	works; is that correct?
15	A There was a reason there would be some
16	reason that "Recently" would sell less, and then other
17	albums they have to have sold more.
18	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Mr. Fine, you're going
19	to have to
20	THE WITNESS: Oh. There would be a reason
21	why "Recently" sold less, and other albums, at least
22	afterwards, sold greater.

1	BY MR. NEWBERG:
2	Q Did you happen to look at what type of
3	album "Recently" was?
4	A No, I did not.
5	Q Well, here's RIAA Exhibit 112 RPX, which
6	I will note that even though it didn't sell very well
7	in the United States, it's apparently Amazon's sixth
8	most popular seller in Portugal.
9	[Whereupon, Exhibit 112 RPX was
10	marked for evidence]
11	Now, taking a look at 112 RPX, the
12	Amazon.com info sheet for "Recently," do you see there
13	that it is a live album, titled, "Recently Live"?
14	THE WITNESS: Yes, I see the title there.
15	BY MR. NEWBERG:
16	Q And if you go to track listing, do you see
17	that there are only five tracks on the entire album?
18	A They have five tracks here, yes.
19	Q And are you familiar with Dave Matthews
20	Band? Do you know whether any of these tracks
21	appeared on any of his previous albums?
22	A I'm not familiar with him

1	Q Familiar with the song
2	A I'm sorry. I'm not familiar with the Dave
3	Matthews Band. So I'm not sure whether these songs
4	were good on other albums.
5	Q Are you familiar with the song "All Along
6	the Watchtower"?
7	A No.
8	Q Jimi Hendrix or the U2 versions of the
9	song?
LO	A No.
11	Q Well, if "Recently" was a live,
12	independently released recording of only five musical
13	works, all of which were works from prior albums or a
14	cover of another artist recording, does that change
15	your analysis at all?
16	A Yes.
L7	Q How would it change it?
18	A It would just change in this particular
19	case this would not be a good case of what I was
20	pointing to.
21	Q In fact, the four worst sellers on this
22	album, would you agree, are "Remember Two Things,"

1	"Recently," "Live at Red Rocks," and "Listener
2	Supported"?
3	A Those are the four.
4	Q Is that correct?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Do you happen to know whether all four of
7	those albums are live compilation albums by the Dave
8	Matthews Band?
9	A I don't know.
10	Q If that were the case, and we were to take
11	those albums out, would the remaining albums in the
12	Dave Matthews Band follow your traditional curve of
13	the importance of the artist?
14	A Well, I would say even here that the drop
15	between "Crash" and "Before These Crowded Streets"
16	would be a drop that would be reflective somewhat of
17	different materials, of the value of the materials.
18	That's a significant drop.
19	Q Would you agree that the drop of "Crash"
20	to "Before These Crowded Streets" looks to be about
21	the same as the drop of "Before These Crowded Streets"
22	to the next studio album, "Everyday"?

1	A No. I think you'd have to say "Crash" is
2	slightly under 5 million; "Before These
3	Crowds," what three and a half. So you'd
4	probably have about a million-and-a-half. And the
5	difference here is probably, maybe, half of that
6	difference.
7	Q So the difference from "Before These
8	Crowded Streets" to "Everyday" is about 750,000
9	copies.
10	A Six hundred, something like that.
11	Q So you don't think that's a general trend,
12	a general downward trend? You disagree with me on
13	that.
14	A Yeah, I would think that it has that
15	the initial change is really due to the material.
16	Q Okay. Let's go on to the last part of the
17	exhibit, the Jimmy Buffet chart, Chart 20.
18	And I believe you point to Jimmy Buffet
19	specifically in your testimony, paragraph 7, saying
20	that, Jimmy Buffet's 'Beach House on the Moon' far
21	exceeded the sales of their most recent prior albums."
22	A Yes.

1	Q And you'd consider that a successful come
2	back of Jimmy Buffet.
3	A Well, I'm not sure that you'd have to say
4	come back, but it's I would certainly attribute
5	that to material that his audience liked, and,
6	therefore, brought more of it than his previous.
7	Q Okay. Are you a Jimmy Buffet fan,
8	Mr. Fine?
9	A No.
10	Q Well, I was hoping you'd say yes, because
11	it would save a lot of time if we can say that half of
12	the albums listed on this chart are re-releases of old
13	Jimmy Buffet albums and "Greatest Hits" and live
14	compilations.
15	If you'll trust me, in the interest of
16	time I have the track listings. I can certainly give
17	them to you. But I count 7 out of the 14 albums on
18	this chart to be new studio albums. That would be
19	both "Speeches, Bores and Ballads," "Fruitcakes,"
20	"Barometer Soup," "Banana Wind," "Christmas Island,"
21	"Don't Stop the Carnival," and "Beach House on the
22	Moon."

1	Now, if you believe one of those not to be
2	a new studio album or believe that album is a new
3	studio album, please let me know.
4	MR. JACOBY: Objection. That's an
5	improper question. If you want to ask the witness
6	what he knows and doesn't know, that's fine. But you
7	can't prove anything by what he doesn't know.
8	BY MR. NEWBERG:
9	Q Okay. Do you know whether that's an
10	accurate
11	A I don't.
12	Q This is the chart that you've submitted
13	with your testimony. Did you check over these albums
14	and what they contained in their history before
15	putting it into this chart?
16	A No, I did not.
17	Q Did you check over which albums were
18	studio albums and which albums weren't before you made
19	the conclusion that "Beach House on the Moon" changed
20	a negative trend?
21	A Well, if I hear what you just said, that
22	"Don't Stop the Carnival" was a studio album, then

"Beach House on the Moon" certainly sold significantly better than "Don't Stop the Carnival." And that would just be an indication of the -- again, the material.

The important thing in my analysis wasn't to look at individual artists and determine whether they were up trends or down trends, et cetera. It really is the premise that, if the artist is important, then sales should be pretty flat from studio to studio album. And that if the -- and it wouldn't matter by the supposition that the material doesn't matter, then you should really be up there. The fact that you had ups and down, even if they're not big ups and downs, just the fact that they go up and down would indicate that those ups and downs are caused by the material.

Q Now, did I just hear you incorrectly or did you just say that if it was just the artist, you would see it being flat? I thought before you were saying a bell curve or a trapezoid.

A Well, it would be flat to the extent once you reach the level of popularity, you would stay there. Obviously, your first album is not going to

1	be when you're a new artist you're not going to be
2	at the top of the trapezoids. So.you're going to get
3	up there, and you're going to stay there for a period
4	of time, and then you're going to come down. And when
5	you see ups and downs I mean, even little ups and
6	downs here from "Fruitcakes" to "Barometer," which
7	is and in this case, the numbers, of course the
8	scale is different. It's 900,000 down to 780,000,
9	back to 900,000, down to 800,000, down to 300,000,
10	back to 700,000. I would say that those are ups and
11	downs, of course, are by the material that Jimmy
12	Buffet is singing. Because if it was just Jimmy
13	Buffet and he can sing anything, you'd expect this
14	thing to be fairly level.
15	Q So getting back to the question I threw at
16	you about an hour ago, which was, if the artist was
17	80 percent important and the underlying musical work
18	was 20 percent important, wouldn't you see these 750
19	to 800s, 900s, 800?
20	A I think you'd see some stuff like 700 to
21	750 that but you wouldn't see drops that go as
22	far down as a lot of these drops go down.

1	Q Now correct me if I'm wrong. So to get a
2	100,000 album change here, you'd have to assume that
4	100,000 album change here, you a have to assume that
3	the musical work was at least as important as the
4	artist?
5	A No, I can't put a value to it. But here,
6	if you look at "Don't Stop the Carnival" and look at
7	"Beach House" and the previous one, I guess "Christmas
8	Island," you're going from 800,000 to under 400,000,
9	which is a 50 percent decline. Let's look at it that
LO	way.
11	Q Okay.
L2	A And then a jump of 400,000 to 700,000,
L3	it's 75 percent better than that. Those kinds of
L4	jumps, the material has to be more than a minor
L5	effect.
L6	Q Okay. Would you agree with me that
L7	outside "Don't Stop the Carnival," that all six of the
L8	other albums studio albums went anywhere from
L9	700,000 to 900,000 albums sold over this decade time
20	period?
21	A That's what this says, yes.
22	Q Right. And "Beach House on the Moon"

1	would actually be the worst of those six.
2	A Excluding "Don't Stop the Carnival"?
3	Q Right.
4	A It would be the worst of them.
5	Q Excluding "Don't Stop the Carnival," of
6	course
7	A That's correct.
8	Q which you've said that would be what
9	you'd compare it to.
10	Do you happen to know what the material is
11	on the album "Don't Stop the Carnival"?
12	A No. But I would also looking at this
13	point out that the drop from "Fruitcakes" to
14	"Barometer" would be an indication of the material
15	too, because you would have expected if it then
16	bounces back afterwards, 120,000 change on 900,000 is
17	a significant drop.
18	Q Does it have anything to do with something
19	you were saying before, that these albums are so close
20	to each other?
21	A Well, but it won't explain why the next
22	one that's so close "Banana Wind" suddenly goes

1	back up. I think it's the material that causes the
2	albums to go down and go back up.
3	Q Which one are you talking about that goes
4	back up?
5	A "Banana Wind" versus "Barometer."
6	Q Okay. And just to follow up on my
7	question about "Don't Stop the Carnival," doesn't that
8	strike you significantly lower than the other six
9	studio albums?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Would it surprise you to learn that "Don't
12	Stop the Carnival" was actually a musical written by
13	Jimmy Buffet and Herman Wouk, based on Herman Wouk's
14	novel of the same name?
15	A I don't know.
16	Q If that was the case, would that make
17	"Don't Stop the Carnival" a good album to look at?
18	A Well, it wouldn't be as I think it's
19	still reasonable to look at it, because if he's
20	written the songs, and if the songs were all good,
21	people still would have bought it. So I don't think
22	that's a reason not to look at it. I think

you've -- you've skipped over Chart 14, which is a 1 2 chart that when they want to look at --ARBITRATOR VON KANN: We have to skip over 3 some charts. 4 5 THE WITNESS: Well, let's just look at one because it's the one of the "Greatest Hits" that, of 6 And I think here's even a 7 course, is left out. 8 clearer situation of what happens with materials. 9 sort of shows everything. country artist; 10 puts reasonable of titles. 11 amount And you 12 fluctuations up and down and up and down, which, 13 again, I say indicates the acceptance of the words. 14 You also have the "Greatest Hits," which, obviously, sells better than any of the studio albums before it 15 16 or afterwards. So I think this is a clearer example 17 of the effect of songs. And, again, I'm not trying to 18 say that the artist doesn't matter. I think the point 19 is, they both matter. 20 BY MR. NEWBERG: Just a point on the "Greatest Hits," I 21 Q 22 don't want anyone to think we skipped over any for any

1	reason but time.
2	MR. JACOBY: Oh, no, we would never assume
3	that.
4	MR. NEWBERG: I can go through them all if
5	you like.
6	"Super Hits," do you know if that's a
7	"Greatest Hits" collection?
8	THE WITNESS: I assume there are
9	some it sounds like it is from the "Super Hits."
10	And that particular one did not do well, and I could
11	not tell you why.
12	BY MR. NEWBERG:
13	Q Do you know if greatest hits are
14	considered better than super hits?
15	A No.
16	Q So, based that "Greatest Hits" had more
17	sales than the studio albums and "Super Hits" actually
18	had fewer hits than any of the other studio albums,
19	does that actually tell us anything about greatest
20	hits albums?
21	A Yeah. I think by and large they still
22	sell well, and that the and that this particular

1	album, without knowing exactly about it, there's
2	probably some other reason that this did not do well.
3	Q What might be one of those reasons?
4	A I don't know. It could have been who
5	released it, how it was promoted, et cetera.
6	Q So there are other factors that go into
7	why the sound recording might not do as well.
8	A Yes.
9	Q Any other charts that you'd like me to go
10	over on this exhibit?
11	A No.
12	Q Just the last little question I have on
13	Chart 5, the Celine Dion chart. The four albums that
14	seem to be far below her other albums, the last one is
15	"Volume 1, Collector Series." Would you agree with me
16	that that sounds like hits collection?
17	A It sounds like it, but I'd have to look
18	into it because it may be a box hit or something of
19	that nature. It may not be a single album.
20	Q But you haven't looked into it.
21	A No, I haven't.
22	Q And the other three albums. You wouldn't

1	point to those to say that certain albums did better
2	or worse than others because of the musical work,
3	would you?
4	A Which three are we talking about?
5	Q The three
6	A French albums?
7	Q French albums.
8	A Yeah. No, I would not.
9	Q Okay. Just making sure.
10	And do you happen to know that on all
11	three of those albums, all of the songs on those
12	albums are entirely in French?
13	A I believe they are.
14	Q And just a couple of questions on one-hit
15	wonders, which you mentioned before. You said when
16	you pick the charts, you just picked a few from
17	memory.
18	A Yes.
19	Q You didn't use any standard criterion.
20	A No.
21	Q And you didn't have any statistical
22	correlation done.

1	A No.
2	MR. NEWBERG: No further questions.
3	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Anything on redirect,
4	Mr. Jacoby?
5	MR. JACOBY: No questions.
6	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Do either of the
7	panelists have questions?
8	Then, Mr. Fine, we'd like to thank you for
9	you reappearance, and your charts, and this
10	information. I want to just clarify, the exhibits
11	that you handed up and reviewed and were discussed,
12	they're not offered, correct?
13	MR. NEWBERG: Not offered.
14	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Okay. Then am I
15	correct that our next witness is Dr. Murdoch?
16	MR. RICH: May I address that briefly,
17	Mr. Chairman?
18	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Certainly.
19	MR. RICH: This morning I learned that I
20	have to attend a funeral in Brooklyn tomorrow at noon
21	unexpectedly. And I need to conduct Mr. Fisher's
22	examination. If there is any concern that if we

1	follow the sequence of Ms. Murdoch and Mr. Fisher,
2	that he might slip over to tomorrow. Ms. Murdoch and
3	Ms. Leary have agreed, certainly, to sequence it
4	differently, such that we would put Mr. Fisher on
5	directly after lunch.
6	I haven't had a chance to address this
7	with counsel from the other side, yet, either. But
8	everybody's confident we can conclude both today, then
9	we can maintain the sequence; else I would request,
10	assuming the reporter were agreeable, that we simply
11	shift the order of sequence of the two.
12	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Do you have an
13	estimate on the direct and cross of Dr. Murdoch?
14	MS. LEARY: I'd say about three minutes on
15	direct.
16	MR. GARRETT: I don't think it would be
17	longer than about an hour-and-a-half to two hours.
18	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Cross?
19	MR. GARRETT: On cross, yes. I'm
20	perfectly amenable to changing the order. I'm doing
21	both of the witnesses, and I'm prepared to do either
22	one of them, however Mr. Rich would prefer.

1	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: If you're amenable, I
2	think certainly based on the time estimates from last
3	Wednesday, it could put in doubt whether we would
4	finish them both in today. And we, of course, want to
5	be as accommodating as possible in a funeral
6	situation.
7	MR. RICH: I would propose we would
8	proceed, then, with Professor Fisher right after
9	lunch.
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, we'll adjourn,
11	then, until 1:30, at which time we'll hear from
12	Professor Fisher.
13	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
14	the record from 12:29 p.m. until 1:36 p.m.)
15	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Professor Fisher,
16	welcome back. And we're delighted to have you back
17	with us. And we're going to need to ask your
18	indulgence for a couple minutes while we deal with a
19	couple of administrative matters.
20	We have conferred further with the staff
21	of the library. Apparently, the highest level people
22	at the library, right now as we sit here, just started

1	a meeting about whether to close the library tomorrow.
2	Both the House and the Senate are going to be closed.
3	They apparently discovered some anthrax in the
4	ventilation system in the Hart Senate office building,
5	and they're going to sweep the tunnels that connect
6	the two groups of buildings, and the Capitol, and a
7	few other things.
8	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Do we know that it's
9	anthrax? I'm not sure we know.
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes.
11	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: We do for sure?
12	Okay. All right.
13	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Some of us know.
14	Upon reflection and discussion, the panel
15	realizes that the worst of all worlds would be that
16	they decide tonight to close this building, and we
17	leave here tonight not knowing that. And at that
18	point, no one would be able to get back in tomorrow
19	morning to get their materials to move them to another
20	location. So we would be significantly handicapped,
21	and we would end up, at a minimum, losing part of the
22	day while we were having transition.

Given all that, we are thinking that the prudent thing for us to do, assuming that the space is available, is to follow the lead of the House and the Senate, and plan to move all of our materials certainly for the rest of this week and I guess Monday. But, perhaps, we should just sort of assume for the duration the idea that we fully anticipate that we'll all be back on Monday or Tuesday. But be prepared, essentially, to be able to go forward with our hearing, with everybody having the appropriate materials at hand, in an alternative location if the worst case comes to past.

So it would be our inclination to say, assuming that this works physically, that we would alert people for assistance to move boxes and things. Plan to do that at the close of the hearing today and to reconvene tomorrow morning at 9 at Arnold & Porter.

Upon reflection and further discussion over lunch and things of that nature, is there reason why we should not proceed in that way or are people completely comfortable with our doing that?

MR. GARRETT: Well, just a caveat. I

1	learned today, earlier, there was an anthrax scare at
2	Arnold & Porter.
3	MR. KIRBY: Oh, they eat it for breakfast.
4	MR. GARRETT: It ultimately turned out to
5	be powdered sugar from a jelly doughnut. But the
6	nerves are not any different there than they are up
7	here. But that aside, there's no problem in having
8	everyone there. I just hope this is not one of these
9	cases where no good deed goes unpunished, because
10	there will probably be some logistical, at least
11	tomorrow morning, just getting everything all set up,
12	or at least I'm warning you of that. But I expect
13	we'll be able to go smoothly meeting at 9.
14	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, we were
15	thinking in fact I said 9. We were thinking it
16	might be appropriate to say we wouldn't start until
17	9:30 or 10, or something to give additional time for
18	adjustment and set up.
19	MR. GARRETT: That's fine.
20	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Is this workable as
21	far as everybody on that side of the room?
22	MR. STEINTHAL: It's fine with us, as long

as we know by 4 -- and we will know as of now -- in 1 2 which we'll be prepared to go through the weekend there. And we'll reassess whether we come back here. 3 ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Do you envision, 4 5 Mr. Steinthal, basically clearing our everything, so that if in the worst case if we had to stay at 6 Arnold & Porter for the duration, we could do it? 7 MR. STEINTHAL: I haven't thought about 8 But I think my judgment would be yes. If we're 9 going to pack up a lot of stuff, it's easier just to 10 take everything than it is to make decisions about 11 what to take and what not to take. 1.2 13 ARBITRATOR VON KANN: To me that would be 14 the safest course. We hope we can get back in here 15 soon, but if we can't, we can finish it the other 16 location. 17 MR. STEINTHAL: I think that would be my 18 approach. CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Okay. And what the 19 2.0 library will do is post this on their Web site. And they have some other devices in terms of public 21 22 notification, because we are a public hearing,

although the public has not been beating down the 1 doors exactly to get in. 2 Well, let's assume, then, that is what we 3 will do. Is there a preference about starting at 9:30 4 5 versus 10? 6 MR. STEINTHAL: I'd prefer to start at 9:30 just to try to keep as much of the day. I mean, 7 we've got a pretty full day. Mr. Fine took a little 8 9 bit longer I think than was budgeted. So even though we've lost Ms. Morissette for Friday morning, I think 10 we're still pretty aggressive to get everything 11 12 accomplished by Friday. 13 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: You could communicate to her that from the point of view of scheduling, she 14 has performed a public service by helping to give us 15 16 a little bit more leeway on Friday. 17 MR. STEINTHAL: And the question is whether I should seek to have her in next week or 18 19 simply wait. And that's something I want to take a look at the way the schedule's going. And we were 20 21 considering waiving on the artists all along in the that we'd like to have them here, but, 22

1	obviously, in the scheme of things I think that
2	waiving on the artists is going to be a tremendous
3	hardship.
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: We would leave that
5	completely at your discretion. Obviously, we want to
6	hear live from any witness that you think is
7	appropriate for us to hear from live, but it's up to
8	you.
9	We were thinking and had a request of
10	the parties that the panel also will need to have
11	rebuttal materials moved to Arnold & Porter. We were
12	thinking that if a large number of Sherpas are going
13	to arrive to move a number of boxes, whether if each
14	one of us had a couple
15	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Do we get a free
16	ride on your Sherpas?
17	MR. GARRETT: Sure.
18	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Is that doable?
19	MS. LEARY: I'm not a Sherpa.
20	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: We'll exclude
21	Ms. Leary from our request then.
22	Okay. Thank you very much. Let's

consider it done then. 9:30 is when we'll start tomorrow morning at Arnold & Porter, with enormous thanks for your graciousness, Mr. Garrett, in being able to arrange this for us at very short notice.

MR. GARRETT: Sure.

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Mr. Garrett, do we need to say -- for purposes of this public notice in case, lo and behold, somebody should show up -- a

MR. GARRETT: When you walk through the doors there will be an escalator that will take you up to the second floor. And there's a reception desk at the second floor, and they'll instruct everybody where to go.

particular floor at 555 12th Street, or where do they

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Excellent.

The other matter that we held over was the question of the sharing of the transcripts and the potential comment by Mr. Marks. We'd like to follow through with your suggestion with regard to the transcript; that you would make a designation of those portions that you would like to share, and submit that

report?

to Seth Greenstein, the counsel for Yahoo. 1 2 there's agreement from him on the things that should be shared, then that would be appropriate to have 3 people look at. 4 5 With regard to the commenting --ARBITRATOR VON KANN: On that last point, 6 7 I suppose if there's not agreement, we probably need 8 to have a time when Mr. Greenstein and you could be 9 heard on that together. MR. GARRETT: Well, we'll do our best to 10 11 agree. 12 If it needs to CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. 13 come back before us, it would need to be in relatively 14 short order. 15 With regard to the comment, Mr. Garrett, upon reflection, we were thinking, but wanted to 16 17 inquire specifically -- that the amount of time the witness 18 from Yahoo took probably not was representative of what the others will do. The 19 20 significance of that particular agreement is, arguably, in a different category from the others. He 21 was represented by counsel, and the others weren't. 22

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1	And we're thinking that given on the one hand the
2	somewhat unrepresentative status of Yahoo and the
3	Yahoo agreement, balancing that against the potential
4	time, if there were comments on all of the different
5	ones, we're understanding your request to be that
6	Mr. Marks be given an opportunity to comment on
7	portions of the Yahoo testimony as opposed to a
8	broader request to comment on other ones. Is that
9	correct?
10	MR. GARRETT: I think I did confine my
11	requests to Yahoo. And I specifically identified
12	Mr. Marks. And they also want Mr. Kenswil, who is a
13	member of the Negotiating Committee, to comment on it.
14	But I don't think that what he would have to say would
15	be extensive.
16	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: We're assuming that
17	this is not a complete reopening, sort of redirect
18	testimony; it's strictly in the nature of rebuttal
19	that would be confined to a focused response only to
20	matters relating to that negotiation.
21	MR. GARRETT: Definitely. And I'm only
22	asking for the opportunity to do so. And if we on

1	review of the transcript don't 'feel a need to do
2	anything further, then, obviously, we're not going to
3	take up the panel's time with that.
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And if you did have to
5	do it, are you thinking that this would be pretty
6	limited in time?
7	MR. GARRETT: Definitely.
8	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And limited would be
9	10 minutes or something?
10	MR. GARRETT: Fifteen Steinthal minutes.
11	MR. STEINTHAL: Yesterday that translates
12	to 15 real minutes.
13	Your Honor, on that issue, there was no
14	testimony from Mr. Mandelbrot about any communications
15	with the RIAA Negotiating Committee or Mr. Kenswil.
16	If we're going to allow some leeway here, it should be
17	limited to that which Mr. Mandelbrot testified to
18	directly, which is communications with Mr. Marks in
19	the negotiation process.
20	So I really don't think the can of worms
21	ought to be open with respect to the Negotiating
22	Committee at this point.

MR. GARRETT: What I would request is that -- maybe this is not an issue that needs to be resolved. I did want to say at this point in time that it was just Mr. Marks, but I'm not asking at this point in time that it be opened up to anyone else. I would like the opportunity to, again, review the transcript, to do it with the client, and then decide what course of action we take here.

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Well, I think that with a look to those agreed upon limits, the panel is open to it being done that way, with the thought that Mr. Steinthal's point is I think very well taken, assuming that, as we've just agreed, this is real rebuttal.

I don't recall any mention of Mr. Kenswil or the Negotiating Committee at all in his testimony; that it was really limited to his negotiations and discussions with Mr. Marks. If it turns out that you find upon review of the transcript that fallible memories have overlooked something, then we could reopen that question at that time, I suppose.

MR. GARRETT: I understand your position.

1	MR. STEINTHAL: Could we also have the				
2	benefit what we've done with some sort of				
3	designation before Mr. Marks testifies of what these				
4	matters of the rebuttal are going to be as opposed to				
5	just the Yahoo negotiations? I think we have a right				
6	to know, as if we were presented with a direct witness				
7	statement, what the specific subject matters are that				
8	Mr. Marks is going to address. I don't want it in				
9	great detail, but if it's the MFN or whatever it is,				
10	I think we're entitled to some sort of subject matter				
11	designation of that which Mr. Marks is going to rebut.				
12	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: The panel also would				
13	appreciate that kind of				
14	MR. GARRETT: Sure.				
15	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Similar to the bullet				
16	point summaries which you provided earlier about what				
17	the comments would be. But this is, obviously, even				
18	more focused than that.				
19	MR. GARRETT: That's what I was going to				
20	suggest, that we provide the same kind of notice that				
21	both sides provided when they filed their statements				
22	last Friday about rebuttal.				

1	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Excellent. Okay.					
2	With those weighty matters behind us, we					
3	get the pleasure of Professor Fisher's testimony.					
4	And, Mr. Rich, will you be conducting some direct					
5	initially?					
6	MR. RICH: I will. Thank you,					
7	Mr. Chairman.					
8	Whereupon,					
9	WILLIAM FISHER					
10	was called as a witness, and, having first been duly					
11	sworn, was examined and testified as follows:					
1	DIRECT EXAMINATION					
12	DIRECT EXAMINATION					
12 13	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RICH:					
13	BY MR. RICH:					
13 14	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted					
13 14 15	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted certain rebuttal testimony in aid of the broadcasters,					
13 14 15	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted certain rebuttal testimony in aid of the broadcasters, webcasters and background music services case; is that					
13 14 15 16	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted certain rebuttal testimony in aid of the broadcasters, webcasters and background music services case; is that correct?					
13 14 15 16 17	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted certain rebuttal testimony in aid of the broadcasters, webcasters and background music services case; is that correct? A That's true.					
13 14 15 16 17 18	BY MR. RICH: Q Professor Fisher, you have submitted certain rebuttal testimony in aid of the broadcasters, webcasters and background music services case; is that correct? A That's true. Q And what is the subject matter of that					

relevance, if any, the law governing just compensation 1 awards in eminent domain bears on this proceeding. 2 Second issue is, what's the appropriate temporal 3 framework for the panel's deliberations. 4 And the third issue is, how do countries other than the United 5 States determine the license fees that broadcasters 6 7 must pay, on the one hand, to the owners of copyrights and musical works, and on the other hand, to the 8 owners of copyrights and sound recordings. 9 I'm going to ask you to summarize briefly Q 10 11 the substance of your written testimony with respect 12 to each of these three areas, beginning with the law of eminent domain. 13 Could you summarize your written testimony 14 concerning how the willing buyer or willing seller 15 criterion has been analyzed in the law of eminent 16 17 domain? Α After the -- this will be a very short 18 19 piece of legal history. After the 20 Revolution, the United States Supreme Court gradually,

over the course of a full century, undertook the task

of refining the meaning of the "takings" clause

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contained in the Fifth Amendment. So the principal innovations made by the Supreme Court along this trajectory are, first, defining the amount of compensation that a landowner is due when his property is confiscated as the fair market value of the tract taken. That term, gains in currency during the 19th century is ultimately applied against the states under the auspices of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Then in the 20th century, beginning with an important Supreme Court case in 1915, the United States Supreme Court clarifies or elaborates the term "fair market value" to be the equivalent of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. Beginning with those early 20th century cases, the United States Supreme Court has several times invoked the same buyer/willing seller language -- the willing language -- to give shape to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, and hundreds of lower courts have taken, not surprisingly, the same position.

Q And I take it in your written testimony

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that you identified several principles associated with the willing buyer/willing seller formulation of fair market value in the eminent domain setting that you believe ultimately has some relevance to this proceeding; is that correct?

A That's correct. So the term -- first, the terms, "fair market value" and then "willing buyer/willing seller" are not self-defining. The courts, led by the United States Supreme Court, have given them some gloss. And three such related principles seem especially pertinent for reasons we'll undoubtedly discuss in a minute here.

Those related principles are, first, that when the United States and the federal government expropriates land, it is constitutionally required to pay the landowner under this willing buyer/willing seller criterion, enough money to make him whole; to indemnify for his loss but not to enable him to make a profit from the circumstance. The government is now eager to have his land.

Second of these related principles is what's known as the "special benefits rule" applied in

the federal courts. Special benefits rule arises most commonly in circumstances in which the government expropriates a portion of a tract of land. the conditions for those it's common government -- projects, say, in simple erode -- to confer indirectly some benefits to the landowner in his capacity as the owner οf the remaining parcel. Those are known as special benefits when they benefit the tract that's left.

Under those circumstances, the federal courts take the position that the Constitution requires that the amount of compensation be the fair market value of the confiscated piece minus the special benefits, the offsetting benefits received by the landowner on the remaining piece.

And the third of the related principles is the proposition that the landowner, whose property is confiscated, cannot use in the eminent domain proceeding what's know versely as "strategic value," "hold out value," which turned out to be other words for market power. Put differently, that the measure of compensation to which he is constitutionally

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entitled does not include -- or is not designed to mimic -- the amount of money that you could extract from the government were they bargaining freely.

To give one example that may suggest the application of this principle -- and may be helpful when we turn in just a second to the question of recording licenses. Suppose there's a mountain valley. At the bottom of the valley is farmland. At one point the valley narrows. And there's only one landowner who owns the land in the gap.

As to other farmers, or purchasers of land for the purposes of housing, the owner of that tract has no market value. Excuse me, has no market power. And the value of the land is determined by much the same factors that would govern the value of all the other tracts in the valley.

Now, against this backdrop, suppose that the government comes along and decides to lay out a road up the valley. It has to pass through the property in the narrow section. There is no practical alternative. If the government were obliged to negotiate freely with the landowners, the person who

owns, has the strategic position, could and likely 1 would extract a substantial premium because of his 2 strategic position. 3 The essence of this related principle is 4 5 to prevent the landowner from capitalizing on his market power under the circumstances. He's entitled 6 7 to recover the market value of his property as do 8 other kinds of purchasers, not to capitalize on the strategic position he happens to be in vis a vis the 9 10 covenant. 11 ARBITRATOR VON KANN: How is that 12 different than the first principle? THE WITNESS: It's very close to the first 13 14 principle. That's one of the reasons why I described 15 them as related. And when we come actually to the 16 webcasters I mean to state that even more strongly. 17 They converge upon a particular measure of the 18 covenant. BY MR. RICH: 19 20 Q Now, the law of eminent domain, of course, 21 is developed in the context of real property. involved in the ethereal world of 22 here

intellectual property. Why is it, nonetheless, that you believe this body of doctrine, this body of law, has relevance to the proceedings here, and as a corollary how do you compare its relevance to the Georgia Pacific line of cases about which there's been significant testimony?

A There are two reasons why I think it's especially appropriate here and more relative to the panel's deliberations than the Georgia Pacific line of cases. Pause to say, I don't mean to suggest that the Georgia Pacific line of cases is irrelevant. On the contrary, I think it's pertinent to pay attention to those cases. But this eminent domain doctrine is I think somewhat counterintuitively more relevant, counterintuitively because, as Mr. Rich indicates, it does involve real property, not intellectual property.

So here are the two reasons. First, this doctrine is old, highly visible and shaped by the United States Supreme Court. It's been developed at least since 1915. And as the main doctrine, it's taught in most first-year property classes. So most lawyers are familiar, at least in broad outlines with

it, and the Supreme Court has shaped it in large part.

For those reasons, if -- significant if -- Congress had any particular doctrine in mind by way of analogy when it selected the willing buyer/willing seller criterion, it's more likely to have been this body of material than the Georgia Pacific cases.

The second circumstance is that in an important respect, the eminent domain doctrine is different from Georgia Pacific line of cases. The Georgia Pacific decisions all -- or almost all -- arise in circumstances in which a defendant has been found to have engaged in patent infringement. And the court is, in the absence of proof of lost profits, trying to ascertain a reasonable royalty that would have been paid had the parties entered into a voluntary agreement. And the many factors in the Georgia Pacific case are designed to explore that hypothetical question.

But because the issue arises in its paridigmatic form in the context of patent infringes damages, it commonly has a punitive cast to it. The

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defendant has engaged in patent infringement and unquestionably, socially, undesirable behavior. And so courts, sometimes tacitly and occasionally, explicitly tilt the doctrine in a fashion so as to disadvantage the wrongdoer.

By contrast, in the eminent domain area, as the Supreme Court has made clear many times, the task of the courts is to balance two equally important objectives, two equally important, and legitimate objectives. two objectives There the the legitimate interest in the landowner in not being compelled to forfeit his property without compensation. The principle is embodied in the Fifth Amendment itself. And on the other hand, legitimate interest of the government standing in the shoes of the public at large and developing public And so, a balance, a delicate difficult projects. balance, between these two is the guiding spirit for the eminent domain cases.

The situation before the panel is more similar in this respect to the second than to the first. No one here has engaged in copyright

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infringement or other kinds of unquestionably socially undesirable behavior that would trigger an analogously punitive spirit. By contrast, the challenge before the panel is, I think as I suggested at some length in my direct testimony, to serve Congress' goals in the Digital Performance and Sound Recordings Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. And just by way of brief reminder, there are latent in that statute, again, two equally important objectives. First, is to protect the copyright owners against injury as the music industry shifts in the direction of digital dissemination of materials, and the second is to promote the development of the new technologies, and thereby to increase public dissemination of digital music.

So analogously, two important legitimate purposes to be balanced. The eminent domain cases are fundamentally similar in that regard. The Georgia Pacific cases are not.

Q You proceed in your written direct testimony to suggest several aspects in which the principles you adduce characterizing the law of

eminent domain have relevance in terms of giving guidance to the panel in its own deliberations here.

Could you summarize the gist of that testimony?

A Yes. So just returning to the three principles and applying them to this context, the first principle reinforces the proposition -- just been advanced by various witnesses including myself -- that the objective of Section 114(f)(2)(b) is to make whole the record companies to ensure that they are, as I say, protected against net injury as the -- as non-interactive webcasting flourishes.

That proposition or that goal is quite clear in the legislative history of the Digital Performance and Sound Recordings Act and the DMCA, and it lends further support from the way in which the willing buyer/willing seller criterion is deployed in the context of eminent domain proceedings. So these things fit together, are compatible, in a nice fashion-- a fashion that reinforces the reading of Congress' purpose.

The second proposition is the special benefits doctrine developed in the federal courts.

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That too finds a parallel in the 114, specifically 114(f)(2)(b)(1), which directs the panel considering -- when setting the appropriate rate to the promotional benefits take into account webcasting. Promotional benefits are very similar vis a vis the owners of copyrights in sound recordings to the special benefits, the offsetting benefits, secured by a landowner when the government expropriates a portion of his property but confers an advantage on the remainder.

The third and last of the implications is the, perhaps, most important. It reinforces the proposition, which has been presented both in my original testimony and in the original testimony of Professor Jaffe, that the willing buyer/willing seller criterion in the context before us should be construed in a fashion that mimics the rates that would be agreed upon by a willing buyer/willing seller in a competitive market -- a market uncontaminated by the exercise of market power. That's the way in which, as I say, the standard is deployed in the eminent domain cases.

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There are several other reasons why a similar interpretation of the willing buyer/willing seller criterion should obtain here. They are to briefly review, first, the structure of the statute as whole, which suggests that non-interactive webcasting should be placed in an economic position interactive intermediate webcasting and radio stations. That's the first proposition. The second proposition is, the legislative history of 114(e) and (f), which were colored by the Justice Department's to prevent the concern record companies from exercising oligopolistic power. Third, the presence in the statutory criterion of the factor that we should take into account the relative contributions of the parties something that's more compatible with a competitive market than a monopolistic market. finally, the eminent domain cases, which, say -- just to repeat for the last time -- have clearly over the course of the century taken the same position vis a vis the meaning of just compensation.

There is one last implication of this proposition procedurally, which is that the testimony

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that was supplied by Professor Nagle is founded upon the assumption that an appropriate valuation of sound recording licenses would permit the record companies to exercise their market power. More specifically, Mr. Nagle suggests -- observes that accurately that there is no plausible alternative to licenses from the record companies for the webcasters; they have nowhere else to qo. And his analysis, for the reasons detailed in my testimony, is explicit in suggesting that under those circumstances the record companies could in an unregulated market extract from the webcasters all of their income and assets, leaving them enough to remain in business and provide them a normal profit. But the basic proposition, which plays out throughout his analysis, is that the record companies could in unrequlated market an everything not necessary to keep the webcasters in business.

That's exactly the kind of analysis that the federal courts in the eminent domain context reject. And so comparably here my suggestion is, to the extent Mr. Nagle's valuation of the licenses turn

upon an acceptance of the exercise of market power, it 1 2 should not be relied upon by the panel. Part B of your written rebuttal 3 testimony, beginning on page 13, addresses what you 4 describe as the temporal frame for this proceeding. 5 Could you briefly summarize the issue you there 6 7 address and your analysis of that issue? ARBITRATOR GULIN: Professor, I'm sorry. 8 9 Before we go into that, let me make sure I understand 10 a point you make about the eminent domain and its 11 applicability here. I think your point was that, while there 12 13 may be a willing buyer/willing seller standard for eminent domain as there is for Section 114, in both 14 15 situations that standard is limited by the concept 16 that the seller is to be made whole and not be 17 permitted to make profits essentially. I want to make 18 sure I understand the implication of this. position 19 Ιf accept the the 20 webcasters, which is, essentially, that there is no 21 injury -- as a matter of fact, I think that there's 22 been some testimony that there's a net promotion

effect -- isn't the natural consequence of that, that 1 we should be setting a negative rate that we should 2 require RIAA to pay the webcasters for the use of 3 their music? 4 5 MR. GARRETT: Will these be 6 payments? 7 ARBITRATOR GULIN: There's some dispute 8 over the terms. But isn't that the natural 9 consequence if we take that analogy to its natural conclusion? 10 11 THE WITNESS: It's a good, difficult 12 question. So, no, for two I think unrelated reasons, 13 but they may convert. The first, and it might be less 14 fundamental but still significant, reason why the 15 royalty would not come out to be zero is that the statute appropriately contemplates that the panel 16 17 would make judgments as to risks and not require a demonstration in each instance of proven injury. And 18 unless the webcasters could establish with 19 2.0 certainty the absence of injury, that would suggest a positive royalty. 21

Now -- however, to take

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although important to the case, not fundamental to your question -- I think your question goes more to the heart of the matter -- well, assuming there really were no net impact, shouldn't the royalty be zero. And although that's a plausible interpretation, imaginable interpretation of the application of the eminent domain cases to this context, I think a better one, a better way of seeing the implication of that analysis, is to return to the example of the owner of the land in the valley.

What the eminent domain cases forbid is the landowner extracting from the government a premium resulting from the fact that he's in this strategic position and the government now needs that land. does it forbid -- in fact, what it not constitutionally requires -- is that he be paid made whole, meaning paid the fair market value of the land excluding the exercise of that market power. has market value. It can be used for farmland, it can be used for housing and so forth.

So the implication of the eminent domain cases is not to leave the record companies out in the

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cold; it's rather to prevent them from extracting from the webcasters' income that's solely attributable to the circumstance emphasized by Mr. Nagle, namely that there are no alternatives, and, therefore, that the webcasters would in an unregulated market have no choice but to pay whatever the figure the record companies named up to their full assets and operating income.

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Just picking up on your example. If the narrow neck of the valley is just wide enough for a road and, by coincidence, a strip mall on either side, and that neck happens to be zoned business so that you run this through, and the value of the property otherwise is limited, but now all of a sudden this landowner the unique and the only, let's say, business zoned land, and it's right there on either side; and if under those circumstances the value now of the two parcels that are left exceeds the value of what's going to go to the government, is the landowner paid zero? I'm sure he doesn't pay the government, even in a world of theory.

THE WITNESS: There actually is a set of

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cases involving the condemnation of easements, not land itself but easements. So imagine -- this may not immediately seem responsive, but it will turn out to Imagine that a law firm owns a -- leases, long-term lease. Arnold & Porter has, imagine, a I'm sure this is not true in fact. 10-year lease. But has a 10-year lease for a fixed price on a building, and the market falls. And so the law firm is in a disadvantageous position. And the government condemns the building in order to put a new agency The law firm benefits under those circumstances because they're released from that They go elsewhere and they can obtain comparable space for less money.

And there have been some suggestions exclusively in the academic literature that the right outcome here is to compensate the landowner, the landlord, for the market value of the building plus the premium he enjoys because of the lucrative lease that he has, and to charge the law firm for the benefit they're getting from the expropriation. So that at least some academics have suggested that the

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application of these same principles would precisely require charging the parties in interest. But no court, so far as I know, has ever so held -- it's never been raised as an issue. The only live issue in the literature is whether the landlord gets the premium of the lease or just gets the fair market value of the building. And there's a debate on that question.

Okay. So back to your issue. I thought of this and looked for some cases. And so far as I could find -- completely exhaustive search, very large literature. But I was not able to locate any case presenting sharply your issue, where, just to generalize it, the offsetting special benefits exceed the value of the tract taken.

One last qualification. Actually, in the 17th century in Massachusetts there are such cases, and the landowner gets zero. But that's before the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, before any of this jurisprudence arises. I don't know of any 20th century cases that go so far.

BY MR. RICH:

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panel's questions Following on the 0 briefly, coming into the setting of this proceeding, the concept of making the owner -- here, the copyright owner -- whole, I understand your response, do particularly to Judge Gulin, to be that the taking can be thought of as the taking of what would be the competitive market price that might have been obtained as opposed to viewing the taking as whatever, per Dr. Nagle, a monopoly seller might have been able to Is that the nature of the distinction you acquire? were drawing?

A Yes,.

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Can I just ask one in the same area? I think a lot of what you say makes a great deal of sense. I'm not sure I disagree with much of the specifics. But I have some difficulty with riding too heavily on the eminent domain model for the following reasons. Two reasons. One is, it seems to me that it is, as with all constitutional documents, stating a constitutional minimum that the government must adhere to. It doesn't mean that people in the free market place may not exceed the

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constitutional minimum, for various reasons. And the other complication with it is that is very heavily imbued with a notion of protecting the public trust, the public fisc. A lot of the quotes that you have speak about we don't want to unduly require paying more out the public treasury than necessary. Here we have two private parties, and they don't have the public trust to debit.

So my one reservation, although, I'm not sure that I actually disagree with very many of the specifics -- but my one reservation is, isn't the eminent domain law really concerned with, a) constitutional minimums and heavily guarded on not paying out more of the public funds than is necessary, which may not necessarily be the way things work in the marketplace? People sometimes pay more, for one reason or another, more than the government might pay.

THE WITNESS: The parallelism actually continues. It's quite common for the government when blowing out a road or any other public project to negotiate with the landowners and to pay an amount, and not to undertake a administrative role in a

judicial proceeding to have the valuation. And the amounts under such circumstances may well be higher than they would be required by the Constitution.

So in practice these are similar, and comparably there could be voluntary license in this context. But if the negotiations fail, then, exactly as you put it, the government proceeds and is obliged to pay the constitutional minimum. And it is at that moment that this body of principles, clustered under the heading willing buyer/willing seller, comes to bear.

sense is that this case is analogous in that sense; that 114 creates an opportunity for free negotiation among the parties. But as a back stop, if they fail to come to terms, sets the level of payment that must be made equal to the willing buyer/willing seller criterion just as the eminent domain cases do.

But that -- to observe this parallelism just amplifies your second question-- but aren't they different in a deeper sense? There is, as you rightly point out -- as to my testimony -- the strong theme of

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recognition of the importance of the public interest in the eminent domain cases.

My sense on that is that, although it's not immediately visible in this particular provision of the copyright statute, the copyright statute, as a whole of which this is a part, is quite similar. to return to some basics undoubtedly familiar to all of you, the central justification for copyright law in the United States is the utilitarian one in which it's designed to confer a limited set of entitlements upon creators they wouldn't otherwise enjoy in order to in activities, creative induce them to engage activities, from which the public benefits. And then the details of copyright all of law, both the elaborate arrangement of statutory provisions and the way the courts interpret them, consists of a balancing And the global balancing act in the copyright statute is, on the one hand, to ensure that incentives for creativity remain strong, but on the other hand, to ensure that the public has access to intellectual products at reasonable prices and without undue use And so the fair use doctrine and limitations.

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copyright law is heavily designed to achieve that, and many of the statutory licenses throughout the copyright statute are similarly designed to strike this balance.

So lurking behind Section 114 and the copyright statute as a whole is a conception of the importance of the public interest analogous to the eminent domain cases.

BY MR. RICH:

Q Let's turn now to Part B of your analysis.

And the question which I had begun to pose was, what was the issue or what were the issues you were there addressing and how do you analyze those issues?

A So the general question is, how far forward and far back is it appropriate to look when setting the rates in this proceeding. The procedural context as I understand it in which this issue arises is that, at least one witness -- maybe more, but Mr. Nagle at least -- has offered testimony that places some weight upon projections concerning the likely shape of the webcasting industry 5 or 10 years down the road. And at the same time, various

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witnesses have offered testimony concerning what

people at some time in the past -- two, three, four

years back -- were predicting concerning where we

would be today.

So I was asked to address the question, what insight does the language of the statute's legislative history and its structure cast on the appropriateness of, on the one hand, looking forward and, on the other hand, looking back. And my response in brief is that the principal focus should be on the So for that purpose, it's I think more sensible to be in with the statute itself, which the absence of voluntary specifies that in negotiations, the statutory royalty would be reset by successive CARPs every two years.

Now, I understand that this particular proceeding is a little bit unusual in that respect because, for purposes of administrative convenience, it consolidates two separate proceedings, one from late 1998 to the end of 2000, and the other from the beginning 2001 to the end of 2002. But the statute, as I suggest in my testimony, seems quite explicit

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that in the absence of voluntary negotiations this rate would be reconsidered every two years.

So that's an early important, because it's from the statute, indication that we should be looking to the present, but it doesn't exhaust the issue. So the next logical question is, all right, so we're going to set the rate by looking at the present. Should we take into account when doing so the likely trajectory of the webcasting industry into the future?

So to answer that I went back to the legislative history, which contains just one piece of information, but it's a crucial, on-point piece of information, indicating that the purpose of the biennial reviews was to create flexibility in light of the fact that the webcasting industry is expected to change dramatically fast. And that objective, the relationship between a short periodic review of the rate and the volatility of the industry, is consistent with the way Congress has dealt with other fields. So my testimony points to a early 1980s D.C. circuit case which makes clear the general idea of the copyright statute is to have long periods of reevaluation in

industries that are relatively stable and short periods in industries that are volatile. So this particular provision in 144 is not anomalous; it's consistent with the way the copyright statute as a whole is set up.

So armed with this information, we return to the question, should we take into account long-term future projections when determining the rate for the present. And there would seem to be against this backdrop three considerations why we should not or should give relative little weight to the future projections.

The first is that it's hard to do so, as Congress recognized; things are changing fast. Second, it's unnecessary to do so because the biennial reevaluations make possible flexibility and adjustment if things change. And the third is a little less straightforward. The third consideration, points in the same direction, is that our ability to effectively advance the underlying purposes of the statute, which to repeat are to protect the record industry against injury while stimulating the development of the new

1	technologies, is likely to be maximized if we
2	concentrate on the conditions that exist at the
3	present and not run the risk of unduly constraining
4	the development of the industry now on the basis of
5	anxieties concerning what might happen in the future
6	insofar as if those anxieties come to past it will be
7	easy for successive CARPs to take them into account.
8	So that's my response to the
9	looking-forward question.
10	Q There's also a looking-back component to
11	this; is that correct?
12	A That is correct. So on that issue I recur
13	to the same set of considerations. Should the what
14	should be the objectives of the panel; what are the
15	underlying purposes of the statute or provisions as a
16	whole? To state one more time, to balance the
17	protection of the record industry against the
18	promotion of the industry.
19	That would seem to be best served by
20	looking to economic conditions as they exist now
21	rather than relying upon predictions made in the past
22	concerning where we would be now. It's not to say

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that predictions made in the past are irrelevant; they should be, seem, consistent with this logic given whatever weight they merit in terms of illuminating the current structure of the webcasting industry, but that they should not trump more recent data. And that inference from the structure of the statute is lent further credibility by the way in which courts administering the Georgia Pacific criteria have taken into account recent developments.

In the Georgia Pacific context, was just stated once again, involves ascertaining reasonable royalty rates when the defendant has engaged in patent infringement. The courts, using the now familiar Georgia Pacific factors, attend economic circumstances as they existed when the parties began their relationship. But if economic circumstances have changed since then and we have more recent data, the courts have been overt in insisting that the more recent data be taken into account. And it would seem a similar result should obtain here.

One last circumstance pointing in the same direction is that the direct testimony of at least one

1	of the witnesses for the record companies suggest that
2	in the free market licensors pursue a similar policy.
3	Licensors there set in their contracts short terms to
4	now allow them to adapt to changing circumstances.
5	And it would seem sensible for this panel to pursue a
6	similar strategy.
7	Q Are you here referring to the testimony of
8	Mr. Wilcox of Sony Music Entertainment as reported at
9	paragraph 27 of your written testimony?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Okay. And the case law which you've just
12	described about taking into account, in fact, changed
13	the circumstances over time are the cases addressed at
14	paragraphs 31 and in notes 39 and 40 of your written
15	testimony?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Let's turn, please, to the third section
18	of your rebuttal testimony, which involves the legal
19	treatment of music licenses in other countries. Could
20	you describe for the panel the nature of the analysis
21	you performed in this area?
22	A Yes. And context is important here. In

the direct portion of this proceeding, Mr. Paul Kempton provided data concerning the way in which 12 jurisdictions of the United States set licenses that broadcasters -- commercial radio broadcasters -- must pay to groups of copyright owners, the owners of copyrights and musical works and the owners of copyrights in sound recordings, or as they are known in many systems as phonograms.

The relevance of that testimony, as I understand it, is not to suggest that it would be appropriate for this panel to mimic either the legal system of any other country or the rates set by any other country. At least to make such a suggestion plausible you'd have to know a lot more than anybody in this proceeding has supplied-- information concerning parallelisms of the economic systems and the legal systems of the two countries.

So the purpose of that testimony, as I understand it, is, to repeat, not to suggest we should incorporate by reference the manner in which any other jurisdiction sets these royalties. It rather has a quite narrow but important probative value. It goes

to the question of what's the relative value of licenses for musical works versus licenses for sound recordings.

And I gather, as the positions of the two sides have been deployed, they are quite sharply divided on this issue. The webcasters take the view that licenses for sound recordings are equal to or less in value than licenses for musical works; whereas the -- and here I rely for numerical purposes on the testimony of Professor Jaffe. The principle implicit in the record companies' request is that the licenses for musical works -- excuse me. The licenses for sound recordings are 5 to 20 times more valuable than the licenses for musical works. So the issue is fairly sharply posed. And the significance of Mr. Kempton's data is that it provides one window, one window among many, on that issue, which is the more plausible characterization of the relative value of these entitlements.

So the gist of his presentation is that in each of the 12 jurisdictions he surveyed, the headline royalty rates, top-of-the-line rates, payable to

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musical works are equal to or greater than the headline rates payable to the owners of copyrights and sound recordings. So the first level of analysis that would seem to support, in a quite straightforward manner, the position taken by the webcasters. However, the salience or probative value of the behavior of each of these jurisdictions, with respect to this issue, does hinge at least a significant part on the question of who is setting these rates and on the basis of what statutory criteria.

Ideally, would one want Mr. Kempton probably put it in -- apples-to-apples comparison. So Ι was asked to explore question -- what exactly are the systems employed in these different jurisdictions for setting these two rates? So with that task I plunged into the relevant literature, the broad outlines of which I already knew because of my experience in international copyright law and the music business as a whole, but the details of which required work, and hard work as it turned So the provisions are complicated, and in many cases obscure, and time was short. So I spent a fair

amount of time at this and am able now to offer the following slightly more refined characterization of what seems to be the appropriate probative value of Mr. Kempton's testimony.

Now, the details are all in the written testimony, and I think it would be unnecessary and inappropriate to march through each of the jurisdictions here for I doubt that we'll have an opportunity to talk about some of them. But for the present purposes I think it's best to do it in summary or schematic form. And that's what this chart is meant to convey.

MR. RICH: For the record, the witness is referring to a demonstrative that he has put up on the white board.

THE WITNESS: So I, in my written testimony in here, have divided the countries -- 12 countries -- into four categories. And the first category behave in a manner that lends strong support to the position taken by the webcasters. Countries in the second category provide significant but less compelling support for the position taken by the

webcasters. Countries in the third category I am unable, at least at this point, to say that they support -- provide significant support for either side. And countries in the fourth category provide support for the position taken here by the record companies concerning the relative value of these entitlements. So as you can see from the chart, there are three countries in the first category, six in the second, three in the third, and none in the fourth. So without marching through the entire scheme, I'll just suggest two cases at opposite ends of the spectrum.

The first is Canada single where а tribunal, copyright board, has the jurisdiction to set both rates and made an explicit judgment that they should be set at comparable levels. There's no reason, says the copyright board in Canada, to think one is more valuable than the other. And not surprisingly, that mode of analysis produces outcome in Canada, as Mr. Kempton informs us, a parity the two rates. So a apples-to-apples comparison yield result supportive of the webcasters's

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Now, there's one nuance in Canada that's probably worth highlighting right now, which is unlike the situation, for example, in Australia. The Canadian determining these board when rates exclusively considers and rejects willing buyer/willing seller criterion; instead, setting the rates at a level that's fair and equitable -- different language certainly. And one might think, well then, isn't Canada not apt here because it's, after all, going off on a substantially different, at least formal, criterion.

And if the issue before us were, should we incorporate into the United States the Canadian regime, the answer would surely be yes, it's inept. But that's not the issue. The issue, to repeat, is just what's the relative value in the opinion of the relevant tribunal in Canada of the two entitlements. And so the fact that the standard they use is not a willing buyer/willing seller criterion doesn't undermine, for our purposes, of their judgment that they should be treated equally.

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The opposite extreme of this spectrum is Switzerland, which in lots of respects would seem to provide substantial support for the position taken by the webcasters there as is true in Spain. A single administrative tribunal sets both rates or has the power to supervise the setting of both rates. And apparently, as best I can tell from the statutes, the relevant criteria would be similar, and the rates are very different. The rates paid by the owners of copyrights and musical works are much higher than the rates paid to sound recording, the representatives of the owners of copyrights and sound recordings.

But the probative value of Switzerland in my view is undermined, quite dramatically undermined, by the presence in the Swiss statutes of a unique, nearly unique, statutory provision which different caps the rates; respectively on two 10 percent and 3 percent. And the rates that, in fact, emerge in those countries, as specified in Mr. Kempton's testimony, are each 90 percent of the relevant cap, leading me to infer that the best explanation for the inequality of the rates

Switzerland is not that an administrative tribunal is determining that musical works are three times as valuable as sound recordings but rather the presence of this tightly constraining statutory cap. And for that reason I placed Switzerland in the third box here, a jurisdiction as to which I can't say in fairness it provides significant support for either side. There's no plausible way, in my view, of construing the Swiss data as providing support for the position taken by the record companies that musical works are less valuable than sound recordings, on the other hand, for the reason I identified, nor does it provide support for the position taken here by the webcasters.

So to summarize, of the 12 jurisdictions, none provide support for the position on this issue taken by the record companies; nine provide support for the position taken by the webcasters of which three provide strong support and six provide for reasons detailed in my written testimony-- significant but less compelling support. And as to three jurisdictions, I have been unable to provide

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1	significant support for either side.
2	MR. RICH: That concludes our direct
3	examination.
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: We normally break at
5	3, which is 12 minutes from now. Why don't we go
6	ahead and take the break and return.
7	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
8	the record from 2:46 p.m. until 3:06 p.m.)
1	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: If you'd please
2	proceed then with your cross examination.
3	CROSS EXAMINATION
4	BY MR. GARRETT:
5	Q Good afternoon, Professor Fisher. Welcome
6	back.
7	A Thank you.
8	Q Let me talk first about your testimony on
9	Pages 19 and 38 here, dealing with international
10	issues. You were here when Mr. Kempton testified,
11	were you not?
12	A I don't think so.
13	Q Okay. You've reviewed the transcript of
14	the testimony of Mr. Kempton, correct?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And you'll recall that when Mr. Kempton
3	was here that the Panel had questions about the
4	standards that were applied in each of the different
5	jurisdictions that he studied.
6	A Yes.
7	Q And as I understand it, part of the reason
8	you're back here is to talk about the standards,
9	correct?
10	A Yes, that's true.
11	Q In order to give the Panel the information
12	that they originally requested, correct?
13	A Correct.
14	Q Now, have you been successful in
15	determining what the standards are that applied in
16	setting sound recording royalty rates in each of the
17	12 jurisdictions Mr. Kempton analyzed?
18	A I've certainly been successful, to the
19	best of my knowledge, in ascertaining the statutory
20	criteria employed in ten of the 12 jurisdictions. As
21	to two of the jurisdictions, as my written testimony
22	indicates, Austria and Italy, I can't say that I have

1	sufficient information to provide a reliable guide to
2	what the statutory criteria are there.
3	Q Okay. Now, as to Canada, I think you made
4	clear earlier that the criteria that are applied there
5	in setting rates are not a fair market value, correct?
6	A Right.
7	Q It's not a willing buyer/willing seller,
8	correct?
9	A Right.
10	Q And were you thinking there just of the
11	sound recording royalty rate or were you also talking
12	about the musical work royalty rate?
13	A The only issue as to which the relevant
14	tribuna in Canada, so far as I know, was explicit on
15	that issue was the sound recording rate. But given
16	the way their analysis was structured, treating them
17	as equal, I infer that the rates are the same, and
18	neither is a willing buyer/willing seller criteria.
19	Q Okay. Do you know specifically what the
20	standards were for setting the musical work rates in
21	Canada?
22	A No. Only what I infer from the structure

1	of the Canadian Copyright Board's interpretation of
2	the two.
3	Q And you're certain that it was not a
4	willing buyer/willing seller fair market value test.
5	A Yes, I inferred that from the way in which
6	the Board said its ruling.
7	Q Okay. You haven't found any statutory
8	standard that appears in Canadian law concerning
9	musical works.
10	A No, I have not, but for that matter nor is
11	there an explicit statutory standard that rejects a
12	willing buyer/willing seller standard for the sound
13	recording rate. This was an interpretation of the
14	Copyright Board that took that position.
15	Q Okay. How about Spain? What is the
16	statutory standard for setting the sound recording
17	royalty in Spain?
18	A As I indicate in my testimony, our
19	information my information concerning Spain is
20	thinner than is true of Canada or, say, Australia. As
21	best I can tell, the relevant statute does not specify
22	with any precision a particular standard, but they

1	appear to me, I infer from the absence of alternative
2	specifications, that they're identical.
3	Q When you say, "they are identical," you're
4	referring to thee standards for setting sound
5	recording rates and musical work rates.
6	A Yes.
7	Q And that's something that you infer,
8	correct?
9	A Yes.
10	Q It's not something there's not a
11	statutory provision that you can specifically point to
12	that says the standards are the same.
13	A No.
14	Q And do you infer that it's a willing
L5	buyer/willing seller test that is used in Spain, or
L6	fair market value test?
17	A No, I don't. I don't have any information
L8	either way.
19	Q Okay. What about the United Kingdom?
20	What is the statutory standard for setting the sound
21	recording royalty in the United Kingdom?
22	A The United Kingdom has several different

1	relevant provisions, frustratingly vague.
2	Reasonableness seems to be the standard in the United
3	Kingdom across the board.
4	Q Okay. And is it your understanding that
5	that is the same standard that is used for both
6	musical work rates and sound recording rates?
7	A Yes. Now, some support for this
8	proposition, although I can't say decisive, is
9	provided by a 1993 decision by the Copyright Tribunal
10	which it was asked at one point when setting when
11	articulating the factors to be used in setting rates
12	for sound recordings, should the two rates be
13	differentiated? And took the position, not admirably
14	crisply, but roughly speaking, they should be set in
15	the same range and, no, did not suggest any basis on
16	which there would be different statutory criteria
17	applied to the two rates.
18	Q All right. Do they apply the willing
19	buyer/willing seller test or fair market value test in
20	the United Kingdom.
21	A They, as far as I've been able to
22	ascertain, don't explicitly reject it but nor do they

1	accept it. On my reading of both the statute and, as
2	I say, the relevant administrative tribunal, it's no,
3	I don't think the willing buyer/willing seller
4	standard is there.
5	Q And that administrative decision is in the
6	record of this proceeding, correct?
7	A Correct.
8	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Mr. Fisher, can you
9	keep your voice up.
10	THE WITNESS: Sorry.
11	BY MR. GARRETT:
12	Q Just to pause for a moment here, on the
13	three countries that you say have strong support for
14	
	the webcasters Canada, Spain and United Kingdom
15	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions
15 16	
	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions
16	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions musical works are valued more highly than sound
16 17	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions musical works are valued more highly than sound recordings when one uses a standard other than fair
16 17 18	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions musical works are valued more highly than sound recordings when one uses a standard other than fair market value or willing buyer/willing seller; is that
16 17 18 19	what we can say is is that each of those jurisdictions musical works are valued more highly than sound recordings when one uses a standard other than fair market value or willing buyer/willing seller; is that fair?

1	because you do say that they use a willing
2	buyer/willing seller standard there, don't you?
3	A They do, yes.
4	Q Okay. I want to talk about that in a
5	minute, but with respect to France, Germany,
6	Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, do they use a fair
7	market value or willing buyer/willing seller standard
8	to set sound recording royalties in any of those
9	countries?
10	A Not so far as I've been able to ascertain.
11	And to the extent I can make inferences as to those
12	five jurisdictions, my answer would be no.
13	Q And let me ask the same question with
14	respect to musical works. In any of those five
15	countries do they use a statute is the standard for
16	setting the musical work royalty rate a fair market
17	value or willing buyer/willing seller rate?
18	A As to a few of the jurisdictions, I can
19	say with some confidence no. One of those, for
20	complex reasons detailed in the testimony, is Sweden.
21	But my best sense as to the remainder, the answer is
22	also no.

Q Okay. So, again, if we're looking just at France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, those countries where there is some significant but less compelling support for the webcasters' position, the sound recording is valued less than or equal to the musical work rate when one uses a standard other than fair market value or willing buyer/willing seller.

A Yes.

Q All right. And on Switzerland, Austria and Italy, were you able to determine what the standard is, or the standards are for setting sound recording royalty rates in those countries?

A Well, as I say, as to Italy and Austria, no, I was not. As to Switzerland, yes, it's, for the reasons I suggested a minute ago, similar to Spain in this regard. The reason why I think it has to be placed in this third box is that it has a special statutory provision that seems the best explanation for the rates that were actually set, a better explanation than a judgment by any administrative or other tribunal concerning the relative value of the two licenses.

1	Q These are legislative determinations that
2	the royalty rate can't exceed certain levels, correct?
3	A Right. Plus, parenthetically, one could
4	argue that, as you point out, it's a legislative
5	determination or one might see in this provision a
6	judgment by the legislature concerning the relative
7	value of the two entitlements. But I have adopted for
8	the purposes here I think a more conservative posture,
9	meaning that lots of things contribute to legislative
10	judgments of that sort, and so I don't extract from
11	the Swiss case support for the webcasters' position.
12	Q Okay. You have used in your oral
13	testimony here today and also in your written
14	testimony the term, "value," correct?
15	A Correct.
16	Q And I just want to make clear it is true
17	that in these jurisdictions certain, quote, "values"
18	may be placed upon the sound recording versus the
19	musical work, but, as I think we've established, it
20	doesn't necessarily mean there's a determination that
21	the fair market value or the value that arise from the
22	application of a willing buyer/willing seller test has

been used to determine that value.

A Yes, that's true.

Q Okay. Would it be better, do you think, instead of talking about the values that these different jurisdictions have attached to musical works and sound recordings instead we talk about judgments as to how much the two different types of works should receive, pursuant to the applicable criteria in those jurisdictions?

A No. I think it's best to characterize them as judgments concerning value. The most explicit of the jurisdictions on this score is Canada where the relevant Tribunal identified as the principle reason for setting the rates at parody, this is a quotation, "There's no reason to believe that the use of sound recordings on radio stations has any greater value than the use of the underlying works." And a similar concept seems to be motivating the other jurisdictions in so far as I was able to gain access to their administrative rulings. And that seems to me a plausible approach.

Q Let me ask you: Do you have a copy of the

1	Australian decision that you reference in your
2	A I do in my materials over here.
3	Q Would you have an extra copy of that?
4	A Just give me a second, I can go
5	Q I can give you one, unless you have one
6	you'd rather get that's marked up or
7	A It is marked up, actually.
8	Q Tell you what, Professor Fisher, while
9	we're getting that decision marked, let me just ask
10	you a few questions about the second portion of your
11	testimony, if I could, all right?
12	A Sure.
13	Q This is concerning the temporal frame; do
14	you recall that testimony?
15	A I do.
16	Q You talked I think the bottom line
	Q TOU CAINCO I CHILIN CHE DOCCOM TIME
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17 18	conclusion was that you thought the Panel ought to, in setting the royalty rates here, look at the present,
	conclusion was that you thought the Panel ought to, in
18	conclusion was that you thought the Panel ought to, in setting the royalty rates here, look at the present,
18 19	conclusion was that you thought the Panel ought to, in setting the royalty rates here, look at the present, correct?

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mean the day they write their decision or the day that we filed our written direct cases or the day that the proceeding was commenced? Do you have a view on that? I suspect you do.

I do, although I don't want to put a great deal of weight on it, because I think it's hard to make an inference from the -- it's certainly very hard to make an inference from the language of the statute. It doesn't address this explicitly, and it's hard to infer an answer from the structure. But, as you know, my sense of the best way in the absence of explicit statutory quidance is to recur to the underlying purposes and the underlying purposes are to repeat to ensure the record companies are not suffering any net the same time to stimulate the injury and at development of the webcasting industry. seem to point toward a present that's somewhat more generous in its definition than a particular day -today or the day that the Tribunal issues its ruling.

So I was suggesting "present" roughly corresponding to the intervals at which the statute contemplates the resetting of the royalty. It seemed

to have been the judgment of Congress that it's sensible to reassess the character of the webcasting industry every two years, and so a sensible interval would be this two years.

Now, I understand that for procedural reasons that, however, is slippery in this proceeding, because there are two different intervals at stake. So this is about as far as my ability to extract guidance from the statute goes.

So to summarize in case it's not clear, no, I don't suggest that there's any warranty to the statute with the legislative history for selecting a particular date. A better approach would be a somewhat more generous definition of "the present," keeping in mind for that purpose is the two-year interval at which the rate is to be reevaluated.

Q Okay. Let's see if I can figure this out. Let's focus for a moment on the first of the two periods, and that's November of 1998 through the end of 2000. Do you understand that that's the first period here?

A Yes.

1	Q Should we be looking at evidence of the
2	value well, evidence of what a willing buyer and a
3	willing seller would have agreed to during that
4	period, I assume, right?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And in determining
7	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Is that a yes?
8	THE WITNESS: Yes, that's a yes, sorry.
9	BY MR. GARRETT:
10	Q And in determining what the willing buyer
11	and the willing seller would have agreed to in that
12	period, should we look at evidence post-December 31,
13	2000?
14	A I've not thought about this before, so
15	I'll give you on the spot my best estimate of an
16	appropriate answer. It would be an appropriate,
17	though not mandatory, reading of the statute to
18	separate the two time periods the two rates into
19	two time periods, and for that purpose to concentrate
20	attention for the first time period on economic
21	information available then.
22	Now with an important qualification on

this issue, actually, I do have -- I just said I don't have very firm view on it, but on this one I do, which is it would be inappropriate, for the reasons I've tried to suggest here, to select a particular date in 4 that interval and try to identify what that parties 5 would have agreed to upon that date. 6

> The why Ι think that's reason inappropriate is that it neglects the purposes of the statute as a whole, and it's also inconsistent with the lessons of the Georgia Pacific style of cases, which urge courts in analogous, though not as I say perfectly analogous proceedings, to take account of economic conditions that emerge after the date as to which a hypothetical negotiation might have occurred.

> Well, I mean what do you do if you have 0 evidence that things are going pretty good, there's a lot of optimism in the webcasting industry about their future, say, in late '98 throughout 1999, into mid-2000? And everybody thought that this was like the new Gold Rush. And then beginning in mid-2000 or so, or maybe a little earlier than that, things began to So the industry began to transform a slow down.

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little bit. Under that hypothetical, what would the Panel be looking at in the way of this time frame?

Let me just ask you this: I mean it's possible, is it not, that depending upon where you decide to look for evidence and in what time period, you could get very different rates, couldn't you?

Yes, you could. And the arbitrariness Α that would be generated by such an outcome is, I think, significantly mitigated by the procedure suggested by the analogy to the Georgia Pacific cases. The recommendation that you not concentrate exclusively upon the projections the parties were making at a particular moment but take into account economic data that emerges subsequently seems sensible way of, as I say, reducing the arbitrariness that would arise from selecting a particular date w When the Gold Rush was on or the Gold Rush was off.

Now, one more reaction on this front is suppose just to keep things simple, to isolate the issue, there was anonymity on the extraordinary prospects of the industry from late 1998 until the end of the year 2000 and that nobody had doubts concerning

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the future of the industry until the second period.

Under those circumstances, should the Panel select a high rate for the initial period and a low rate for the second period?

Well, concern about the apparent arbitrariness of that outcome would be amplified, in my view, by the fact that it would likely have the effect of frustrating one of the major purposes of the statute, namely it would, certainly if the rate were substantial enough, imperil the survival of a significant portion of the webcasting industry.

So this is, like many of the delicate issues unaddressed explicitly in the statute, I think is best examined in light of the overarching purposes. You don't want to select a time frame system that will defeat what the statute is all about. And what the statute is all about, to repeat, is to make sure the record companies are made whole, but on the other hand to ensure that the webcasting industry flourishes.

Q All right. So when you say "present," at least for the 1998 to 2000 period, you're not literally talking about 2001. You're talking about

1	that period 1998 to 2000, correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And you talk about Georgia Pacific. I
4	infer from that that you certainly see some relevance
5	from Georgia Pacific in this case here.
6	A I do, yes.
7	Q And you've cited one principle from
8	Georgia Pacific that you think has particular
9	relevance, correct?
10	A Yes.
11	Q And would it be fair to say that there is
12	some controversy among the courts about that
13	particular principle? That's not uniformly applied
14	that you take into account subsequent factors.
15	A I am not aware of any decisions that
16	address the issue and reject the principle.
17	Q Okay. Your understanding of Georgia
18	Pacific is that courts uniformly say we're going to
19	determine what the parties would have agreed to at the
20	beginning of the period here but take into account
21	subsequently obtained information, correct?
22	A Yes. My understanding of the relevant

1	case law is that if I can be precise on one point
2	here is that the doctrinal category is not Georgia
3	Pacific. The doctrinal category is setting reasonable
4	royalty rates in patent infringement litigation. The
5	reason why that's important is because the lead
6	decision in this area was decided well before the
7	Georgia Pacific case. So this is not an elaboration
8	of the Georgia Pacific doctrine per se, although some
9	of the later cases addressing the issue do meld the
10	Georgia Pacific criteria with this issue.
11	So with that frame work set, my
12	understanding of the relevant case law is that when an
13	issue arises, should we take into account data that
14	became available after the date as to which the
15	hypothetical negotiation would have occurred, courts
16	consistently accepted.
17	Q Okay. Now, let me focus on the second of
18	the two periods here, that dealing with the years 2001
19	and 2002.
20	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Before we do that, let
21	me ask you this, Professor: Would another way of
22	saying that, another way of framing that issue be that

1	the trier of fact should presume that the parties in
2	this hypothetical negotiation would have had accurate
3	information even if in fact they didn't? In other
4	words, is that a presumption that should be made in
5	trying to construct a rate now after the fact?
6	THE WITNESS: Yes. In fact, that's it
7	is in just those terms that at least one of the courts
8	explained this principle. Yes, it's just the way you
9	put it.
10	ARBITRATOR GULIN: And you feel there's no
11	Mr. Garrett seems to feel there's some controversy
L2	over that, that there's some division of opinion.
13	THE WITNESS: Yes, but not to knowledge.
L4	ARBITRATOR GULIN: And you feel there
L5	isn't.
L6	THE WITNESS: Right.
L7	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Okay.
L8	BY MR. GARRETT:
L9	Q Now, for the second period here dealing
20	with years 2001 and 2002, will you apply the same
21	principles that you just articulated here?
22	A Yes.

1	Q It's a little bit different situation,
2	because 2002 hasn't even commenced yet, correct?
3	A Yes, it's true.
4	Q So in this particular case, the Panel
5	should be looking at what the willing buyer and the
6	willing seller would have agreed to at the outset of
7	2001, taking account of knowledge gained through some
8	subsequent date here, correct?
9	A Correct.
10	Q And what is that subsequent date?
11	A Well, I don't think the statute and the
12	argument I've suggested outlined here suggests any
13	particular date. There wouldn't be a cutoff. Now,
L4	for procedural reasons, meaning the importance of
L5	allowing data on this important question to be
L6	adequately scrutinized by the parties, it may be
L7	appropriate to cut off the time as of the termination
L8	of I guess the rebuttal phase of this proceeding. But
L9	there does not seem to be any reason in the logic of
20	the statute to close off information as of a
21	particular moment.
22	Q All right. You're not suggesting, though,

that we would take into account the projections 1 2 through the year 2002, are you? No. Actually, it would seem to me -- I'm 3 sorry if I misspoke in this regard. 4 When I was suggesting that it would be unnecessary, and given the 5 statutory language inappropriate, to take into account 6 7 long-term projections, five or ten years down the road, I did not mean to suggest that it would be 8 9 inappropriate to take into account projections through the end of the period contemplated by the statute. On 10 11 the contrary, that would seem to me sensible. 12 Now, you also referred to some testimony Q given by Mr. Wilcox in this proceeding; do you recall 13 that? 14 I do, yes. 15 Α 16 What is the significance of his testimony, 17 in your mind? 18 The significance of his testimony is only, but not trivially, to suggest that private actors in 19 20 loosely analogous positions make similar judgements appropriateness 21 concerning the οf preserving flexibility by selecting short license terms that will 22

enable them to readjust their economic relations and 1 2 more specifically the license rate if and when conditions change. 3 4 So that marketplace evidence there 5 supports the view that you're articulating here. 6 Not in the sense that rates agreed 7 upon are pertinent. For that, there's a whole other 8 literature. I gather this is one of the main issues 9 that is contested in this proceeding. But for the purpose of suggesting that it's, I quess the bottom 10 11 line, wise and sensible to adopt this approach, and 12 Congress' wisdom on this score is reinforced by the 13 fact that private parties when they confront analogous difficulties do the same thing. 14 15 0 What if the record shows that private 16 parties when they confront an analogous thing do in 17 fact look to projections? Say they do look 18 projections going out three or four years in 19 determining what the rate should be. something that the Panel should ignore here? 20 21 there's one difference in that Α Well, context from the one we were just discussing involving 22

Mr. Wilcox's testimony. The difference is that a private party would have a reason for taking into account future trajectories here that the Panel does not, which is there's a disadvantage to the private party to be regularly reassessing the rates. And so there's an offsetting circumstance that would tilt in favor of longer-term projections for a private party. Not so here because the statute mandates a biannual review. And so the relevance of the analogy is weaker in that context.

Q Well, but you point out from Mr. Wilcox's testimony that they have this shorter time period that you believe is established in the marketplace. Assume we couple that evidence with further evidence that even in setting those shorter time periods and licenses projections are still made. That's the way the marketplace operates. Is that something the Panel you think should ignore in this proceeding?

A Perhaps. Now, here's a separate worry on this score. It relates to one of the major themes of the other part of my testimony, which I'm sure we'll get to sooner or later, namely the market power issue.

Q You have all the power here.

A We'll see. It may be helpful for these purposes to refer at least roughly to the testimony of Mr. Nagle. As I recall, one of his suggestions was that in loosely analogous positions he and his firm counsel private clients to make projections into the future, estimating the shape of the industry five or ten years down the road. Because maximizing revenues will be achieved by setting the rates in the present so as to accelerate consolidation of the industry into a relatively few number of players, which together will be able to generate more revenues than a less consolidated industry down the road.

Now, that's a tactic that's one manifestation of the exercise of market power. That's one of the things a monopolist can do is take the long-term view of that sort and set rates in the present, not on the basis of marginal cost but on the basis of an effort to shape the industry in a particular direction so as to maximize profits, ultimately.

That's the kind of analysis that might

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underlie, as you suggest, the willingness of people in an unregulated market to project into the future. And it's exactly that kind of analysis that I'm suggesting here, as is Professor Jaffe suggesting here, is inappropriate; in fact, it's one of the purposes of 114(f)(2)(b), to prevent precisely that kind of calculus.

Q Well, what if the evidence shows that those who don't have market power, individual record companies, for example, still have relatively short terms for their licenses and in setting the royalty rates do make certain projections into the future. Is it inappropriate under those circumstances to take that -- is it inappropriate for the Panel to take those circumstances into account in setting royalty rates here?

No, Ι don't think it would be A different way of putting it is inappropriate. invocation of mУ initial ${\tt Mr.}$ testimony suggested that it reinforces the wisdom of Congress in concentrating on short-term purposes, a pattern of the sort you describe, once purged of the

circumstances that I suggest are illegitimate factors, 1 2 would suggest that Congress was not quite so wise. So under these conditions, what should one do? 3 4 0 I think it's clear. 5 (Laughter.) 6 I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. Go ahead and finish, please. 7 No, I think the issues are posed directly 8 9 My initial guidance is the structure of the statutory scheme and my reference at the end of my 10 11 analysis to Mr. Wilcox is meant to reinforce the 12 inferences to be derived from the statutory scheme. 13 You suggest that in some analogous circumstances that 14 the behavior of private actors may deviate from what 15 Congress -- the arrangement Congress set up. 16 those conditions, my answer is that one should still 17 pay closest attention to the statutory scheme, but perhaps one comfort level in doing so is likely 18 diminished by the fact that private actors sometimes 19 20 behave differently. 21 Well, when we look at the statutory scheme, it not only has the two-year periods, but it 22

1	has the willing buyer/willing seller test, correct?
2	A Yes, that's true.
3	Q So I mean the Panel's function here is to
4	determine what a willing buyer and a willing seller
5	would have agreed to, correct?
6	A Well, with at least one obvious
7	limitation, namely if one imagined willing
8	buyers/willing sellers under these circumstances would
9	agree to five-year contracts, then, no, that's not
10	what the statute contemplates. The statute
L1	contemplates setting, in effect, two-year contracts.
L2	Q Incidentally, I had a question I wanted to
L3	ask you. When you set out in your section on eminent
L4	domain, you show how the test was initially
L5	articulated on Page 4, in Paragraph 6, down at the
L6	bottom. You said, "It's usually said that market
L7	value is what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a
L8	willing seller." Do you see that?
L9	A Yes, I do.
20	Q Then when I look at the statute on Page 47
21	I'll just give you a copy of Section 114, and this
22	is the language I'm sorry, the willing

1	buyer/willing seller language is there on Page 47 of
2	what I handed you, correct?
3	A Right.
4	Q It talks about rates and terms that would
5	have been negotiated in the marketplace between a
6	willing buyer and a willing seller. Is there any
7	significance to the words "in the marketplace," which
8	doesn't appear in what you say is the usual
9	formulation of the willing buyer/willing seller test?
10	A Not that I can think of. It's hard to see
11	how remember that the backdrop of the willing
12	buyer/willing seller criterion in the eminent domain
13	context is the fair market value test. And when the
14	Supreme Court says what a willing buyer would pay in
15	cash to a willing seller, that's with reference to
16	fair market value. So the use of the term
17	"marketplace" in 114(f)(2)(b) doesn't seem to suggest
18	that Congress meant to differentiate the two contexts.
19	Q Well, you're not suggesting that the term,
20	"in the marketplace," is the surplusage in the
21	statute, are you?
22	A Yes. I'm suggesting it's surplusage.

There's quite a bit of surplusage in the Digital 1 2 Millennium Copyright Act. You don't think that maybe that what 3 Congress was getting at is they wanted the Panel to 4 5 now focus on the marketplace that's actually developed here, how a willing buyer and a willing seller would 6 7 act in that actual marketplace as opposed to some hypothetical marketplace? 8 9 Α No, I don't. And this, actually, I have 10 quite, as you know, strong views, meaning that there are multiple aspects of the statute that all point in 11 12 the opposite direction: the structure of the statute 13 whole, the intervention by the Justice as 14 Department, the placement of one of the subordinate 15 factors and finally the eminent domain cases. So 16 that weight it -- the weight of those against 17 independent forces are all pointed in a particular 18 direction, I think you'd have to read a great deal into the term "marketplace." 19 20 You refer to a hypothetical, competitive 21 marketplace, correct? 22 I do. Α

1	Q Okay. But even that hypothetical,
2	competitive marketplace will have certain
3	characteristics, certain conditions, certain ways in
4	which people act or don't act, correct?
5	A Yes, that's true.
6	Q And so it's not just enough to just say,
7	"Well, let's have a competitive marketplace." You
8	also need to focus on what those different types of
9	conditions and the way people act and all that. You
10	really need to shape that marketplace, correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And would it be inappropriate in doing
13	that to take a look at the way the marketplace has
14	actually developed over the past couple of years?
15	A Well, if it can be done in a fashion that,
16	as I say, purges it of the exercise of market power,
17	no, I don't think it would be inappropriate at all.
18	Q Let me ask you a little bit about your
19	section here on eminent domain. First of all, just as
20	a general matter here, you articulate at least three
21	principles here that you believe have applicability to
22	this proceeding, correct?

1	A Correct.
2	Q These are three principles of eminent
3	domain law, correct?
4	A Correct.
5	Q Did you understand your task to be to find
6	all of those principles that exist in eminent domain
7	law that may have applicability here?
8	A That may have applicability here, yes.
9	Now, you have to understand I'm sure you do
10	understand eminent domain law is a gigantic field.
11	It occupies approximately 12 volumes of the Nicholls
12	treatise on the subject, and it has many
13	Q I've got all 12 of them sitting on my
14	shelf.
15	A I see, I see. Well, it has many
16	dimensions, as you're undoubtedly familiar with now.
17	And so this is by no means a comprehensive map of the
18	law of eminent domain. There are many other aspects
19	of it. These are just the characteristics that seem
20	to be most pertinent to the field here. There are
21	some others we could go into that are cast less
22	dramatic like, but these are, in my view, the three

1 | most relevant.

Q I was just wondering, are there any other principles out there that might help me?

(Laughter.)

These seem to be kind of -- I mean are there other principles -- should I spend the time to research this area to see whether or not there are other principles of eminent domain law that might be applicable to this proceeding?

A Well, I could tell you that there is -this is a curious position to be in -- the area that
I would look to next if you're not satisfied with
these three is the subset of the body of eminent
domain pertaining to comparable sales. The reason why
that would seem to be relevant is because there is an
analogous reference here to comparable voluntary
agreements being possibly relevant.

I think you will find there, if you peruse the pertinent sections of Nicholls and the related case law, that the grounds on which the courts construe the term "comparable" are very similar to the position offered here by the webcasters.

Q I was asking for things that help me.

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A I understand, but try it out. Maybe you'll read it some other way. But you see why it's connected even if it doesn't tilt decisively in one direction or other. In the eminent domain context, as here, it is sometimes deemed relevant by the courts to ascertain what other people using similar property in the neighborhood recently have done.

Now, there pretty important constraints, procedure constraints, it being on similar property, the same characteristics recently and in the same neighborhood so that they are truly And in the absence of comparability comparable. evidence as to such sales is excluded. And my view is I quess it's fairest on this tier to offer this as a reason I didn't go into this is it doesn't seem to me to add significantly one way or another to the exploration of the comparable sales question here, because I think they line pretty much exactly.

Q Well, but isn't it true, even in the area that you're just referring to, that courts in many cases make adjustments where they don't find things

1	perfectly comparable?
2	A Yes, they do sometimes make adjustments.
3	Q And, frequently, when a party tries to
4	distinguish something that the other side has offered
5	as comparable and says that it is different, then
6	burden of showing does this difference does this
7	distinction make any difference to speak?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Okay. So that might be an area I might
LO	want to research, right?
1	A Could be.
.2	Q Okay. Anything else you can think of?
_3	A Not that I can think of.
L4	Q Let me just ask you one about the special
L5	benefits that you talk about on Page 6. I took a look
.6	at one of the actually several of the things that
.7	you had cited. This is an article by Ackerman on the
L8	effect of special benefits and determining
.9	compensation; do you recall that?
20	A I do.
21	Q Would you like a copy?
22	A I doubt it. I remember the article, but

1 | --

(Laughter.)

Q Sort of the way I felt about it, but it's my job. Well, maybe I can do without it without passing this out as an exhibit here. It says, "The concept of special benefits in condemnation cases is widely known and routinely applied but it is nonetheless confusing." Do you agree with that?

A Yes, not as to aspects of it that would be relevant here, but, yes, some features of it, in particular, the edges of the distinction between general and special benefits is confusingly applied.

Q Okay. Then he goes on to say, "Simply stated, any analysis of the field of special benefits must begin with the acknowledgement that it is a complex area with a myriad of rules and variations." Would your answer be the same that you would agree but here it seems kind of clear to you?

A Yes.

Q Then he goes on to quote Nicholls and says, "Upon this subject," referring to the special benefits, "there is a great diversity of opinion and

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more rules, different from and inconsistent with each

other, have been laid down than upon any other point

in the law of eminent domain." Would that be a fair

4 | statement again?

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And perhaps I can provide you some examples and suggest why it's such a puzzling field but why the character of those puzzles doesn't need to trouble us here. There are two grounds on which -two main areas in which complications arise. The first, as I indicated, is what's a general benefit and what's a special benefit? So the rough concept is straightforward enough. The rough concept is, to return to our road example, the government lays out a new road in a, to keep it simple, completely rural areas where there weren't roads before. The effect of establishing such a road enhances the market value of all of the land in the general vicinity, because now it's accessible to transportation systems, and it's more suitable for, say, housing and so forth. what's known as a general benefit, and that's not taken into account when setting the damage awards.

By contrast, if the government, in

building this road, confiscates a portion of a particular tract and that tract receives a distinctive benefit limited to that tract itself, for example, now the owner doesn't have to lay down a private road in order to gain access to the hub lines of the city, that's a special benefit, and that is taken into account. That's the principle but differentiating in practice in much more complex cases what's general and what's specific is very hard, and it's produced a multiplicity of rulings.

Now, the reason why that's not critical here is because the analogous offsetting benefit in the webcasting context is the promotional benefit, and the promotional benefit is extremely specific. The promotional benefit arises when a particular song is broadcast or in our case released on a non-interactive webcaster. And what happens under those circumstances -- this is obviously not speaking from my personal knowledge, but from the testimony of people who are in a position to know -- is that demand for that specific song goes up, meaning the demand for CDs containing that specific song go up, because consumers are

exposed to that specific song.

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In some of the webcasting examples, it's very dramatic in that, not, as you pointed out before, mandatory but it's a matter of custom, there's typically "buy" buttons on the site, and there the promotional benefit to the owner of the copyright in the song recording is direct because you click on the "buy" button, you buy that individual CD.

So this very large and confusing body of law concerning what's special and what's general is not necessary for us to explore here, because the promotional benefits are clearly special in character. That's one.

The other area that creates a lot of anomaly in this field is that not all jurisdictions adhere to what the Supreme Court has identified as the constitutional minimum. Now, because I've been with constitutional concerned here floor, as articulated by the Supreme Court, I've concentrated on the Supreme Court's minimum and the practice of the federal courts but in a fashion loosely analogous to your suggestion that not everybody sticks to the

constitutional floor. Some states raise the bar above that. And so some states take the position, for example, that when you sever land, you will apply the special benefits rule against the severance, the injuries associated with severance, but not if you confiscate a portion of it. That's a more generous posture than the federal courts supply.

Other jurisdictions flip back and forth on this. Oklahoma, for example, recently adopted a referendum. Believe it or not, there was a popular referendum on this issue, and it was then later interpreted in a puzzling manner by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Those all involve a very complicated body of law contributing to Mr. Ackerman's judgment that it's tricky. But they all involve, as I say, efforts by individual states to set the bar above the constitutional floor. And for the reasons I've suggested here, the venerable, highly visible version of this doctrine is the Supreme Court's juris prudence That whole on the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. literature is unnecessary for our purposes.

Q Actually, the particular complexity that

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I want to talk about didn't involve either of those 1 two, but thank you for sharing. 2 Mr. Ackerman says just practical he tries to give some 3 guidelines for dealing in this area, and one of the 4 5 things he says here on Page 107 is, "Consider whether 6 the benefit is caused by the actual public project necessitating the acquisition." Does that make sense 7 8 to you? 9 Α Yes. 10 So it's not just enough to say there's 11 some benefit, you've got to link that benefit to the 12 project that -- the particular project, correct? 13 Correct. Α 14 Now, let me ask you this: Let's assume we 15 have a webcaster who offers two types of services. 16 One is a DMCA-compliant service and the other he has 17 a channel that consists of nothing but songs provided -- sound recordings provided by record labels for the 18 19 specific purpose of promoting the sale of those sound 20 recordings. That's all done outside the statutory 21 license. Are you with me so far?

Under a contract or license agreement of

1	some sort.
2	Q Yes, exactly.
3	A Okay.
4	Q So he's got those two types of services,
5	correct?
6	A Correct.
7	Q Now, assume further that one can determine
8	that the DMCA webcasting portion results in the sale
9	of ten sound recordings a month, but the other aspect
10	of this service results in the same of 100 sound
11	recordings a month. Got that so far?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Should the Panel take into account, in
14	setting the royalty rate here, that ten sales or 110
15	sales?
16	A Ten sales.
17	Q Okay. It's pretty clear to you that if
18	there's some aspect of the service that is outside the
19	DMCA and generating promotional value to the record
20	companies that that's not something Congress
21	contemplated in taking into account here under Section
22	114.

1	A Yes, that's my sense, that the promotional
2	benefit in question is promotional benefit of the
3	activity as to which the statutory license applies.
4	Q Okay. And in the statute, for example,
5	you talked a little while ago about "buy" buttons.
6	A Right.
7	Q But "buy" buttons aren't mandated by the
8	statute, are they?
9	A No.
10	Q If the reason the sales were being made is
11	because of that "buy" button, that's not something
12	that really ought to be taken into account.
13	A No, on that I disagree. Just as you
14	suggested earlier, the way in which the industry has
15	in fact developed is appropriate in calculating the
16	rate. So here a customary characteristic of the
17	industry is appropriate in setting and ascertaining
18	the offsetting promotional benefit. Now, again, this
19	is actually a lends further support to Congress'
20	wisdom in selecting biannual reviews, because if the
21	industry custom changes and webcasters who are not
22	obliged to provide buttons withdraw them, and so the

1.	relevant promotional benefit disappears, then it would
2	be appropriate to increase the royalty rate. But just
3	because the webcasters are not currently obliged to
4	provide a service that they do in fact supply doesn't
5	seem a reason to ignore the, in fact, promotional
6	benefit they confer.
7	Q Well, what if the evidence shows that some
8	provide it and some don't? What's your guidance under
9	those circumstances?
10	A It's the aggregate effect of the pattern.
11	So if two-thirds provide it and one-third don't, you
12	make an effort to ascertain what the total effect is
13	of the
14	Q Do you need to know how many actually
15	provide it?
16	A You need to know at least roughly, yes.
17	Q Let me ask you
18	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Let me ask you about
19	another way to handle that. What would happen if the
20	Panel were to say, "This is the rate for a service
21	that has no "buy" button, but if you install a "buy"
22	button, the rate is ten percent less or five percent

1	less." You can buy down your rate by adding a feature
2	that benefits the record company. If we had some way
3	to quantify that, would that be a reasonable way to
4	proceed?
5	THE WITNESS: Yes. Actually, I think that
6	would be a reasonable way to proceed. And I suppose
7	the statutory authority for it would have to lie in a
8	combination of rates and terms, but the statute does
9	empower you to differentiate among groups of
10	webcasters. So it would seem a perfectly appropriate
11	way to differentiate.
12	BY MR. GARRETT:
13	Q Let's talk just a minute about eminent
14	domain, as you discuss it in your testimony, refers to
15	taking of real property, correct?
16	A Correct.
17	Q But it is also true, is it not, that the
18	government has eminent domain power to take
19	intellectual property?
20	A Yes, that's true. There's a statutory
21	provision that confirms this authority.
22	Q And that's 28 USC Section 1498, correct?

1	A Right.
2	Q And Section 1498 essentially says that the
3	government has eminent domain authority to use patents
4	and copyrights, correct?
5	A That's true.
6	Q And it's true, is it not, that when the
7	government exercises that authority, that the patent
8	holder or copyright owner, as the case may be, is
9	entitled to reasonable and entire compensation under
10	Section 1498?
11	A That's true.
12	Q And it's also true, is it not, that under
13	Section 1498 in determining reasonable and entire
14	compensation courts apply the Georgia Pacific test?
15	A They do, but when they do so they
16	frequently recognize that they're applying a set of
17	criteria developed in a different context, and they
18	have to be applied in a different spirit. So, for
19	example, you will find in cases in this subcategory
20	you've identified statements like the following: This
21	is a case that's best analogized to the exercise of
22	the eminent domain power in relation to real property.

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And so we should keep in mind when surveying and applying the Georgia Pacific standards that our goal here is to balance two competing purposes and then they recur to the competing purposes I've identified earlier, namely ensure that the patentee is not deprived of value of his invention but simultaneously to ensure that the public is not injured.

And in fact some of these cases, at least one I can recall, say explicitly, "The Georgia Pacific factors don't really apply here in their proper form."

Then it goes on to review them in their, as I say, modified spirit. The most recent of these, I can't remember the case name now, but it was a 1999 federal claims decision.

So the bottom line is, yes, Georgia Pacific standards are applied when the federal government exercises authority to acquire typically a non-exclusive license and a patent. But when those criteria are applied in this special context, they are typically done so in a manner that deviates subtly from their application in the more typical situation

of patent damages. 1 2 0 Do you think these cases under 3 Georgia Pacific might be particularly applying relevant in this case here? 4 I think they are more relevant than the 5 Α general body of Georgia Pacific cases for just the 6 reasons that you seem to be suggesting in your line of 7 8 questioning, namely that these do not implicate a 9 punitive spirit or purpose as do the more general body 10 of Georgia Pacific cases. 11 Your thought was, as I understand your 12 testimony, that Congress probably had in mind adopting 13 the willing buyer/willing seller test eminent domain 14 law, right? 15 That's put it a little too strongly. 16 There's no indication, as far as I've been able to 17 find, in either the statute or its legislatively 18 history, that Congress was making reference to any 19 analogous field. My suggestion in my testimony and 20 here is that to the extent that the congressmen, most of them lawyers, had anything in mind when they saw 21

the words, "willing buyer/willing seller," it would

1	have been eminent domain law rather than Georgia
2	Pacific criteria.
3	Q Spoken as a true property professor. When
4	Orrin Hatch introduced the DMCA and the willing
5	buyer/willing seller test, what he was thinking about
6	was eminent domain of real property and not Georgia
7	Pacific.
8	MR. RICH: Object to the form to the
9	extent that purports to characterize the prior answer.
10	MR. GARRETT: I don't object. I don't even
11	need an answer, actually.
12	BY MR. GARRETT:
13	Q I think the only thing that I wanted to
14	get back to is that I promised I just want to do
15	we have those Australia exhibits?
16	PARTICIPANT: Yes. Yes, we do.
17	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Get Ms. Schaeffer
18	back in here to talk about Australia.
19	MR. GARRETT: I'm going to hand out a
20	document that I've marked as 113 RPX.
21	(Whereupon, the above-referred
22	to document was marked as RIAA
ŀ	

1	Exhibit No. 113 RPX for
2	identification.)
3	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Thank you.
4	BY MR. GARRETT:
5	Q I'm going to give you a moment, if you
6	want to look at any aspect of that decision. That is
7	the decision that you reference in your testimony?
8	A It is, yes. Maybe as we go through this
9	if we do it in much detail, it will take me a little
10	bit of time, because the version I have is not the
11	online version. It's a xerox of the relevant so
12	the pagination's going to be a little different, but
13	we can manage.
14	Q I'm sorry, I forgot that you had your own
15	copy. I think you had said in your testimony that in
16	setting actually, also let me just make clear, all
17	of the countries that you studied, you were studying
18	only the sound recording and musical work rates for
19	conventional over-the-air radio, correct?
20	A Correct.
21	Q You haven't come across any information
22	here about the difference between sound recording

rates, musical work rates in the digital environment. 1 did 2 Α Well, yes, Ι come across such information. I didn't attempt to catalog it, because 3 it seemed to be not relevant here, but, for example, 4 there's an initiative now in Germany to redefine the 5 6 relevant rates for digital release of these materials. But those -- I think it's just been introduced, the 7 8 proposition, and it's nowhere near the point of setting an actual rate. 9 10 Okay. Q 11 Α So, no, for these purposes I concentrated, 12 as did Mr. Kempton, on commercial, over-the-air radio. 13 discussion 0 Okay. But in your of 14 Australia, you talk about the Australian equivalent of CARP 15 the adopting here, Ι quess, willing buyer/willing seller test, correct? 16 17 Α Yes, that's true. Interestingly, however, it's not quite the same willing buyer/willing seller 18 test that I, for one, suggest should be applied, but 19 it is a variant of the willing buyer/willing seller 20 21 test. 22 Okay. How does it vary from the one that

1 you suggest? 2 It varies because it accepts the exercise of market power by the relevant Collecting Rights 3 Society on behalf of the sound recording copyright 4 5 owners. There's also a distinction in Australia, 6 7 is there not, that the statute imposes a cap on the 8 royalty rate that may be set for sound recordings? 9 It does, yes, at one percent of gross 10 revenues. 11 0 Okay. And so in this particular decision, 12 is it fair to say that what the Copyright Board, the 13 Australian Copyright Board was trying to do 14 determine what a willing buyer/willing seller would 15 have agreed to as a royalty rate knowing that there's 16 a one percent cap? 17 Δ That's a subtle, hard-to-answer question. It's not explicit -- the Tribunal is not explicit 18 19 about that. It seemed to me there are plausible arguments in both directions. So in favor of the 20 characterization you provided, there's the analogy to 21

I'm sure you recall that in the Swiss

Switzerland.

case there is a similar cap, actually there are two caps there. And the rate -- both rates bear a relationship to the cap, strongly suggesting that the cap itself is the functional determinant of the rate. And so if you applied that to the Australian analogy, then you would move Australia from this category to this category for the same reason.

On the other hand, in Australia, the cap is one percent, and the rate, as reported by Mr. Kempton, is 0.4 of a percent, less than half of the statutory cap. Now, without knowing any more about the inside elements of the negotiation, it seems hard to believe that the cap is the decisive circumstance if the eventual rate is less than half of the cap.

Now, as I indicate in my footnote in my testimony, the Collecting Rights Society in Australia in the public news section of its web site takes the position that the cap is, in part, responsible for the rate in question. Now, one could say, well, that's arguably a self-serving proposition in so far as they have an apparent and obvious interest in increasing the rates that they can charge. On the other hand,

1	it's entitled to some weight, and that's why I include
2	it in my materials.
3	So the ambiguity on this issue, what
4	exactly we make of the cap, is the primary reason why
5	Australia, even though it parallels in many ways the
6	United States, I didn't put here. The primary reason
7	why I didn't is because of the uncertainty, in my
8	mind, concerning just how much downward pressure this
9	cap actually exerted.
10	Q Well, putting aside the cap there for a
11	second, it's true, is it not, that the statute
12	required the Australian Copyright Board to take into
13	account the amount of protected sound recordings that
14	the broadcasters actually use?
15	A Yes. That's a separate issue, also
16	discussed in the testimony.
17	Q And the rate that they adopted was that
18	0.4, approximately, rate, correct?
19	A Correct.
20	Q And is it true, is it not, that the Board
21	also found that about 40 percent of the recordings
22	were protected 40 percent of the recordings that

the broadcasters use were protected sound recordings? 1 2 Α Yes. Do you think that the fact there were only 3 40 percent of the sound recordings used were protected 4 had some bearing on their setting the rate at 0.4 5 instead of all the way at 0.1? 6 7 It's possible. And the use of the Α 8 identical numbers would support this inference. the other hand, the statutory language, as I recall 9 it, just sets a cap on the rate. 10 It doesn't say, "Here's a maximum amount," and then discount it on the 11 12 basis of what portion of the repertoire is protected 13 and what's not. So it would seem to me would have 14 been a plausible interpretation of the combination of 15 provisions to set the rate up closer to the one percent line. 16 17 0 But one would have to really read -- I'm sorry. Go ahead, I'm sorry. 18 19 Just to repeat, I don't mean to suggest 20 here that I can extract from this puzzling combination of circumstances a decisive interpretation of what 21 22 And it is, just to repeat, went on there.

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1.	uncertainty on precisely this issue is why I didn't
2	promote Australia to a stronger case.
3	Q Okay. Is it a bit more complicated
4	situation here with Australia?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Okay. How long have I been? So I've got
7	another hour to go.
8	(Laughter.)
9	Just give me a minute.
10	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Do you have an idea of
11	expected redirect?
12	MR. RICH: I have a very precise estimate
13	at the moment.
14	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: A former colleague
15	of Professor Fisher, named Paul Freund, maybe they
16	weren't colleagues, was once arguing a case in the
17	Supreme Court and after the other side had made a
18	particular disastrous argument, he rose and said, "I'd
19	like to point out a typo on Page 14 in our brief.
20	Here it is. I have nothing further unless the court
21	has any questions." After which Justice Frankfurter
22	supposedly said, "I've heard many fine arguments in

1	this court, but that's the only perfect argument that
2	I've ever heard."
3	MR. GARRETT: Does this apply in my
4	situation?
. 5	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: I don't know, we'll
6	see.
7	(Laughter.)
8	MR. RICH: To the reference of disastrous
9	here?
10	MR. GARRETT: You make me think I better
11	ask some more questions.
12	THE WITNESS: He was a colleague,
13	actually, for a very short period of time,
14	unfortunately. He had a large office, appropriately,
15	in a very prominent location in the law school.
16	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Everything was a
17	complete mess, and he knew where every single thing
18	was in it.
19	THE WITNESS: Exactly.
20	BY MR. GARRETT:
21	Q Well, not to disappoint, thank you very
1	1

1	A Thank you.
2	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: And Mr. Rich still?
3	MR. RICH: We still have no redirect.
4	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Okay. Do members of
5	the Panel have some questions?
6	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: I have questions in
7	two areas.
8	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Let me just ask, sort
9	of looking at this, do you have an estimate?
10	(Laughter.)
11	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: I would think ten
12	minutes or less as a guess. One of the things you
13	said several times, you said again today, was one
14	objective of the DMCA was to make sure that the
15	webcasting industry flourishes, and I'd like to probe
16	that a little bit. You are aware that this is the
17	second CARP proceeding having to do with digital
18	music. There was an earlier one that dealt with the
19	subscription services, correct?
20	THE WITNESS: Correct.
21	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: And they were
22	operating under the 1995 Act, and they had to apply

the standard that appears on Page 145 of your purple 1 book, Section 801(b)(1), I guess --2 THE WITNESS: Right. 3 -- in making the 4 ARBITRATOR VON KANN: determination, which they explicitly held was not a 5 fair market standard, and the Library and D.C. circuit 6 7 affirmed, correct? Correct. And then in the 8 THE WITNESS: 9 DMCA, the Congress changed the standard, and we now, 10 this CARP, is bound by the standard on Page 47 that 11 we've looked at several times. Now, in comparing 12 those two standards, I have noted that some of the things in the earlier standard were carried over and 13 14 example, if look some weren't. For you 15 801(b)(1)(c), we have almost identical language about 16 the relative creative contributions and technological 17 contributions and capital investment and cost and risk That's all been carried over to the new 18 and so on. 19 standard. But one of the things that was not carried 20 21 over was 801(b)(1)(d) --22 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Which page?

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THE WITNESS: Page 145. Which says that,
"to minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of
the industries involved and on generally prevailing
industry practices," I would have thought that
provision is a provision that says to whoever has to
carry it out, "Protect these industries. Don't let
them get disrupted. We want these industries to
flourish and do well." For better or worse, for
wisdom or not, Congress dropped that provision in this
Section and instead substituted this fair market test.

Why should I not read that to Congress, in effect said, "This time around you've got to let the chips fall where they may. If these webcasters can pay fair market rates and flourish, terrific. If they can't, too bad. You have no obligation to specially protect them, to make sure that they flourish, to insulate them. It's a tough world out there, but we've decided, for better of worse, to remove your special protective mission that in the prior section and just marketplace determine the outcome."

I guess I'm questioning a little bit the

proposition that one of the overarching principles we're supposed to do is to, quote, as you said, "make sure that the webcasting industry flourishes." I would think you'd look at this legislative history and say, "They took that mandate out. They said replicate the marketplace and if the marketplace says this industry should flourish, it will. And if the marketplace says this is not a viable industry, it goes down the tubes, that's what happens in the great American system. Some industries survive, some don't; some flourish, some don't." You no longer have any special protective mission here. You just replicate the marketplace.

THE WITNESS: I think that if all one had by way of evidence concerning Congress' intent, that that would be a perfectly fair inference. The reason why I don't draw that inference is because there are many statements in the legislative history of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act reiterating the objective that appears in the legislative history of the Digital Performance and Sound Recordings Act. So that we have independent evidence that the relevant

committees, these are not individual congressmen, understood that that original purpose survived in the DMCA.

Now, I've been perhaps inappropriately using shorthand here, so let me try to clarify one point. The legislative history in question, which is referred to in my direct testimony, not the rebuttal testimony, doesn't emphasize just protecting and preserving the webcasting industry, like the oleomargarine industry or some comparable thing. It's rather that the goal is to foster innovation and development of superior ways of delivering music to consumers. That's what the aspiration was, and that note has been consistent throughout the '90s and near the future -- not near the future, near the present.

Now, although I understand this is not an appropriate piece of legislative history, I did provide in the introductory sections of my direct testimony a quotation from Orrin Hatch's, to refer to one of the principal players, recent statements concerning his conception of what ought to be happening in the music industry, which evinces a

continuation of this theme in patience at the absence 1 2 of development in this area and a desire that it would flourish, to repeat, not just because webcasters are 3 4 nice people and deserve a break but because it 5 advances the --ARBITRATOR VON KANN: He wants to download 6 7 his music, as I remember his statement. He's a little 8 miffed that he can't get at more of it at the moment. 9 All right. The other area is this --10 CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Could I just ask on 11 that point, is there also, looking at 801(b)(1)(d), 12 minimize any destructive impact on the structure of 13 the industries, in theory, could have been looked at 14 before as trying to ensure there were still lots of 15 little webcasters versus at this point not being 16 concerned if industry consolidation was one of the 17 impacts? 18 THE WITNESS: See, that's harder to answer 19 because it's more specific. To be honest, I would 20 have to go back to the material that I consulted in 21 relation to my direct testimony to see how precise are

the indications in the legislative history of the DMCA

on this question; meaning, if I get the question accurately, whether the expressions of enthusiasm had to do with promoting webcasting to advance the public interest or a particular conception of a decentralized webcasting industry. And that, as I say, I'd have to review the materials from a couple months ago to give you a more precise answer.

CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Thank you.

wanted to ask about is on Page 18 of your testimony, second full sentence on the page. And it says, more specifically, "To the extent the Panel has evidence showing that things have turned out differently in how the webcasters once thought they would, the Panel should of course rely upon the current data." And you then proceed in the next paragraph to talk about the Georgia Pacific line of cases.

Now, I'm going to accuse here of a little bit of inconsistency, recognizing that, as Alexander, quote, told us, "A foolish consistency is the hobgob of little minds." But earlier you told us that you think the eminent domain line is more significant

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perhaps than the Georgia Pacific. But when you go to both support that sentence, you do talk about the Georgia Pacific line of cases, and I had the following reaction, which I would like you to comment on.

In the Georgia Pacific area, the reason that it is appropriate for the courts to look at current data is they are trying, essentially, to fix damages for patent infringement that has occurred. And there's a large body of law in the damage area that says you avoid windfalls. You don't let people get double recoveries. You figure out what their actual loss is. But if it turned out that the loss didn't turn out to be as bad as we might have thought it was going to be at the moment of injury, you don't make the defendant pay a great deal more than he actually caused. So it seems to me quite reasonable that in the Georgia Pacific area you would look at current data.

We are doing something, though, different I think, and I want to press you a little on that. We are trying to set a price that parties in this marketplace, the willing buyer/willing seller, would

have agreed to for a period of time to cover the use of intellectual property. We are trying to set a royalty. And it seems to me that, in general, in the marketplace, prices don't get set at the end of the period by looking back and seeing how things turned out. You and your landlord sit down and you negotiate a price for the lease and you think your business is going to be great, you can afford the lease, and unfortunately, your business doesn't do very well.

later and say, "Well, gee, I'm sorry things haven't been so good. We'll cut the lease price in half. Or we'll cut the price for the software royalty in half. Or we'll cut the price for the bandwidth to ten percent, because your business really didn't turn out nearly as good as you thought it would be." Or you buy the stock and the company tanks or whatever.

Generally speaking, when we price things, the parties make their best calculation at the time, and that is a price, and if it turns out that things did much better than you thought, great, you've done very well, and if they didn't turn out as well, you

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don't generally retrospectively adjust prices because people's expectations weren't achieved.

So my question is, is it really -- it seems to me that in the Georgia Pacific area where are you fixing damages, you are, in essence, saying, "All right, we're sitting here in a trial, and we're trying to figure out how much damage you really suffered because of that patent infringement four years ago or six years ago. And at the time it looked like it was going to be devastating but you lucked out, it wasn't nearly as bad, so we'll --" that's a different exercise than saying what would two parties have agreed to prospectively to set a rate. I would have thought in that area you do have to make the judgment pretty much based what the parties' upon understandings and willingness were then, not to come at the end of the period and look back and say, "Boy, I'm glad I didn't agree to that rate. I'd be out of luck."

So the question, and it's a long one, is is it really accurate to look at the Georgia Pacific cases on this proposition? Aren't we really doing

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something very different than those courts are doing?

THE WITNESS: Good, hard question, and I'm going to try to respond to what seemed to be three different but plainly related themes. The first one, maybe the least important for your purposes, is am I being inconsistent in the testimony concerning whether the Georgia Pacific cases are pertinent? And my sense, which I suppose one might regard as just convenient, but actually it happens to be the way I see the field, is that they are relevant, although the eminent domain cases are, for the reasons I tried to indicate, more relevant. And that's the position I've taken in the written testimony and orally and not simply because I hope to capitalize in this particular subset.

So maybe a little bit more word on that front. Why are they relevant? Well, because they do, to return to an earlier theme, involve intellectual property, after all, and they do represent a considered effort by a sizable body of federal courts to calculate royalty rates on the basis of willing buyer/willing seller criterion. So, yes, they have

some appropriate place here. And, therefore, it seems appropriate to pay attention to all their manifestations, including this particular one.

The second issue, aren't what we're doing -- what you are doing here different? Yes. On the other hand, on one specific issue, which may be relevant to the more general question, not as different as you might have suggested. My impression is that these cases, in fact I think it was Sinclair itself, was willing to take into account subsequent information, not to reduce the rate but to increase it. And so it can't be explained on the basis of the characterization you supplied. Now, that's the second issue.

The third is, not surprisingly, highlights the relationship between this theme and the theme you emphasized earlier, which is that I keep on recurring in this written testimony and here, when confronted with difficult interpretive issues as to which there's no good guidance in the legislative history to the underlying purposes.

And so specifically, as to this issue, if

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holding webcasters to a hypothetical bargain they might have struck, if they were to have struck a bargain in the early segments of the period, had the effect of, as you suggest, driving them out of business, as might have occurred in an unregulated market, that would be, just from their standpoint, unfortunate, but regrettable from the standpoint of the purposes of the statute as a whole, which are to develop this industry rather than to select interpretations that will have the effect of closing it down.

But that argument only stands up if you are persuaded on the premise, namely that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act does indeed have as one of its aspirations the continuation of Congress' goal in the Digital Performances and Sound Recordings Act of stimulating, preserving this industry, serving the public's interest in expanded access to music while protecting the record companies against net loss.

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: When you speak about driving them out of business, you're not -- it is clear that some of the webcasters are much better --

1	are in much better financial shape at the moment than
2	others. You are not suggesting, I take it, that any
3	rate which would cause any webcaster to say, "Well, I
4	can't pay for that on top of everything else," is an
5	impermissible rate. It clearly can't be true that we
6	have to set a rate which every single entrant in the
7	field at the moment certifies that they can pay. You
8	don't support that view, I assume?
9	A No, I certainly don't support that view.
10	On the other hand, nor do I support the view that it
11	would be appropriate to pick a rate designed to drive
12	two-thirds of them out of business in order to
13	maximize the revenues of the record companies ten
14	years from now.
15	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: I'm sorry that I need
16	to ask you to pause for a moment. We have some
17	visitors who in this context are not particularly
18	welcome.
19	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
20	the record at 4:35 p.m. and went back on
21	the record at 4:36 p.m.)
22	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Yes, that last

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answer did prompt me to ask one more, and then I think I am done. And I guess this is almost a metaphysical question in a way, but there's a reference to it in your testimony. Let me see if I can find it here. Yes, on Page 16 of your testimony -- you referred a moment ago to going out of business, and here on Page 16 it says, "But a high rate imposed immediately would force many firms out of business in apparent conflict with the statutory goal of stimulating the development and application of new methods of distributing music."

And I guess this theme has been sounded a few times, and the it's reason I say metaphysical is that there are a number of webcasters who in earlier times when they felt more bullish made commitments at apparently fair market rates to pay millions of dollars for bandwidth and licenses and office space and employment and built up quite large obligations. Then the advertising market crashed, basically, and these webcasters, many of them, are getting very little revenue and having a very hard time contending with that set of expenses.

And then along comes the Panel to set this

rate, and suddenly everybody's pointing at the record companies and saying, "You're about to put us out of business. Not the \$2 million we're paying for bandwidth, not the so many million we're paying for software. You are the one that's going to put" -- and I guess that seems to be carried forward a little bit and seems to me a bit unfair to sort of say to the last guy, "But you don't get a fair market rate, because, unfortunately, times are tough." All these other guys did.

And, again, it seems to me, don't we have to sort of put that aside and say our obligation is to set a fair market rate for this particular commodity. If that's the straw that breaks the camel's back, life is tough, but it isn't the record companies that are putting you out of business anymore than it is the bandwidth suppliers or the software company or your landlord. This happens to be the fair market rate that we have to set. Why isn't that the way we have to look at it?

THE WITNESS: Given the importance of brevity here, I'll try to be crisp, but it's a hard

question to answer. So I suppose the metaphysical, more abstract response is --

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Who killed the Golden Goose or who put John out of business?

answer -- question from an economic standpoint, but one implication of it would seem clear enough, namely that the record companies should not be forced to suffer as a result of bad business decisions made in the past by individual webcasters. So just as important as the statutory purpose of cultivating this industry is the statutory purpose of assuring they don't suffer net injury. So if a rate necessary to allow short-sided webcasters remain in business dipped below the line necessary to compensate the record companies for injuries they sustain, as you say, the appropriate response is, "Tough."

Now, having said that, one more level of refinement might be appropriate here. The purpose -- this is related to Judge Gulin's question right at the beginning of this proceeding -- the purpose of the statutory criterion informed, among other things, by

the eminent domain case law, is not to deprive the record companies of fair market value for the things that are being taken arguably against their will from them. The purpose is rather to ensure that in this particular context the record companies don't enjoy the power to leverage their market position into what I would characterize as windfall profits.

Now in other areas of the Internet field, and presumably will. So interactive can webcasting, because it has very different economic functions. is an entirely different category, unconstrained by this entire apparatus. So in other areas, Congress has made the judgement, a sensible judgment, given the differences in the technology, to let the market, including its exercise of monopoly power, operate unconstrained. But in this particular context, it hasn't.

The purpose, thereby, is not, however, to return to the original analogy of the landowner in the valley, to give him nothing. The purpose is rather to say, "Yes, you get the fair market value of your land, but you don't get to extract from the government a

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premium related to the fact that the government has no place else to qo."

ARBITRATOR VON KANN: You said a moment ago if they make poor decisions. I'm not even sure we have to conclude they were poor decisions. They may have been entirely reasonable assessments, which history has proven wrong. They may have decided this stock was a very good buy at so much, and, unfortunately, it turned out not to be, even though you did all your due diligence. I mean I think there were understandings about what the advertising market would yield, and they have not, at least recently, proven out.

I'm not necessarily -- I don't think necessarily it means they failed to do a good due diligence; the world changed for various reasons, so we've heard. But it does seem to me Mr. Garrett's question to you about don't we have to take into account, to some extent, the economic conditions and the assessments and the assumptions that the parties were operating on, at least during the first period, which, to a large extent, have unfortunately not

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1	materialized.
2	It seems to me very hard to see how we can
3	ignore that that was sort of the assumptions that
4	people were making about this business, and that would
5	have influenced the kinds of prices that people would
6	have been prepared to sign on for, I would have
7	thought.
8	THE WITNESS: To which, as I recall, I
9	think my answer was, yes.
10	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Okay. All right.
11	Thank you.
12	MR. RICH: Mr. Chairman, one more brief
13	follow-up to Judge von Kann's question.
14	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. RICH:
16	Q When you testified, Professor Fisher,
17	about the statutory goal of stimulating the
18	development and application of new methods of
19	distributing music on the Internet, have you found any
20	similar analog with respect to the other kinds of
21	inputs mentioned by Judge von Kann, you know,
22	bandwidth or software, are you familiar with any

1	comparable statutory license procedure or statutory
2	imperative with respect to the pricing of those kinds
3	of goods, services or license agreements?
4	A No.
5	MR. RICH: I have no further questions.
б	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: But those are things
7	that are apparently priced, as much as we know, on the
8	marketplace in arm's length negotiations between
9	willing buyers and willing sellers, I guess. True?
10	THE WITNESS: True. And it's one of the
11	reasons why this is a special field is because this is
12	an area where there is a very substantial
13	concentration of market power in a single actor.
14	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Thank you, once again,
15	for being with us today.
16	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: Mr. Garrett has
17	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Oh, Mr. Garrett, I'm
18	sorry.
19	MR. GARRETT: I have one follow-up to
20	Judge von Kann's questions
21	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Please.
22	MR. GARRETT: on the difference in the

1	statutory standard, but it will not entail asking any
2	questions. I simply want to hand out a document that
3	we filed a set of documents that we filed at the
4	beginning of this proceeding with the Copyright
5	Office. It was actually directed against with
6	respect to Professor Jaffe's
7	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Jaffe's or Fisher?
8	MR. GARRETT: Fisher, Fisher's, excuse me,
9	I'm sorry, Professor Fisher's testimony. And it
10	ultimately resulted in a ruling from the Copyright
11	Office that it has this a complete set of both the
12	our filings and the other side's filings on the
13	Copyright Office order talking about the differences
14	in the statutory standards.
15	MR. STEINTHAL: Wasn't this part of the
16	record previously?
17	MR. GARRETT: I don't believe we've handed
18	this out before. It is part of the record. It was
19	part of the record that was developed for the
20	Copyright Office, but I don't believe we've
21	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: We've got it. I
22	think we've seen this at some point.

1	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: In that event, we once
2	again thank you for making the trip. We wish you a
3	safe journey back with thanks for the information
4	you've brought us.
5	ARBITRATOR GULIN: Mr. Garrett, did you
6	intend to offer this one
7	MR. GARRETT: Oh, yes. I ask the Panel to
8	take official notice. Actually, it's cited in
9	Professor Fisher's testimony too.
10	ARBITRATOR VON KANN: The Australian
11	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Just that article? No
12	objections?
13	MR. GARRETT: The Australian decision?
14	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Yes. Admitted as RIAA
15	Exhibit Number 113 RPX.
16	(Whereupon, the document, RIAA
17	Exhibit No. 113 RPX, was
18	admitted into evidence.)
19	CHAIRMAN VAN LOON: Let's reconvene then
20	at five past five.
21	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
22	the record at 4:46 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript in

Hearing: Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral the matter of:

Recording,

Docket No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA 1 & 2

Before: Library of Congress

Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel

Date: October 17, 2001

Place: Washington, DC

represents the full and complete proceedings of the aforementioned matter, as reported and reduced to typewriting.